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This thesis asks how states form and justify policy as guardian of children’s right to 
protection from harm balanced against the rights and responsibilities of parents. To 
answer this, I have examined how Norway and the United States – two countries with 
very different welfare regimes and child welfare orientations – have formed and 
justified their policy on public responsibility for children in long-term care.  
By comparing how child protection policy is formed in the two countries we get a 
clearer image of how different ideas influence and shape the role of the state as a 
guardian for children and how this affects the boundaries between public and family 
responsibility in child protection. The thesis examines child protection policy as a 
result of both political processes in national legislatures, and as processes at the 
street-level where child protection workers form de facto policy when they make 
decisions based on discretionary reasoning.  
The empirical focus is on policy for children who cannot be reunified with their 
families of origin, and who will either grow up in foster care or exit through adoption. 
Adoption is controversial child protection measure in many countries, because it 
severs legal ties between birth parents and child. However, from the child’s 
perspective it may offer closer integration with his or her de facto family, and 
research shows that children adopted from care have better transitions to adult life 
compared to those that grow up in foster care. 
Article I examines how the U.S. Congress came to consider adoption the placement 
of choice when children cannot be reunified with their birth parents. It examines the 
legislative process that resulted in the “Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997” 
(ASFA). By analysing congressional hearings, the article provides new insights to 
understand how adoption is justified in the United States. The article uses a discourse 
theoretical framework that distinguishes pragmatic, ethical–political, moral, and legal 
arguments. It argues that U.S. federal adoption policy is based on three pillars. 
Pragmatic risk-oriented thinking forms the central knowledge base to inform policy. 
Parent responsibility ethics stresses individual responsibility for rehabilitation. Child 
 5 
refamilialization ethics emphasizes decisive and authoritative action to protect the 
child's needs for safety and permanence. 
Article II examines how Norway turned to a more active policy on adoption from 
care. It examines public records from four occasions when the government and 
Storting (The Norwegian parliament) debated adoption from care, over the period 
2002-2013. The analysis is built on the same discourse theoretical framework as 
Article I to enable comparison. The findings show that a more active adoption policy 
is justified by strengthening of child-cantered perspectives. First, research and expert 
discourse gained influence in the framing of adoption policy over time. Second, the 
ethical response to this knowledge base has been to shift attention from shared family 
needs to the child’s individual and developmental needs. There signs that legislators 
view adoption in relation to children as independent legal subjects with rights. 
Article III, examines how a sample of 299 child protection workers from Norway, 
England and California (U.S.) consider the question of adoption in relation to a 
vignette about a three-year-old boy. Findings show that a majority of the respondents 
suggest adoption. However, while the English and Californians were close to uniform 
in their recommendation for adoption, Norwegians were split between 60% favouring 
adoption and 40% recommending continued foster care. This split among Norwegian 
child protection workers reflected different normative considerations about parental 
consent, as well as differences in how national policy on adoption should be 
understood. 
Article IV examines how child protection workers in Norway, England and California 
(U.S.) assess risk based on a vignette that combines parent intellectual disability and 
infant neglect. Findings show that workers across all countries agree that this is a 
high-risk case. However, reasons behind the assessments vary across countries. 
Californians display a greater range and more uniform reasoning compared to the 
English and Norwegians. English and Norwegians are generally more similar, but 
differ on attention to social and environmental factors and attention to the mother’s 
cognitive functioning. I discuss these findings in relation to research on parental 
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intellectual disability, child welfare orientation and familiarity with assessment tools. 
I argue that both child welfare orientation and assessment tools are important to 
understand these differences in reasoning. 
In the discussion I chose to emphasize two especially interesting findings. First, 
Norwegian child protection workers have much stronger discretion compared to their 
Californian colleagues, which results in more policy formation happening from the 
bottom-up. While this may be intended to give practitioners greater freedom to tailor 
services to individual needs, the thesis finds that it challenges central principles of 
justice because identical cases are treated differently. Second, there reason for 
differences in official adoption policy between Norway and the United States stems 
mainly from different normative conceptions about the role of the state in long-term 
care. The U.S. Congress took a clear stance to limit public responsibility for raising 
children in foster care, favouring swift public action to refamilialize children with 
families in the private sphere. This government policy is reflected in the decisions by 
street-level practitioners, both in terms of their decisions and in their justifications. 
By contrast, in Norway the political signals from the government on when adoption 
from care is an appropriate solution to long-term care are mixed and unclear. Political 
signals to promote more adoptions have not been followed by clear suggestion about 
when adoption should be regarded in the child’s best interests. Norwegian legislators 
are telling street-level practitioners to forward more cases to adoption, but are 
unwilling to provide guidance on how to weigh central principles. The lack of clarity 
about when adoption is to be preferred over foster care is apparent in the findings that 
Norwegian child protection workers are spilt, and the resulting de facto policy from 
the ground is inconsistent. This is a serious challenge to the legitimacy of Norwegian 
child protection, as it challenges central principles in the rule of law – legal certainty 
and equality before the law. It places a heavy burden of legitimizing individual 
decisions on street-level practitioners, while the political actors are freed from 
responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
All states with an operating child protection system faces dilemmas about how best 
protect children from harm and balance this against parents’ rights to respect for 
family life. How states resolve this dilemma and how far the state can go to protect 
children differs over time and between countries. The boundary of what is acceptable 
and legitimate public intervention is drawn in political processes that involve both 
cognitive and normative ideas about the appropriate role of the state as a guardian of 
children’s rights and needs against the rights and responsibilities of parents. 
Arguably, this dilemma of striking the appropriate balance of intervention has been 
rendered more acute in later years as children’s rights have come on the agenda and 
children are increasingly seen as independent subjects with rights of their own, apart 
from the family unit. Exploring how such boundaries are drawn in different states 
gives us a clearer understanding of how states use their coercive powers, and what 
ideas direct the state’s responsibilities as guardian of children. 
The thesis asks how states form and justify policy as guardian of children’s right to 
protection from harm balanced against the rights and responsibilities of parents. 
I approach this question by exploring how child protection policy is formed in 
Norway and the United States, both in the national legislatures (top-down) and by 
child protection practitioners who form de facto policy in their daily work (bottom-
up). By comparing how child protection policy is formed in the two countries, both at 
the political and the street-level, I seek to get a clearer image of how different ideas 
influence and shape the role of the state as a guardian of children and how this affects 
the boundaries between public and private responsibility in child protection.  
Articles I (Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 2020) explore how child protection policy is 
shaped in the national legislatures of the U.S. and Norway. Here I focus on the 
arguments and discourses that the government, legislators, and policy advocates 
present during legislative processes, and how different ideas and ideals are reflected 
in final policy. Articles III (Skivenes and Tefre 2012) and IV (Tefre 2017) approach 
policy formation from the bottom-up. By focusing on the rationales provided by child 
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protection workers for their assessments and decisions in specific cases these articles 
shed light on how policy is formed by ideas at the street-level. 
All articles share a theoretical perspective rooted in the literature of ideas and 
discourse and use an argumentative approach to explore how different cognitive and 
normative ideas shape the way child protection policy is formed. Child protection as a 
field is steeped in cultural values and norms that concern how we view families and 
the appropriate relationship between the public and the private. If we are to 
understand and explain the construction of different countries’ child protection 
systems and their institutional arrangements we must understand the ideas that 
underpin them, and their role in how the systems evolve. Exploring the arguments 
that governments, legislators and child protection workers present to justify their 
decisions provides a window to study the ideas that support child protection systems, 
and what is seen as legitimate state intervention in different contexts. 
The main empirical focus of the thesis is policy on adoption from care, and how and 
when adoption from care is considered an appropriate intervention by legislators and 
practitioners. In many countries, adoption remains a controversial form of child 
protection intervention. It involves the permanent termination of parental rights and 
the transfer of parental rights to new adoptive parents. Often the termination of 
parental rights is made without parental consent. In cases of involuntary termination 
of parental rights and adoption the state actively seeks to create new legal families to 
improve the life of children. From a parental perspective, adoption without their 
consent is perhaps the most intrusive public intervention possible. At the same time, 
the research literature is clear that for children who cannot return to their birth 
families, their expected life outcomes across a range of variables is much better for 
adopted children compared to children who grow up in long-term foster care 
(Bohman and Sigvardsson 1980; Christoffersen et al. 2007; Hjern, Palacios, and 
Vinnerljung 2018; Hjern, Vinnerljung, and Brännström 2019; Palacios et al. 2019; 
Triseliotis 2002; Vinnerljung and Hjern 2011). This makes adoption a good lens 
through which to examine the boundaries of legitimate state intervention. Three of 
the four articles focus on adoption from care explicitly. While the fourth article 
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focuses on risk assessments and does not consider adoption it joins the other articles 
in examining practitioner’s reasoning of a case associated with high likelihood of 
resulting in long-term care. In this introduction I will draw on all four articles to 
discuss how a focus on policy formation of adoption and long-term care for children 
can shed light on the state’s role as guardian of children in Norway and the United 
States. 
1.1 Adoption in Child Protection 
Adoption in child protection is a difficult area because it is such an invasive measure, 
severing all legal ties between a child and his or her birth parents, but at the same 
time holds the potential to benefit children who cannot return to their birth families in 
ways that other child protections measures cannot. To explain this, I give a brief 
overview of the research on adoption as a child protection measure. 
Children’s need for a stable environment and attachment to loving caregivers for a 
healthy development has long been recognized in research across several disciplines. 
Equally well documented are the detrimental effects of abuse and neglect, 
discontinuity in care, and disrupted attachment to caregivers that come with moving 
between different placements (Palacios et al. 2019). While all children are vulnerable 
to disruptions in care, children who have experienced early life adversity through 
abuse or neglect are especially vulnerable to further disruptions in care. For these 
children continued instability in foster care or residential placements are linked with 
negative consequences in growth, behavioural adjustment, mental health, educational 
achievement, and social integration (Palacios et al. 2019). Children growing up in the 
foster care system have significantly heightened risk of experiencing difficulties in 
their transition to adult life (Backe-Hansen et al. 2014; Clausen and Kristofersen 
2008). The foster care literature shows that placement instability is a considerable 
problem in all countries (Angel and Blekesaune 2015; Christiansen, Havik, and 
Anderssen 2010; House CWM 1996a; Konijn et al. 2019; Oosterman et al. 2007; 
Selwyn and Quinton 2004, 2004; Stott and Gustavsson 2010), with many children 
experiencing multiple foster home placements over their childhood. Overall adoption 
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has proven to be a remarkably stable placement, while breakdowns do occasionally 
happen, their prevalence is far below that of foster care (Coakley and Berrick 2008; 
Palacios et al. 2018; Wijedasa and Selwyn 2017). Both adopted children and children 
growing up in foster care are more likely than the average population to face 
challenges in their adolescence and transition to adulthood as a result of adverse life 
experiences (Backe-Hansen et al. 2014; Palacios et al. 2019; Vinnerljung and Hjern 
2011). However, outcome studies comparing long-term placement in foster care and 
adoption find with few exceptions that children who are adopted have better life 
outcomes compared to those growing up in foster care. This applies to a range of 
variables, including: health, mental health, disability, criminality, educational level, 
risk of suicide, income level, and labour marked participation (Bohman and 
Sigvardsson 1980; Christoffersen 2012; Christoffersen et al. 2007; Hjern et al. 2018, 
2019; Lloyd and Barth 2011; Palacios et al. 2019; Quinton and Selwyn 2009; Selwyn 
and Quinton 2004; Triseliotis 2002; Triseliotis and Hill 1990; Triseliotis, Shireman, 
and Hundleby 1997; Vinnerljung and Hjern 2011). The observed benefits of adoption 
over foster care are usually attributed to the stability and security that both children 
and their adoptive parents experience with adoption, which is key to recovery from 
past adversity (Hjern et al. 2019). Studies have found that adopted children often feel 
secure in their family, and felt that they had a ‘family for life’, while many foster 
children were well aware that connection to the foster family can be terminated at 
will by the foster parents or child protection services (Triseliotis 2002; Triseliotis and 
Hill 1990).  
The well-known risks to children associated with placement instability and the firmly 
established knowledge that children need stable attachment to caregivers have led 
most countries to move child protection policies in the direction of establishing some 
form for permanence for the children that promotes continuity and stability. The 
focus on permanence is not new (Bartholet 1999; Fein and Maluccio 1992), but 
securing permanence for children is still a major challenge in all countries where 
there has been research (Palacios et al. 2019). Permanence can mean different things, 
and we can broadly separate between legal permanence, residential permanence, and 
relational permanence (Brodzinsky and Smith 2019). Legal permanence establishes a 
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life-long legal tie between child and caregiver that affirms the authority and 
responsibility of the child’s caregivers to make all relevant decisions and to take all 
appropriate actions in raising the child. Ideally this responsibility rests with the 
child’s birth parents, but when this is not possible it may be given to adoptive parents. 
An important implication of legal permanence is that the state relinquishes its 
guardianship and custody of the child, and withdraws from its daily involvement in 
the child’s life. Residential permanence refers to placement stability, and concerns 
continuity of provided care in a designated home. Relational permanence refers to 
maintenance of the child’s connections to significant attachment figures. This 
includes close primary attachments of a child to caregiver(s), reciprocal caregiver 
bonding for a lifelong commitment, and each person having a sense of belonging to 
each other (seeing themselves as a family) (Brodzinsky and Smith 2019:185; Palacios 
et al. 2019:62). Some studies have questioned whether it is relational permanence 
rather than legal or residential permanence that explains positive child outcomes 
(Biehal et al. 2010; McSherry, Malet, and Weatherall 2016), but for children who 
cannot return to their biological families adoption is the only placement alternative 
that can provide the child with all three types of permanence. 
Despite the evidence that adoption can offer substantial benefits over long-term foster 
care to children who cannot return to their birth families, adoption remains 
controversial in many countries (Berrick, Gilbert, and Skivenes in press c; Gilbert, 
Parton, and Skivenes 2011). The U.S. has adoption and permanency planning as a 
guiding principle, with a clear aim of minimizing the number of children who grow 
up in non-kinship foster care (Tefre 2015). The UK also has a strong focus on 
permanency planning and have actively sought to increase their use of adoptions from 
care in law and practice (Skivenes and Thoburn 2016). The Nordic countries have 
been considerably more restrained in their view of adoption. Finland and Sweden do 
not permit adoption without parental consent, (Skivenes and Thoburn 2017; 
Vinnerljung and Hjern 2011), whereas Norway and Denmark allow adoption without 
parental consent, but it is still rarely practiced (Helland and Skivenes 2019; 
Socialstyrelsen 2015). A central question for this thesis is to shed light on how and 
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why two high income, advanced states, Norway and the United States have taken 
such different approaches to adoption from care.  
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2. Child Protection Orientations 
Child protection systems can be defined as: 
the systems designed to protect the rights of children … from abuse, neglect, 
and maltreatment when parents or family are not able to care for their 
children or they are a direct or indirect threat to their children’s well-being… 
[Including] the legal authority and responsibility of states that prevails when 
parents do not, or cannot exercise their parental responsibilities (Berrick, 
Gilbert, and Skivenes in press b) 
In 1997 Neil Gilbert led a research project comparing child protection systems in nine 
countries, resulting in a categorization of two distinct orientations to child protection, 
a more narrow ‘child protection’ orientation (to avoid confusion I will call this 
approach risk-orientation), and a broader ‘family service’ orientation (Gilbert 1997). 
The two orientations differed on four components; first, the way in which the 
problem of child abuse was framed. Risk-oriented systems emphasize abuse as an act 
that demands the protection of children from harm by ‘degenerate relatives’. Whereas 
family service orientations conceive abuse as a problem of family conflict or 
dysfunction, arising from social and psychological difficulties that can be remedied 
by help and support. Second, risk-oriented systems respond by investigating deviance 
in a highly legalistic way, while family service systems respond in a service oriented, 
often therapeutic way to family needs, with an initial focus on assessment of needs. 
Third, the social workers in risk-oriented systems function in a highly adversarial 
way, while family service workers work in a spirit of partnership, particularly with 
the parents. Fourth, while family-service oriented countries displayed a high rate of 
voluntary out-of-home placements, the majority of such placements in the risk-
oriented countries were usually the result of court orders. The countries could be 
clustered into three groups. The risk-oriented countries consisted of the Anglo-
American countries, while the family service countries were divided into those that 
operated with mandatory reporting – the Nordic countries – and those without 
mandatory reporting – The Continental European Countries (Gilbert 1997:232–33). 
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This clustering also overlaps with the welfare regime clusters of (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 1999). 
In Child Protection Systems (Gilbert et al. 2011) the same countries are revisited 
(with the addition of Norway) in order to investigate developments since the mid-90s. 
The conclusion was that much had changed, and that the dichotomy of service 
orientations no longer offered an adequate representation. All countries, to varying 
extent, had adopted elements associated with the competing orientation. However, 
and importantly, the authors identified the emergence of a third and alternative ‘child-
focused orientation’. The characteristics of the child-focused orientation borrows 
from both the risk- and family service orientations but is further shaped by two 
somewhat contrasting lines of influence. On the one hand it is influenced by ideas 
from ‘the social investment state’, on the other it is influenced by ideas stressing the 
importance of ‘individualization’. The term ‘social investment state’ was coined by 
Giddens (1998), and in relation to children it takes the view that investment in 
children has strategic significance for states who wish to equip its citizens to respond 
and adapt to global economic change, to enhance individual and national 
competitiveness. As such, ensuring that all children maximize their developmental 
opportunities becomes a matter of priority for social and economic policy. This is a 
future oriented approach that considers childhood a preparation for adulthood, such 
that investment in children now is designed to ensure that they will later become 
productive and law-abiding citizens (Gilbert et al. 2011:253). 
In contrast to this is the rationale and origins of policies and practices that perceive 
children as individuals here and now, and autonomous bearers of rights of their own. 
These policies are concerned with the quality of childhood itself, and focusing on the 
rights of all children to be treated with respect and provided a loving upbringing. In 
this perspective children are seen less as future workers, but rather as current citizens. 
This is reflected in the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UN General Assembly 1989 (UNCRC)), by all countries mentioned with the 
exception of the United States.  It is argued that this reasoning is particularly evident 
in national legislation that provides children a right to participate and have a say in 
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matters that concern their lives. However, such rights also have a strong standing in 
the U.S. even though it has not ratified the UNCRC (Gilbert et al. 2011:254). 
This tension within the child-focused orientation means that different countries will 
likely place different weight on its components in its policies and practices. However, 
the central point is that a child-focused orientation means that the state takes a greater 
role compared to the other two orientations, as the orientation puts children’s rights 
above parental rights and emphasizes parental responsibilities and obligations. The 
suggestion is that these orientations do not form distinct models, but rather than 
trying to place them along a continuum, countries’ child protection orientation may 
be understood in relation to where they may fall within a three-dimensional 
framework – closer to some planes than others (Gilbert et al. 2011:256).  The 
framework calls attention to the fact that how child protection systems respond to 
maltreatment are primarily dependent on how the systems strike the balance between 
rights and responsibilities and the nature of the relationships among children, parents 
and the state. 
2.1 Comparing Norway and the United States 
Child protection in Norway (family-service-oriented) and the U.S. (risk-oriented) 
takes very different forms. Articles III (Skivenes and Tefre 2012) and IV (Tefre 
2017), place and explain how the countries fit within the framework and uses it to 
form expectation and as a baseline for interpreting the results of the analysis.  
There are also more general characteristics of political decision-making in the two 
countries; Norway is a unitary, parliamentary, consensus oriented, multi-party 
system, with an advanced welfare state. The U.S. is a federal, presidential, 
adversarial, two-party system, with a residual welfare state (Christensen and Peters 
1999). There are also important differences in the formal allocation of responsibility, 
and procedures for producing and approving legislation in the two countries. In 
Norway, legislative bills are normally drafted by the government and sent to 
consultative bodies in a hearing, with a deadline for response. The government may 
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then revise its bill proposal after the public hearings, before presenting it to the 
Storting where it is debated in the relevant committees and in plenary sessions. In the 
U.S. Congress, bills are drafted and introduced by members of Congress, although the 
executive branch may participate it does not have the same role as the Norwegian 
government in preparing and presenting the bill. Importantly any bill must be 
approved by both chambers of Congress. Hearings also differ, in that these are 
organized as in-person events arranged by Congressional committees during the 
legislative process. In both countries witnesses or consultative bodies are invited to 
participate in hearings (whether orally or written), but any citizen or organization is 
free to submit a response to public hearings.  
The cultural context in the two countries is different; the U.S. has a heterogeneous 
population, with vast racial, religious, and socioeconomic differences, characterized 
also by a highly individualized culture, and low generalized trust in government, 
particularly in the legislative branch of congress. Norway on the other hand, which 
despite increased immigration still has a more homogenous population and less social 
stratification, with differences primarily being of a socioeconomic type, and 
characterized by an egalitarian culture, and with high generalized trust in government 
(Christensen and Peters 1999). These are factors that may impact on what are viable 
political solutions to any given problem. This is also reflected in the overarching 
welfare regime types of Norway (social-democratic) and the United States (liberal) 
(Arts and Gelissen 2002, 2010; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Ferragina and Seeleib-
Kaiser 2011). In a review on the regime-type literature Norway and the United States 
are placed as polar opposites on a classification continuum, with Norway (along with 
Denmark and Sweden) representing a ‘pure’ social democratic welfare regime and 
the U.S. as the only representative of a ‘pure’ liberal welfare regime (Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). According to this literature Norway is characterized by a high 
level of de-commodification, low level of social stratification, and a high level of de-
familialization. In the U.S. on the other hand, public welfare is residual with a low 
level of de-commodification and targeted services for the poor. This leads to high 
social stratification, separating between those that can and those that cannot 
participate in the welfare market. There is also a low degree of de-familialization, as 
 20
care arrangements are subject to the market. The welfare arrangements of the 
countries also affect foster families in the two countries, where Norwegian foster 
parents have access to a much wider network of public support and services to help in 
caring for their child, and U.S. foster parents are left more on their own in caring for 
their child (cf. Berrick and Skivenes 2013). 
The countries’ traditional orientations to child protection and the wider welfare 
arrangements are clearly different. Norway, a social-democratic welfare state with a 
family-service oriented child protection system and the U.S. a liberal welfare state 
with a risk-oriented child protection system. Norway and the U.S. can be seen as two 
extremes along some dimensions. Norwegian child protection represents a broad 
approach to public responsibility for children. Based on the principle of the child’s 
best interests, the state takes on a role of protecting children’s well-being within a 
developmental frame, and directing support toward children’s needs (Berrick, Gilbert, 
and Skivenes in press a). The U.S. has a much narrower range of public responsibility 
for child protection, and is mainly concerned with children’s safety and protecting 
children from harm by family members. The state generally restricts intervention to 
preventing serious harm, with a strong family ideology and high thresholds for 
restricting parental freedom (Berrick et al. in press a). It is precisely these differences 
that make the countries interesting in a comparative sense. Because comparing the 
two countries was expected to yield very different answers and justifications to the 
question of what the appropriate range and mode of state responsibility in child 
welfare should be. The focus on normative and cognitive ideas that underpin policy 
formation sheds new light on how states with very different orientations legitimize 
their responsibility for children in long-term care. 
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3. Top-down and Bottom-up policy formation 
This thesis asks how states form and justify policy that sets boundaries of legitimate 
public intervention in the private family sphere to protect children from harm. It 
approaches this research question by examining how policy is formed and justified to 
come to legitimate decisions both at the political level and the street-level. At both 
levels I use an argumentative approach to examine the reasoning that actors use to 
justify legitimate decisions. 
Public policies are instruments of political will to exercise control and shape the 
world (Goodin, Rein, and Moran 2006). A public policy can be defined as a “course 
of action (or non-action) taken by a government or legislature with regard to a 
particular issue” (Knill and Tosun 2012:4). This definition emphasizes public policies 
as actions of public actors, and that the actions are focused on a specific issue and 
restricted to addressing a certain problem (or aspect of it). 
I focus on the arguments of governments, politicians and practitioners who shape 
child protection policy through their actions, either through legislation or policy 
decisions (top-down), or through their decision-making with individual children and 
their families at the street-level (bottom-up). The arguments presented by these actors 
for their decisions provide a window to understanding the ideas, both cognitive and 
normative, that shape the final policy outcome. 
My primary interest is in shedding light on the ideational and discursive elements that 
shape and justify child protection policy in different national contexts, and serve as 
legitimation for division of public and private responsibility for children. However, I 
also recognize the importance of institutions on policy formation both at the political 
level and by street level bureaucrats. In this section I will explain in more depth the 
theoretical assumptions that underlie the thesis. 
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3.1 Policy study through Arguments, Ideas and Discourse 
Behind every policy issue lurks a contest over conflicting, though equally 
plausible, conceptions of the same abstract goal or value. The abstractions are 
aspirations for a community, into which people read contradictory 
interpretations. It may not be possible to get everyone to agree on the same 
interpretation, but the first task of the political analyst is to reveal and clarify 
the underlying value disputes so that people can see where they differ and move 
toward some reconciliation (Stone 2012:14) 
I approach the problem of policy formation by examining arguments for policy 
proposals as they are expressed by participants in the processes themselves, as they 
engage in discourse to convince others of the validity of their claims. Through an 
analysis of the discourse and argumentation I seek to shed light on the ideational 
underpinnings that shape and legitimize child protection policy in Norway and the 
United States. This approach locates itself within a still growing literature on policy 
studies that take ideas, discourse and argumentation as important influence on policy 
formation (Béland and Cox 2011; Blyth 2002; Campbell 2002; Campbell and 
Pedersen 2015; Daigneault 2014; Ervik, Kildal, and Nilssen 2009; Fischer and 
Forester 1993; Fischer and Gottweis 2012; Goodin et al. 2006; Goodin and Tilly 2006 
Part IV; Kildal and Kuhnle 2005; Kingdon 2011 [1984]; Majone 1989; Parsons 2007; 
Schmidt 2002, 2008, 2010, 2017; Stone 2012). Importantly, this literature takes ideas 
and discourse as a distinct logic of explanation alongside structural, institutional and 
psychological logics of explanation (Parsons 2007).  
The policy literature focused on ideas and discourse has gone under different names, 
such as deliberative, argumentative, discursive, or ideational turn in policy research, 
and includes a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches, but all share 
the recognition that ‘public policy, constructed through language, is the product of 
argumentation. Accordingly, they see policy making fundamentally as ‘an ongoing 
discursive struggle over definition and conceptual framing of problems, the public 
understanding of the issues, the shared meanings that motivate policy responses, and 
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criteria for evaluation’ (Fischer and Gottweis 2012:7). I place the theoretical 
approach of this thesis within this wider policy literature that focuses on ideas as they 
are expressed in arguments and discourse. This means a focus on actors’ 
representation of substantive ideas, the discursive interactions through which actors 
generate and communicate ideas, within given institutional settings (Schmidt 
2008:306). 
I define ideas as “claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the 
normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons 2002:48). The substantive content 
of ideas have both a cognitive component – beliefs about descriptions of the world 
and causal relationships – and a normative component – beliefs about norms, values, 
rights, concepts of justice and fairness (Campbell 2002). Ideas are analytically 
distinct from the material world, but give meaning to it and thus participate in 
constructing the world and how actors make sense of their material, social and 
political environment (Béland 2010:148). Moreover, ideas are dynamic, they do not 
only establish how actors understand the world, but enable them to reconceptualise 
the world and thus promote change (Schmidt 2011). This also means that ideas 
constitute interests, and that interests cannot exist independently of ideas. As such all 
interests are subjective (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006, 2011). Both material reality and 
interest-based behaviour clearly exist. This should not be conflated with the idea that 
actors have objective material interests externally given by their relative position to 
material reality, and which are something other than their perceived subjective 
interests. Rather, material reality is part of the setting in which actors conceive of 
their interests (Schmidt 2008:318). This in no way denies that perceived interests can 
be and often are powerful drivers in policy formation. However, it highlights the 
importance of ideas as constitutive of understanding and explaining social action. 
March and Olsen (2006:3) define an institution as “a relatively enduring collection of 
rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that 
are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient 
to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances”.  The importance of institutions on action has long been 
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recognized by the political sciences, although different analytical approaches have 
considered the causal effects of institutions in different ways (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
March and Olsen 2006; Sanders 2006; Shepsle 2006). A general characteristic of the 
institutional literature is that institutions function to constrain action or enable action 
to take certain forms. Very briefly, rational choice institutionalists consider 
institutions as more or less stable conditions external to the actors that they must 
account for in making strategic choices to reach their goals, and for example how 
institutional design affects moral hazard in principal-agent theory. Historical 
institutionalists have focused on the lock-in effects of policy choices at critical 
junctures and how they can establish path dependencies that constrain later policy 
choice. Sociological institutionalists have focused on how institutional arrangements 
affect actors’ perceptions of normatively acceptable behaviour following a logic of 
appropriateness. While all of these approaches continue to produce important 
empirical and theoretical insight to how policy develops, their focus on how 
institutions (once established) mainly constrain actors to various types of rule-
following behaviour (whether through a logic of consequence, path dependence or 
appropriateness) means that they leave less room for agency when it comes to 
explaining institutional change (Béland 2005; Blyth 2002; Hay 2006; Schmidt 2010). 
While much institutional theory is concerned with how institutions shape, constrain 
or motivate the actions of actors, I am interested in how actors – both within and 
outside institutions – act to support, criticise, uphold or change institutions through 
cognitive and normative ideas that are carried and communicated in discourse. This 
means taking institutions simultaneously as given (the context in which actors think, 
speak, and act) and as contingent (the result of actors’ thoughts, words, and actions). 
Thus, institutions are understood as internal to actors, serving both as structures that 
constrain agency and constructs created by and changed through agency (Schmidt 
2008:314). While institutional theory generally accepts this premise that institutions 
were at least at some point constructs of human agency, they generally focus on their 
function as structuring actors’ behaviour in one way or another. A focus on discourse 
offers a complementing approach to the three other forms of institutional analysis by 
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shedding light on how ideas and discursive interaction between actors can affect 
institutional and policy change, as I show in articles I (Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 
2020). 
Institutions are maintained through actors’ ‘background ideational abilities’ which 
enable them to make sense in a given meaning context in terms of the rationality of a 
given discursive institutional setting (Schmidt 2011:55). This can be likened to 
Habermas’ (1987) notion of the lifeworld  as a background reservoir of shared, and 
commonly taken-for-granted, meanings and history that shape our personalities and 
group identities, and which help actors interpret in daily life. Actors can draw upon 
common interpretations of the situation through already established and shared 
understandings in the lifeworld (Habermas 1999). Similarly, the concept of 
‘institutional facts’ concerns things which only exist through collective agreement 
about their status as institutions (Searle 2006). As with the lifeworld such institutional 
facts (such as money, contracts, family, or nation-states etc.) are taken for granted 
and internalized as people grow up surrounded by them. In this view institutions are 
stable carriers of ideas. However, elements of the lifeworld or institutional facts can 
be subjected to critical examination and re-evaluation through discourse, so that 
meanings established in the lifeworld can be changed gradually (Habermas 
1987:124). 
Collective political action always involve processes of articulation, argumentation, 
discussion, deliberation, bargaining and legitimization for proposed action (Goodin et 
al. 2006). What Schmidt (2008) calls actors’ ‘foreground discursive abilities’ 
corresponds to Habermas’ notion of communicative action (1984). 
Communicative action is oriented towards reaching understanding between 
participating actors, it locates the concept or rationality in the human capacity to 
establish intersubjectively shared meaning. Human communication is a medium with 
a rationally binding character, as it contains the capacity to function in an action-
coordinating manner, meaning that an actor’s actions will depend on how he 
evaluates the statements of other actors. Conveying ideas through discourse requires 
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intersubjective valid reasons to convince others of their acceptability and legitimacy. 
Both cognitive and normative ideas require justification to be recognized as 
legitimate. In this regard Habermas (1984:85–94) separates between constative, 
regulative, and expressive speech acts. Constative speech acts refer to cognitive ideas 
about the objective world. Actors must be able to provide valid reasons for the truth 
of their claim, i.e. that the claim is true in relations to empirical facts and 
circumstances. Regulative speech acts refer normative ideas about the world of 
intersubjective relations. Actors must be able to provide valid reasons for the 
rightness of their claim, i.e. that the claim is right in relations to the existing 
normative context. Expressive speech acts refer to states in the subjective world. 
Actors must be able to provide valid reasons to support that he is truthful, i.e. that his 
manifest intention is meant as it is expressed (Habermas 1984:99, 325–26). While 
norms are not true or false in the literal sense that claims to fact are, they are referred 
to by Habermas as ‘truth analogue qualities’ (Eriksen and Weigård 2003:54). The 
demand that actors provide valid reasons for normative rightness ideally means that 
“moral conflicts of interaction can be settled with reasons in light of intersubjectively 
recognized normative behavioural expectations” (Habermas 2003:241), making it 
possible not only to evaluate the validity of descriptive and causal truth claims but 
also the validity of normative rightness claims (Kalleberg 2009:254). The crucial 
point for current purposes is that through the requirement of actors to provide valid 
reasons for their claims Habermas theory provides standards for evaluation of social 
norms and normative problems. 
A focus on discourse offers a way to study how institutional change can originate 
within institutions. By engaging each other in discourse actors can think outside of 
the institutions they inhabit and within which they act, to critique and deliberate about 
these institutions and seek to persuade others on action to change them (Schmidt 
2011). Further, the discursive level of communication between political actors is 
where we can empirically observe how ideas are expressed, spread and, changed over 
time within institutions and between different institutional settings. Times when 
institutions and policies change (whether radical or incremental) are objects of focus 
 27 
to be studied through ideas and discourse, explaining it by reference to what actors 
themselves think and say that leads to change. 
We can separate policy discourses analytically between two communicative spheres 
that have different roles in the formation and legitimization of policy (Schmidt 2008). 
In the policy sphere actors engage in ‘coordinative discourses’ about construction of 
policy ideas. Participants include individuals and groups who are central to the 
creation, elaboration and justification of policy – including civil servants, government 
officials, legislators, experts, interest groups and activists. These processes are akin to 
the activity described by Kingdon’s (2011) policy stream. 
In the political sphere actors engage in ‘communicative discourse’ (Schmidt 2008) 
which includes the wide range of political actors who bring ideas developed in 
coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. From the top 
these actors include government and political leaders, spokespeople, and political 
party activists who seek to persuade the public to support their policies. On the other 
hand, communicative discourses also include opposition parties, social activists and 
movements, experts, organized interests, the media, and the general voting public 
who may question and criticise policy proposals, and present policy alternatives of 
their own, and engage in policy change from the bottom-up. Thus, where policy ideas 
and proposals come from and how they combine with ideas about problems and 
politics is very much an empirical question (Béland 2016; Kingdon 2011). 
3.2 Discourse Ethics and Political Justification of Policy 
The more concrete the matter in need of regulation and the more concrete the 
character of legal propositions, the more the acceptability of norms also 
express the self-understanding of a historical form of life, the balance between 
competing group interests, and an empirically informed choice among 
alternative goals (Habermas 1996:152). 
In this thesis I focus on communicative discourses, and I am interested in how policy 
is formed and justified, and what this can tell us about the state’s responsibility for 
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children, and legitimate boundaries of public intervention. This means that I do not 
make claims about how policy proposals were shaped in coordinative discourse, but 
on how they are legitimized in communicative discourse. Institutions feature mainly 
as contextual backdrop for discourse and argumentation. In both Norway and the US 
these discourses take place within the ‘strong’ public sphere of parliament and 
Congress. I view parliamentary bodies primarily as institutionalized decision-oriented 
publics “structured predominantly as a context of justification” and regulated by 
democratic procedures (Habermas 1996:307). Accordingly, in articles I (Tefre 2015) 
and II (Tefre 2020), my focus is not on how problems make it onto the political 
agenda, but on the political process of how problems are framed and dealt with in 
communicative discourses, and how policy proposals developed in parliamentary 
bodies are justified to the public. 
I consider democratic legitimacy of policy as a concept with two components, a 
procedural and a discursive. The discursive component is defined by Habermas 
(1996:30): 
“the legitimacy of statutes is measured against the discursive redeemability of 
their normative validity claim – in the final analysis, according to whether 
they have come about through a rational legislative process, or at least could 
have been justified from pragmatic, ethical, and moral points of view. The 
legitimacy of a statute is independent of its de facto implementation. At the 
same time, however, de facto validity or factual compliance varies with the 
addressees’ belief in legitimacy, and this belief is in turn based on the 
supposition that the norm could be justified”.  
In this light legitimate policy is respected because it is accepted as reasonable, more 
than by threat of sanction. The procedural component includes whether the 
democratic rules of the game have been followed in establishing law, whereas the 
discursive component ties legitimacy to the ability to provide publicly acceptable 
reasons for the policy proposals. I also consider that the procedural and discursive 
demand to legitimacy does not end with parliamentary legislation. The same demands 
 29 
to procedural and discursive justification apply to the street-level practitioners of the 
welfare state when they make decisions based on government policy. In this I agree 
with Rothstein (1998) that policy legitimacy also relies on the output side of how 
services are received and perceived by citizens – I return to this below (section 3.3). 
Public parliamentary debates, hearings and preparatory documents are thus analysed 
as institutional procedures to legitimize political decisions by allowing both 
proponents and opponents to offer substantive justifications for their policy positions. 
Whether participants in these processes may or may not have a priori fixed positions, 
and may or may not be willing to be convinced by the arguments of others matters 
less to the analysis than the substantive content of the arguments they present. The 
focus of analysis in this thesis is primarily on the act of public justification to 
legitimize state responsibility for children and the ideas and arguments that support 
different approaches to state responsibility for children. Even when policy is best 
explained by actions of groups seeking selfish goals, they must still appeal to the 
public interest on the intellectual and normative merits of their case. Even if these 
arguments are rationalizations they are still important, because they become integral 
parts of the political discourse (Majone 1989:2). Argumentation and persuasion is 
therefore a key component for policymakers and citizens to reach moral and policy 
choices under any circumstance, because at the very least they must always carry the 
people with them (Goodin et al. 2006). While acknowledging that there may be 
private interests behind public arguments, the need for public justification forces 
participants to at least justify their position in ways that are acceptable to the public, 
what Elster (1998:111) has called the civilizing force of hypocrisy. Studying public 
argumentation in normatively contested policy questions such as child protection 
opens to examine the fundamental assumptions and ideas that underlie what is 
publicly acceptable reasons for state intervention and responsibility for children, and 
which ideas are contested and which are widely shared in political fellowships, and 
how do they differ between political fellowships such as Norway and the United 
States. 
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I base my analysis of public justifications for state responsibility for children in long-
term care on a discourse theoretical framework developed by Habermas (1996). 
Discourse ethics is a normative theoretical framework for rational argumentation that 
distinguishes different types of normative and cognitive arguments in relation to 
corresponding standards of justification. This lets us disentangle the underlying 
assumptions and ideas that form the basis of policy arguments, and separate between 
different types of normative and cognitive assumptions that underlie policy choices. 
While Habermas’ theory includes a strong procedural component (see Bächtiger et al. 
2010; Steiner et al. 2004), I employ the perspective as a theoretical tool for analysing 
the substantive content of policy arguments. As noted the basic premise of this 
approach is that policymakers must always provide valid public reasons to legitimize 
policy choices, and these may be scrutinized and contested by opposing parties. 
Public reasons and arguments for policy must at least be shaped in ways that 
policymakers assume will be acceptable both normatively and cognitively to the 
public they seek to persuade. Thus, an analysis of public policy justifications also 
provides a window for analysing what political fellowships consider to be more or 
less acceptable or legitimate reasons for state responsibility for children. Tefre (2015, 
2020) operationalizes Habermas’ discourse ethics to disentangle the ideational 
components that policy justifications build on, by recognizing four basic claims to 
validity: Pragmatic, Ethical-Political, Moral, and Legal (Habermas 1996:159–68). 
With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Eriksen and Weigård 2003; Skivenes 2002, 
2010), there has to my knowledge been made little effort to operationalize Habermas’ 
discourse types as conceptual categories for empirical analysis of policy formation 
(cf. Buchstein and Jörke 2012:275). I use the four discourses; pragmatic, ethical-
political, moral and legal, to scrutinize the foundation of these reasons. A thorough 
explanation of the four discourses are available in Tefre (2015, 2020), and in the 
discussion section I will focus on what we learn about state responsibility for children 
through the discourse analysis in these two articles. 
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3.3 Street-level discretion and policy formation 
It is widely recognized that separating the political from the administrative, viewing 
political leaders as policy makers and street level practitioners as implementers is 
misleading (Evans and Hupe 2020; Lipsky 2010; Majone 1989; Zacka 2017). One of 
the key insights of Lipsky (2010) was the recognition that street-level practitioners 
shape public policy in important ways, and that policy as experienced by citizens, is 
the result of their interaction with street-level practitioners. Legislative mandates 
often lack clear standards for street-level practitioners to apply. Legislation may be 
vague, ambiguous, or contradictory. Even when statutes do set precise goals, the 
technical knowledge to reach them may be insufficient, uncertain, and there may even 
be conflicting knowledge bases advocating for different approaches (Majone 1989). 
Further, practitioners are faced with a plurality of action prescriptions, and must 
consider and balance different rule sets at once: Statutes from a range of laws, 
precedents, public policy and political signals, regulations and managerial directives, 
occupational norms and professional standards, and societal expectations from 
clients, affected parties, media exposure, and public opinion (Hupe and Evans 
2020:411). Thus, rule saturation stemming from a multiplicity of mandates can itself 
contribute to indeterminacy of policy outcomes because street-level practitioners 
have to choose and balance how to best address the prescriptions (Evans and Harris 
2004).  
Child protection belongs to an area of public policy Rothstein (1998:78–79) has 
labelled dynamically interventionist, which are characterized by (a) attempting to 
influence citizens’ behaviour in a dynamic process, (b) the state of knowledge about 
what works is uncertain, and (c) there are great variations in the field. All of this 
makes it impossible for centrally located political authorities to prescribe in detail all 
the various responses that must be taken under particular circumstances in order to 
meet the identified needs of individual citizens. The paradox is that the need for more 
precise targeting of policy, in regard to individual needs, requires law and statutes to 
be framed in imprecise and general ways, in order to grant flexibility to implementers 
(Rothstein 1998). Rules follow a logic of if x, then y, where the antecedent x classifies 
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an action (or nonaction), and the consequent y describes the legal consequences of the 
antecedent. However, for reasons discussed laws and policy frequently leave 
significant indeterminacy. Discretion is necessary in at least four different 
circumstances (Grimen and Molander 2008; Molander 2016): (a) the antecedent may 
be clear, but consequence unclear, (b) the consequence may be clear, but the 
antecedent unclear, (c) both the antecedent and consequence may be unclear, or (d) 
even if both antecedent and consequence can be clearly stated as goals the knowledge 
or tools required to reach them may be uncertain. Accordingly, street-level 
practitioners are also granted wide freedom of action, i.e. discretion, in deciding the 
appropriate course of action and which measures to apply in each individual case.  
They must, that is, be granted the right to judge, independently, and of their 
own responsibility, which measures are appropriate in a given situation. It is 
the sum of their actions which constitutes the public program. As to whether 
these actions reflect the objectives laid down by the democratically constituted 
organs – this must be regarded as an open question” (Rothstein 1998:80).  
Child protection work relies heavily on discretionary processes, from screening, 
investigation and assessment of reports of maltreatment to the decisions of what to do 
if maltreatment is confirmed. Understanding how child welfare workers use their 
discretion to make decisions in meetings with individual children and families is 
therefore a key part of understanding state responsibility for children. Laws certainly 
regulate practitioners’ activities, but because legal rules and other action prescriptions 
are often indeterminate when applied to a specific case, practitioners are granted quite 
extensive discretionary powers (Molander 2016). The greater the indeterminacy of 
action prescriptions or rules to guide street-level practitioners, the higher degree of 
freedom they have shape and form policy in their interactions with clients of the 
welfare state. 
Discretion can be considered both unavoidable – because rules are often 
indeterminate in the face of complex situations – and necessary – to secure sensitivity 
to individual circumstances (Molander 2016). However, leaving the important final 
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step of policy formation in the hands of street-level practitioners also introduces a 
serious challenge to democratic legitimacy of policy, labelled the black hole of 
democracy by Rothstein (1998:80). This concerns the lack of transparency with what 
goes on when street-level practitioners make decisions based on discretion and 
whether these conform to the legislative intent of democratically constituted organs. 
Discretion also challenges the moral and legal principle of equal treatment for equal 
cases, which is central to the rule of law. Even if we disregard the fact that 
practitioner do make errors and mistakes, the challenge is deeper. Because decisions 
are made with underdetermined prescriptions, even in ideal circumstances different 
practitioners may come to different conclusions on the same case. 
Child protection workers play a central role in forming policy from the bottom-up 
through their discretionary decisions in meetings with children and families. To shed 
light on how states form and justify policy as guardian of children’s rights to 
protection from harm, I examine how child protection workers in Norway and the 
United States make and justify decisions. 
I follow Molander and Grimen (Grimen and Molander 2008; Molander 2016) in 
defining discretion has having two distinct aspects, a structural component that 
denotes the discretionary space which defines the rules and standards of what 
practitioners are allowed to do, and an epistemic component for discretionary 
reasoning, the cognitive act of making a reasoned judgment and decision within this 
space (Molander 2016). Accordingly, having discretion does not imply that 
practitioners are free to do as they like, discretion is always limited by standards. 
Dworkin (1978:31) argues that “the concept of discretion is at home in only one sort 
of context; when someone is in general charged with making decisions subject to 
standards set by a particular authority”. To illustrate this, Dworkin (1978) compares 
discretion to the hole in a  doughnut. Just like this hole cannot exist without the 
doughnut surrounding it, discretion cannot exist without a belt of restrictions that 
defines the space left open to discretion. As such, discretion is relative in two senses: 
it is relative to the restrictions that surround it, and it is relative to the authority that 
impose these restrictions and delegate discretionary power to decision-makers 
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(Molander 2016:20). Just as the hole in the doughnut can be greater or smaller 
depending on the thickness of the doughnut, so the space left open to discretion can 
be greater or smaller depending on the specificity of standards that guide 
practitioners’ actions. Discretionary space can thus be seen as a continuum from 
strong discretion where decision-makers are subject to very few regulating standards 
to weak discretion where the decisions to be made are regulated by precise rules that 
specify what to do under specific conditions. Discretionary space can be greater or 
smaller, but not eliminated, as discussed above. In articles I (Tefre 2015) and II 
(Tefre 2020) I examine how legislative processes form the discretionary spaces for 
street-level practitioners, by focusing on legislative intent and how statutes are 
justified. In the articles III (Skivenes and Tefre 2012) and IV (Tefre 2017) I discuss 
the possible implications of clear statutes and the use of decision tools to frame the 
discretionary space of child protection workers in Norway, England and California 
(USA), however these are mainly important in the light of how workers use their 
discretionary reasoning to justify their decisions.  
The epistemic aspect of discretion concerns discretionary reasoning which “is a form 
of practical reasoning that aims to reach conclusions about what ought to be done in 
particular cases where the warrants are weak” (Grimen and Molander 2008:179; 
Molander 2016:25). ‘Warrants’ refer to the action prescription or principles laid down 
in statutes, policy documents, guidelines, decision-tools, professional standards and 
the like, that aim to provide general guidance of how to act in particular 
circumstances. A challenge in child protection is that action prescriptions and legal 
principles are often vague (e.g. the best interests of the child) and at times 
contradictory (e.g. family preservation and child well-being) (Berrick 2018; Križ and 
Skivenes 2014; Mnookin 1973). As such the discretionary space in child protection 
decision-making is often large, and child protection workers can be said to exercise 
fairly strong discretion. However, the legitimacy of discretionary decisions relies also 
on the ability to hold practitioners to account in different ways (Molander 2016; 
Rothstein 1998). Legitimacy here relates to a normative conceptualisation of 
discretion, i.e. that “the delegation of discretionary powers is based on the epistemic 
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assumption that the entrusted actor is capable of passing reasoned judgments” 
(Molander, Grimen, and Eriksen 2012:219). Professionals who have discretionary 
power to make decisions that intervene in the lives of clients, are under an obligation 
to justify their judgments, decisions and actions with reasons which others can 
understand, assess, accept or reject, and there are sanctions available for 
transgressions. This is what makes the difference between discretionary power, 
delegated to advance certain aims, and arbitrary power (Molander et al. 2012:221). 
The requirement to provide reasons is an important part of both securing legitimacy 
and accountability, and should ideally bridge the gap between legislated policy and 
actual decisions practitioners make in their meetings with children and families, and 
importantly in a way that is understandable to those affected. Importantly these must 
be public and not private reasons to be considered valid. By this I mean that the 
personal moral compass or religious convictions of the decision-maker are not valid 
reasons to justify a decision. Professionals are granted discretionary power on 
grounds of their specialized competence and knowledge in a specific field (Abbott 
1988). There is thus an expectation that professionals use this knowledge, as well as 
professional and public ethical standards to reach their decision. Justifications are 
necessary both to hold decision-makers to account, and scrutinize the validity of the 
arguments they apply to reach their decision, but also because of the indeterminate 
nature of discretionary decision-making. If we accept that even under ideal 
circumstances, reasonable and conscientious practitioners may come to different 
conclusions about the same case, then justifications provided for this is the only 
window we have to examine the validity of the conclusions. 
By comparing the justifications child welfare workers in different countries provide 
for their decisions we can gain better insight into how similar legal principles are 
applied and balanced by different states, and thus how important principles in child 
protection policy is experienced by children and families. In articles III (Skivenes and 
Tefre 2012) and IV (Tefre 2017) I shed light on the discretionary reasoning of child 
protection workers in Norway, England and California (USA), by analysing their 
justifications for the decisions they make in a specific situation, and I will return to 
this in the discussion section. 
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4. Methods 
4.1 The Comparative Approach 
The comparative ambitions of this thesis are modest, and aim at exploring how 
different cognitive and normative ideas shape the formation of child protection policy 
in and the responsibility of the state for children’s right to protection from harm in 
two very different contexts. While both Norway and the United States have taken 
steps to increase the number of adoptions there are clear differences both in their 
stated policy goals and their institutional design, and as such a comparison does not 
fit easily into classical small-N comparative designs that often build on either most-
similar systems (method of disagreement) or most-different systems (method of 
agreement) design (Collier 1991; Hantrais 2009; Landman and Carvalho 2017). 
One of challenges in the comparative literature is the problem of conceptual 
equivalence (Hantrais 2009:77–78), the comparative literature on child protection 
abounds with examples of how seemingly similar concepts can have subtly different 
meanings. Understanding and content of rights and obligations, what is meant by 
voluntary and coercive, how to measure the number of children in care, how the 
child’s best interests is understood both between countries, and between different 
administrative institutions or groups of people in the same countries (Burns, Pösö, 
and Skivenes 2017; Gilbert 1997; Gilbert et al. 2011).  
Christensen and Peters (1999:4) have argued that while there are many important 
differences between Norway and the United States, there are also similarities, most 
importantly are fundamental conceptual similarities in the politics of the two 
countries that should make it possible to use the same concepts for the two countries 
without a great deal of fear that they have been stretched to a point of obscuring the 
comparison. However, care must still be taken not to miss the subtle differences. 
Although concepts such as family, neglect, abuse, permanency, foster-care, adoption, 
responsibility, obligation etc. are understood in fairly similar ways in both countries, 
they are not identical. For instance, what constitutes neglect or risk in the sense of 
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justifying state intervention may differ considerably. An important goal for the 
comparative ambitions in this thesis is to examine how ideas contribute to situated 
understandings of such concepts in Norway and the United States. Thus, improving 
our understanding of how seemingly similar concepts are used and understood can 
contribute to very different policy outcomes despite superficial similarities in claims 
to children’s interests or rights. But as the examples given show, it is important to 
always locate the concepts used in a comparative study within the political-
institutional and cultural contexts of the specific countries examined, and not take 
their immediate comparability for granted. A strength of this design then is the in-
depth study of the political and practical justifications for decisions, as a key goal is 
precisely to understand how different conceptualizations and orientations to child 
protection may impact policy on adoption and long-term care. 
The ideational approach to policy analysis focuses on a ‘logic of interpretation’ 
(Parsons 2007), which is well suited to exploring how such concepts can shift and 
change in subtle but important ways between contexts. As such, the comparative 
strength of this thesis lies in its ability to produce nuanced explanations of similar 
concepts that can then be used to compare in more detail how these ideas shape 
policy justifications.  
Articles III (Skivenes and Tefre 2012) and IV (Tefre 2017) both use the vignette 
methodology to provide child protection caseworkers in Norway, England and 
California (U.S.) with identical cases, and ask them both to assess these cases and 
make a decision. The strength of the vignette methodology in comparison is that they 
hold the specific conditions respondents are asked to assess constant, thus freeing the 
analysis to address how respondents interpret and assess the identical situations 
across different countries. This allows us to study how street-level practitioners use 
their discretion in assessment and decision-making and also compare how this aligns 
with the overarching legal and policy framework of the countries. As such, each of 
these articles include both cross-country and within-country comparison of the 
decisions and the reasoning behind them, expressed by the street-level practitioners 
who participated in the study.  
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Articles I (Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 2020) focus on single countries and policy 
formation in the U.S. Congress and the Norwegian Parliament (Storting), 
respectively. However, in order to facilitate this comparison I have used the same 
analytical approach, based on Habermas’ discourse ethics (Habermas 1996) in both 
articles, distinguishing pragmatic, ethical-political, moral and legal discourses. By 
using the same analytical tools, I have aimed to structure the findings and discussions 
in the two articles in a way that will allow a coherent comparison. Thus, an important 
task in the later discussion (section 6) is to draw on the findings from these two 
papers and compare the political processes and the ideational elements that led 
Norway and the U.S. to different policies on adoption from care. A strength of using 
two single country studies as the basis for comparison is that each country has been 
examined in detail, and I have traced the processes as they unfolded over a period of 
years in each country. This allows me to also trace developments over time within 
each country. However, I must also note that the legislative processes in the U.S. took 
place in the mid-1990s, whereas in Norway I trace a period from 2003-2013. Thus, 
while the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) remains a cornerstone of U.S. 
federal child protection policy, I have not examined in detail how perceptions of 
children and families may have changed in the political discourse since this time. 
This must also be kept in mind in comparing findings from the two studies. 
4.2 Document analysis 
The primary data sources are made up of official government documents that were 
produced in the legislative processes in Norway and the U.S. Here I will focus on 
more general methodological considerations of document analysis for policy studies. 
For an overview of specific documents and analytical approach included in the two 
countries I refer to Tefre (2015; 2020).  
4.2.1 Data Material 
The units of analysis are the political actors that participate in the debates on 
adoption. There are however important differences between the countries in this 
regard. In the United States members of Congress have a much greater degree of 
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freedom to act according to their own conviction or interests compared to Norway 
where party discipline is the norm. A consequence of this is that in the U.S. I focus on 
individual members of Congress and public witnesses as the units of analysis, 
whereas in Norway parties, governments and organizations are the units of analysis.  
There are important differences between legislative processes in Norway and the 
United States, as noted in section 2.1, that makes the documents that the studies build 
on differ in substantial ways. Because of the procedural differences of law-making in 
Norway and the United States the document material submitted for analysis is 
somewhat different. In the U.S. the bulk of data for the analysis comes from the 
public hearings leading up to the passing of ASFA, this is partly because committee 
reports and other written material is very scarce. In Norway, the written legislative 
record from government and Storting committees is much more detailed, and also 
includes overviews of the consenting and dissenting opinions from the hearings. As 
such, the hearings take a central place in the analysis of ASFA, including the 
contribution of public witnesses. In Norway the focus is more squarely on the 
government proposals and the response to these by political parties. While these 
differences impact on the type of data that is available to the analysis in the two 
countries, it is not a major problem and they do not prevent a comparison of the 
ideational elements that unpins policy formation. 
4.2.2 Data Analysis 
The analytical method is grounded in argumentation theory and the conceptual 
framework of discourse ethics. The central variables are the arguments of the actors 
involved in the policy formation processes to uncover the types of knowledge, norms 
and values that inform policy, both explicit and implicit. This contributes to in-depth 
understanding of the normative foundations of child welfare policies and the role of 
the state. 
In both Articles I and II, the analysis was done in several steps. First, I identified the 
basic position that each of the actors had toward the debates’ topic at the different 
points in time. A second reading, established the most central reasons speakers gave 
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for their position and sorted these according to factual (pragmatic/legal) or normative 
(ethical/moral) reasons. Importantly this step also traced how speakers changed or 
maintained their reasoning over time. A third reading focused closer on identifying 
whether the speakers offered proof of validity for their claims and reasons, and if so 
which were these.  
I structure the presentation and discussion of findings according to discourses in order 
to make clear what standards of justification apply. However, it is often difficult to 
locate a specific argument in a single analytical category, because a fully constructed 
argument may draw on several types of justification. Operationalizing Habermas’ 
discourse theory is challenging as a full political argument may draw on several 
discourses and thus also make conceptually different claims to validity. As such, it is 
often not possible to assign a single statement to only one discursive category. 
However, the idea behind using the discourse theoretical framework is not to sort 
individual statements into mutually exclusive boxes, but that the theoretical 
discursive categories themselves are clear and mutually exclusive, so that when I 
identify one part of an argument as raising a claim to moral validity this is 
conceptually distinct from identifying an argument as raising a claim to ethical-
political validity. Thus, while it may not be possible to categorize a single argument 
as raising only one claim to validity, the framework allows us to examine the same 
argument both according to moral and ethical-political claims to validity. The 
discourses then function more as analytical lenses to make clear the different types of 
discourses that compose a single coherent argument, and the variety of different 
validity claims raised in different arguments throughout the debates. The quotations 
that are included in the articles I and II are thus meant as illustrations of the type of 
discourse in question, although they may contain elements of other discourses as 
well. 
4.2.3 Limitations 
The main limitation of the document analysis in articles I (Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 
2020) lies in the fact that it is based only on the publicly available record, and on 
instances of public justification for policy. As such, the articles do not address the 
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coordinative discourses between policy elites that took place outside of the public 
eye. Nor does it capture whether there were conflicts of interests and power struggles 
between specific interest groups, and how these may have influenced the shaping of 
the policy proposals I have debated. I cannot answer with any certainty why the topic 
of adoption was raised to the political agenda or which actors were instrumental in 
getting them there (Kingdon 2011). While there are still many questions about the 
formation of these policies that my analyses do not address, my focus on public 
justifications gives us important insight into the ideas that give form to policy 
proposals and provide them with legitimacy. In the final instance, it is the public 
justifications for policy that are available to street-level decision-makers (child 
protection workers and judges) when they need to interpret the principles and 
legislative intent behind child welfare policies. 
4.3 Vignette Survey 
The methodological section of Skivenes and Tefre (2012) outlines the general design 
and approach taken in the vignette survey, and the following is a condensed version. 
The study was reviewed by the office of the Norwegian Privacy Ombudsman for 
Research, which assesses privacy-related and ethical dimensions of a research 
project, and by the Research Ethics Committee of the English city where we 
conducted interviews. In California, our study did not fall within the scope of the 
rules that the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects of the Californian 
Health and Human Services Agency is obligated to review under the Federal wide 
Assurance. 
4.3.1 Data Material 
The survey data were gathered as part of the CHILDPRO project (NFR project code: 
196766). The survey was answered from January to May 2008 in Norway, from 
March to August 2008 in England, and between March and September 2010 in 
California. The data-material consists of convenience samples in all three countries. 
Child protection workers were recruited from public child protection agencies, all of 
whom perform assessment work with children and families. We recruited study 
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participants by first inviting city councils and/or the head of a child protection agency 
to participate. The child protection agency sent an invitation letter to all workers and 
supervisors in the defined unit(s) on our behalf. This letter contained detailed 
information about the research project and stated that participation in this study was 
voluntary. The letter also discussed the implications for those consenting to 
participate and stated that participation would occur during non-work hours. Those 
who wished to participate contacted the principal investigator by email or phone. 
Workers received an honorarium based on a research reimbursement model that 
proposes reimbursing participants for their time (Grady et al. 2005). We also 
followed justice considerations; we wanted all participants in the project to receive 
the same relative amount, regardless of their country of residence. Workers received 
NOK 1000 in Norway, GBP 75 in England and USD 150 in California. The 
honorarium may not only have motivated a broader set of workers to participate, but 
it may also have skewed the sample towards those who were attracted by the 
honorarium. 
Many of the participants were experienced caseworkers. Our California sample had 
the longest mean experience of 12 years, a variance of 40 years and a median of 11 
years. In England, the mean was 8 years, with a variance of 35 years and a median of 
6 years. In Norway, the mean was 9 years, with a variance of 38 years and median of 
8 years. The participants from California were also more highly educated than 
caseworkers in Norway and England. Eighty-nine percent of the Californian 
caseworkers in our sample had earned a master's degree, and the remaining 11% held 
a bachelor's degree. In both England and Norway, fewer than half of the caseworkers 
sampled held a master's degree (40% in England and 37% in Norway), and the 
remaining workers held bachelor's degrees or an equivalent college degree. In all 
three countries, the vast majority of caseworkers sampled were female; England 
stands out with 21% of the caseworkers being male. In California and Norway, the 
proportion of male to female workers was only seven and five percent, respectively. 
The vast majority of our sample has a degree in social work, or a closely related field 
(such as family counselling). Level of education ranges from BA, through MA and 
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two PhDs (see author’s own in appendix for detail about this distribution). A minority 
in each country had degrees in psychology or social sciences. 31 respondents did not 
describe the type of education beyond level of the degree. 
4.3.2 Data Analysis 
The Vignettes follow a common type of vignette technique in which fixed-choice 
responses are combined with open-ended questions (Finch 1987). A benefit of this 
approach is that while the fixed-choice responses make it easier to compare the 
responses in different countries, the open-ended questions leave room for the 
respondent to define the meaning of the situation and point to the elements that lead 
to a specific decision (Finch 1987). 
The case vignettes are based on real cases and have been tested and reviewed by child 
protection workers in all three countries. To determine if the vignette cases in the 
survey were realistic, if they were sufficiently complex, and if the respondents' 
answers reflected their opinions rather than those of their managers, we asked about 
25% of the sample to respond to these issues. The results show approximately nine 
out of ten respondents thought the vignettes were realistic (the rest answered ‘I don't 
know’ (5), ‘in between’ (3) and ‘no’ (2)). Regarding complexity, one-fifth of the 
respondents found them less complex than real cases, about three-fifths said they had 
the same complexity level as real cases and less than one-fifth found them more 
complex than real cases. Although the vignette contains only limited information, it 
was designed to be recognizable to workers in different countries as an approximation 
of a real-life situation (Barter and Renold 1999, 2000; Finch 1987; Soydan 1996). 
The survey was translated from Norwegian to English and back to Norwegian again 
to make sure we had the same version of the questions and vignettes. The aim of the 
vignettes was to capture the workers' professional assessments of cases. We asked the 
same questions in each country, and we gave participants an option to choose open 
categories, as an alternative to fixed categories, and to allow them to explain their 
choice. This was to make sure that if they experience the survey form to be rigid, they 
had an alternative. Although we aimed for a survey that was similar in each country, 
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we are aware that this type of comparison involves challenges regarding conceptual 
differences, legislative framework and cultural factors that have implications for child 
protection. Therefore, the vignette itself does not include any references to national 
legislations or other specifics that could make it specific to any one country.  
The vignette contains limited information about the case and allows the child 
protection workers to interpret the case according to their own setting. The open- 
ended questions are therefore of central importance, and it is through these questions 
that we seek to understand just how the case is interpreted and positioned within the 
respondents' respective contexts (Barter and Renold 2000; Finch 1987; Grinde 2004). 
The questions allow the participants in each country room to provide details that 
relate to the different policies, laws, social norms and institutional practices that may 
be influential to their decisions. Finally, although one of the strengths of the vignette 
technique is the reduction of ‘social desirability factors’ and the avoidance of 
observer effects (Soydan 1996; Wilks 2004), we are aware that what is expressed in 
the respondents' answers may not necessarily reflect how they would act in a real 
situation. Respondents may have several reasons for answering in ways that may 
seem more socially acceptable or more acceptable to the researchers (Barter and 
Renold 2000; Finch 1987; Wilks 2004). 
4.3.3 Limitations 
A limitation of our data relates to the differences in samples across countries, which 
are due to the specific hiring patterns of the public authorities we sampled and the 
economic recession, which seemed to affect our Californian study sites most. The 
groups of workers invited to participate in this study differed in England, Norway and 
California. This is partly due not only to the organization of the agencies in the 
respective countries, but also the fact that in California we only recruited workers 
from the Emergency Response unit. The main difference between agencies is in the 
degree of task specialization. While all who are included in the sample actively 
perform assessment work some do this exclusively, while others also have other 
tasks. The highest degree of specialization was in the Californian sample where the 
agencies delegate assessment work to Emergency Response workers who do this type 
 45 
of work exclusively. In England and Norway most agencies in the sample divide 
between a front end and a back end. Those in the back-end work with children who 
are already placed in care, and are not included in our sample. In the front end are 
those who respond to reports and carry out assessment and investigative work. In 
many agencies, those who are in the front will also work with families, providing 
services and following them up. This differs from the strong specialization in the 
California sample. Also, some Norwegian agencies operate with a “generalist” 
model, where case workers are assigned to individual children and families, and 
follow them through the system even after a child enters foster care. So, while they 
still do assessment work, their area of focus spans the whole spectrum of possible 
services. These differences in cross-country samples may affect how workers 
answered our questions. However, the Californian workers were not completely 
different from the English and Norwegian workers because most of them had ample 
experience working in other roles in other child protection units, especially as on-
going caseworkers.  
The relatively small sample sizes in each country and the hiring pattern mean that the 
samples cannot be taken as representative of the general population of child 
protection workers in these countries. Therefore, the findings from theses vignettes 
should be treated as indicators for future research, and can function to formulate 
hypotheses for future testing in a more rigorous comparative design with a 
representative selection of workers.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Article I – The Justifications for Terminating Parental 
Rights and Adoption in the United States 
The article asks why adoption came to enjoy such broad bipartisan support in the US 
Congress during the period leading up to the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (ASFA). It examines how legislators and public witnesses during a series of 
Congressional hearings from 1995-1997 justified adoption as a legitimate and often 
preferred permanency goal for children who cannot reunify with their parents. The 
analysis focuses on two sections of ASFA that established the circumstances when 
the state can legitimately place children for adoption from care. These sections, Sec. 
101(a) and Sec. 103(a) considered the child’s need for ‘safety’ and ‘permanency’. 
The article is based on written public records from the United States Congress and 
includes legislative hearings, floor debates, committee reports, and bill proposals 
from both the Senate and House of Representatives. The analysis builds on a 
discourse theoretical framework (Habermas 1996) to categorize the substantive 
arguments presented in the proceedings and examine the ideas and discourses that 
support them. 
First, the article finds that the emphasis on child safety to justify adoption was clearly 
risk-oriented. The pragmatic argument for adoption as risk management is grounded 
in ideas that the most abusive parents are unable to change their abusive behavior 
regardless of services. Family-preservation services were regarded as ineffective, 
especially to these families, and adoption seen as a safe alternative to the risk of 
attempting reunification with parents who had already demonstrated severely abusive 
behavior. The ethical-political justifications for adoption to promote child safety were 
child centered and argued that efforts to reunify had become unreasonable and 
centered on adult needs and biological ties, at the expense of children’s safety. In 
essence legislators argued that it was necessary to “push the pendulum of government 
back in the direction of the children”, that is children’s need for safety ought to 
outweigh parent’s interests in attempting reunification when the state intervenes. 
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Secondly, the focus on children’s need for permanency was justified pragmatically by 
referring to research on the importance of stable care and long-term relationships for 
children and the instability of the foster care system. Research also showed that 
adoption was an effective way of securing the permanency that foster care lacked, 
and could demonstrate positive outcomes for children. At the same time 
psychologists testified that, psychological ties were more important to children’s 
healthy development than biological ties. This emphasized the importance of 
psychological parents over biological parents to children in the proceedings, where 
the ‘real’ parents were those who satisfy the child’s daily needs for care. An 
important ethical-political argument for adoption to secure permanency was that 
children should not suffer for their parents’ behavior. This meant a stronger emphasis 
on parental responsibility and duties to the child on the one hand and the state’s role 
as guardian of children’s needs on the other. Children should not suffer because of 
their parents’ inability to live up to their responsibilities. This demonstrates an 
adversarial relationship between parents and the state in child protection legislation, 
and the role of the state as a watchdog. It individualizes the parental responsibility for 
improving their function as caregiver and legitimizes adoption if parents fail to do so 
within a reasonable amount of time. Although the state should make services 
available to aid parents to improve capacity to care, the ethical responsibility to make 
such changes are on the parents. Adoption than served as a way of providing new 
permanent families for children whose families would be unable to provide the 
necessary stability. 
The article argues that the ASFA built on three fundamental discourses. First, ‘child 
risk pragmatism’ characterized the justifications for adoption. This focused on 
managing risks to children, primarily to their immediate health and safety but also to 
risk associated with their developmental outcomes, mental health, and life 
opportunities. Adoption was seen as an effective way of improving expected life 
outcomes for children who would otherwise grow up in foster care. Adoptions were 
also considered necessary to save a foster care system that was never intended to 
provide permanent care for children from collapse, and offered a cost-neutral or 
possibly cost-saving way of reducing the pressure on the foster care system. Second, 
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‘parent responsibility ethics’ emphasizes the responsibilities that come with parental 
rights, both to the child and society. Parental rights are conditional (Harding 1997:51) 
and the state’s role is to ensure that parents keep within the acceptable boundaries of 
parenting. This included a stronger focus on individual parent behavior compared to 
the socioeconomic conditions surrounding of the family. Both as explanations for 
parenting failure and in the responsibility to improve their parenting capacity. Third, 
‘child refamilialization ethics’ clearly distinguishes the interests of parents and 
children, and the state’s role as primarily a guardian for children’s interests. 
Legislators argued that children should not grow up as wards of the state because of 
their parents’ failure to provide adequate care. Adoption was seen as the best way 
securing children’s needs for a permanent, loving family. The idea of 
refamilialization builds on the idea that children ought to grow up in the private 
sphere. The state’s role in long-term care is to facilitate a way back to the private 
family sphere for children, either through reunification with the biological family, or 
through adoption, rather than serve as a permanent guardian for the child. 
5.2 Article II – The Child’s Best Interests and the Politics 
of Adoptions from Care in Norway 
The article asks why adoption from care gained broader political support in Norway 
in the period between 2003 and 2013, and how the political parties in parliament 
(Storting) justified their position on adoption from care. The article examines how 
political parties and governing coalitions draw on different ideas and arguments to 
justify their view of the legitimate role of the state in long-term care and adoption for 
children, and how parties’ positions change over time. 
The article builds on written public records from the government and parliament, 
including white papers, legislative proposals, parliamentary committee reports and 
minutes from plenary debates in parliament. It covers all four occasions when 
parliament discussed adoption during the years 2002-2013. The analysis builds on a 
discourse theoretical framework (Habermas 1996) to categorize the substantive 
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arguments presented in the proceedings and examine the ideas and discourses that 
support them. 
The article finds that several discursive shifts in political argumentation occurred 
under the Stoltenberg-government. I argue that we cannot explain the shift in support 
for adoption simply on changes in political majority because opposing parties, 
formerly restrictive on adoption, also became open to using adoption more 
frequently. The Stoltenberg-government used legal argumentation to expand the room 
within existing law and conventions to allow for adoption. The Stoltenberg-
government did so in two ways, first it challenged the restrictive interpretation of 
previous governments regarding the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
judgment in Johansen v. Norway (app. No. 17383/90), and secondly by latching onto 
a recent Supreme Court judgment (Rt-2007-561), which it argued opened for using 
adoptions from care to a greater degree that previously. The analysis uncovers two 
important developments in argumentation that legitimizes a shift towards a more 
active adoption policy: First, research-based knowledge and expert discourse on child 
development has become the central knowledge base framing adoption. This 
knowledge base places the child and its developmental potential as the central subject 
of interests. Secure attachment to caregivers and stability for the child are central 
components to promote development. This child centred knowledge base has been 
important to shift Norway towards a more active adoption policy. 
Second, there is evidence of a normative shift in priorities from addressing the child’s 
interests as part of a family unit towards the child’s autonomous interests and aligns 
with the child-centred knowledge-base. The ethical-political justification is based on 
the view that children ought to be able to have secure attachments and be safe where 
they live to develop into healthy adults. If adoptions are superior to foster care at 
promoting healthy development then the state is justified in pursuing more adoptions 
in the best interests of children, when reunification is no longer an option. According 
to this view the state is not just responsible for protecting the child from harm, by 
placing it in a safe foster home, but ought to actively pursue the best possible 
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conditions for its development, even if this means setting aside the biological 
principle through adoption. 
There are signs of less paternalistic, moral discourses on adoption that sees the child 
as an autonomous legal subject and bearers of rights. According to this perspective 
children have individual rights on par with adults, and we are obliged to consider the 
individual child’s needs and wants rather than view the child as part of the family.  
The analysis of arguments and justifications shows that Norway’s path to an active 
adoption policy built on ideas that framed the child’s interests and needs as distinct 
from the family. The biological principle is central to Norwegian child protection 
policy and practice, but as this analysis shows it is challenged by an emerging child-
centred perspective. 
5.3 Article III – Adoptions in the Child Welfare System – A 
cross-country analysis of Child Welfare Workers’ 
Recommendations For or Against Adoption 
The article asks how a sample of public child protection workers (N=299) in three 
different child protection systems (Norway, England and California, USA) decide and 
justify their decision in a case involving adoption of a three-year-old foster child.  
The article combines fixed-choice and open-ended questions. By analysing open-
ended questions where respondents explain the rationale for their decision the article 
examines how child protection workers use their discretion to interpret and 
implement policy on adoption, and contribute to establishing de-facto boundaries for 
the use of adoption in child protection. 
The article finds that while 98% and 96% of child protection workers in England and 
California respectively would start adoption proceedings, only 62% of Norwegian 
workers would do so, whereas 38% would continue foster care. 
The analysis shows that most workers in the three countries point to several factors to 
justify their decision. The most important factor is the ‘parents’ behaviour’. The 
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second and third most mentioned justifications for adoption are child focused and are 
about ‘permanency’ and ‘attachment’ relations for the child. The fourth justification 
for adoption is parents’ failure to visit the boy. The following two reasons workers 
give for adoption recommendations are clearly child focused: Benjamin’s ‘needs’ and 
his ‘early placement and age’. The two last accounts relate to the time factor, and the 
fact that the foster parents ‘want’ to adopt the boy. 
Although there are clear similarities in how the countries view this case, there are 
also some differences that require examination. The American workers distinguished 
themselves by putting more emphasis on three factors: ‘parental behaviour’, the fact 
that the child is ‘wanted’ and his ‘early placement and young age’. Less emphasis 
was placed on the child’s ‘needs’. The English workers distinguished themselves with 
the issue of ‘permanency’, and the Norwegian workers put more emphasis on 
‘attachment’, but less on ‘time’. 
For those that do not recommend adoption, more than half say that their decisions are 
due to a lack of consent from the biological mother. If the mother had changed her 
position and given consent, most workers would have considered adoption. 
Our analysis of child protection workers accounts for recommendations for and 
against adoption shows us that the type of child protection system and its policy 
guidelines play a major role in the recommendations of frontline child protection 
workers. This finding indicates that workers follows the democratically legitimized 
instructions for interventions, and more so in England and the U.S. However, we also 
notice that workers have elaborate rationales for their decisions and demonstrate their 
in-depth knowledge of the reasons for adoption policies and permanency 
considerations for children that are looked after. The findings indicate that American 
and English workers have a clearer perception of the role of public and private 
responsibility for children and the state’s role in a long-term placement situation, than 
their Norwegian peers. 
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5.4 Article IV – Maternal Intellectual Disability and Infant 
Neglect: Child Welfare Risk Assessments in Norway, 
England and California, USA 
The article asks how a sample of public child protection workers (N=297) in three 
different child protection systems (Norway, England and California, USA) assess risk 
for a two-month-old infant in a case involving possible neglect and parental 
intellectual disability (ID). The article first examines how workers score the risk to 
the child on a scale of 1-5. Secondly, by analysing open-ended questions where 
respondents explain the rationale for their assessment the article examines how child 
protection workers use their discretion to interpret and implement policy for 
thresholds of intervention towards a group of families where children have a 
significant chance of growing up in foster care. 
Two primary conclusions can be drawn from this study: First, the combination of 
parental ID and infant neglect generates a uniform response of serious risk across all 
countries. This supports earlier studies that find that parental ID and concern about 
neglect are red flags to child protection workers. Second, despite the uniformity in 
risk assessment, there are clear differences both between and internal to countries in 
how workers justify risk. 
The article identified seven risk factors used by at least 20% of workers in one of the 
countries studied, which could be further associated with three main concerns: First, 
risk factors associated with mother’s parenting included ‘parental capacity’, 
‘cognitive functioning’ and ‘neglectful behaviour’. Second, risk factors associated 
with the child’s vulnerabilities included: his age, safety concerns, and health issues. 
Finally, risk factors associated with the family environment, which included the lack 
of support from network. 
Californians showed a greater degree of uniformity in their rationale for risk 
assessment; a large portion of these workers concentrated on four variables – the 
child’s age, the child’s health, the mother’s parental capacities and the mother’s 
cognitive functioning – all of which are specified risk categories in their Standard 
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Decision Making (SDM) assessment tool. The composition of the U.S. sample as 
specialized Emergency Response workers may also account for some of this 
uniformity. 
Californians and Norwegians were more likely than English workers to focus on the 
mother’s cognitive functioning. This finding is consistent with English practice 
guidelines on working with ID parents which advocate a cautionary approach to 
interpreting ID and learning difficulties as grounds for action. 
Californian workers paid much closer attention to the child’s vulnerabilities than 
either of the other two groups of workers. These results could be interpreted as 
confirmation of the importance of early identification of risk in child protection 
systems based on the premise that younger children are more vulnerable than older 
children, particularly if they have additional special needs (Gilbert et al., 2011, 
p.248). 
Only 13% of Norwegians mentioned the lack of social support networks available to 
the mother, compared to 40% in England and 35% in California. Both English and 
Californian assessment tools call attention to ‘family and environmental factors’ 
(CAF) or ‘the availability of social support networks’ (SDM), which may partly 
explain this. Norwegian Child Protection has also been criticised for paying too little 
attention to potential support systems around the family, but since this study have 
taken steps to change this and the result might be different today. 
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6. Discussion 
This thesis asks how two high income, advanced states, Norway and the U.S., form 
and justify policy as guardian of children’s right to protection from harm, balanced 
against the rights and responsibilities of parents. I will centre the discussion around 
two interesting findings. First, Norwegian street-level child protection workers have 
much greater discretionary space to form policy from the bottom-up, compared to 
their Californian colleagues. Second, the role and of the state in long-term care and 
adoption in Norway and the U.S. reflects wider differences in the boundaries between 
public state and private family responsibility for children in the two countries. 
6.1 Policy formation from the bottom up is stronger in 
Norway than the U.S. 
A central finding of this thesis, located in article III (Skivenes and Tefre 2012), is that 
while Californian (and English) child protection workers were united in their 
recommendation to place Benjamin for adoption, Norwegian child protection workers 
were divided between 60% recommending adoption and 40% recommending 
continued foster care. In the article we discussed how these findings could be 
understood in light of the reasons workers provided, where important reasons why 
Norwegian workers would not recommend adoption were tied to concerns about the 
mother’s lack of consent, and concerns about the policy restrictions on the use of 
adoption. In light of the policy framework presented above and findings from articles 
I (Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 2020), I argue the reason why Norwegian workers are 
divided amongst themselves and Californians are united can be explained by 
differences in discretionary space for child protection workers in the two countries, 
and thus differences in the degree to which they can engage in policy formation from 
the bottom-up.  
The framework laid down in the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), 
and which California conforms with in its penal code, sets very clear rules for the 
type of case that the Benjamin-vignette (Vignette attached in Appendix 2) represents, 
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and as such restricts the discretionary space available to practitioners. The Benjamin-
case arguably falls within both grounds for adoption in ASFA: the exception to 
reasonable efforts (sec. 101), and adoption timelines (sec. 103) (cf. Tefre 2015). The 
severe nature of the maltreatment and the injuries Benjamin suffered makes the case a 
probable candidate for proceeding straight to adoption. And even if this was not the 
case, Benjamin has spent the last 2.5 years in foster care which far exceeds the 15 (of 
the last 22) month limit when ASFA requires adoption proceedings to be initiated. 
Californian workers can thus be seen as operating very much in line with legislative 
intent, which sets specific time limits for when to start adoption proceedings and also 
outlines explicit examples of cases when reunification efforts may be abandoned and 
adoption pursued from placement. Norwegians lack clear legal guidance on adoption. 
Instead the central question to be determined when the alternatives are permanent 
foster care or adoption, is whether adoption is in “the best interests of the child” 
(Child Welfare Act (CWA) Section 4-20, second paragraph, letter c). This leaves the 
primary responsibility for deciding when adoption is appropriate to the discretion of 
practitioners. When child protection workers are split 60/40 on a question that has 
life-long implications for a child, we should also ask what this implies for the 
credibility and legitimacy of decisions. Rothstein (1998) cautions perfectionist 
calibration of legal regulations to individual circumstances because of the high 
demands it places on decision-makers and the increased risk of arbitrary results, in his 
words “it is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong” (Rothstein 1998:86). We 
can apply this argument to the question of the ‘child’s best interests’ principle in 
adoption, because it places high demands on the reasoning of child welfare workers 
and judges, while it frees political authorities from having to make any commitments 
to how adoption ought to be applied in Norway, and also frees them from the 
responsibility. 
As more power to form policy is delegated to the street-level through wide 
discretionary space for decision-making it also transfers more of the responsibility for 
legitimizing policy to the street-level, and the requirement to justify individual 
decisions intensifies. However, findings in article IV (Tefre 2017) suggest that even 
when practitioners within a country agree on the outcome of an assessment, their 
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justifications for doing so may vary substantially. The Californian child protection 
workers in our sample have a Master’s degree, a high level or organizational 
specialization (Emergency Response-workers) and use standardised assessment tools 
that guide their discretionary reasoning. Norwegian workers mainly have a 
Bachelor’s degree or the equivalent, varying degree of organizational specialization, 
and still have no officially sanctioned guidelines for decision-making (cf. Falch-
Eriksen and Skivenes 2019; Skivenes and Tefre 2012). Thus, in addition to wide 
discretionary space through less specific legal statutes, Norwegian child protection 
workers also have fewer tools to aid their discretionary reasoning. Formal education 
and specialization are two of the principal coordinating mechanisms of professional 
organizations that justifies their wide discretionary powers (Parsons 1969). 
Norwegian child protection workers have less of both, compared to their Californian 
counterparts. The study design in this thesis prevents me from differentiating the 
relative impact of education, specialization and professional guidelines, but the 
combined outcome is greater variation in both decisions and justifications for the 
decisions in identical cases in Norway than in California. Berrick et al. (2017) make 
similar observations where Norwegian workers are clearly divided in a question of 
care order than Californian workers. It is still noteworthy that both in article IV  
(Tefre 2017) and in the study by Berrick et al. (2017) the variance in responses by 
English workers, who also have comprehensive guidelines, are more similar to 
Norwegian workers, but they are also more similar to Norwegians in terms of their 
educational levels and degree of task specialization, at least in our sample (cf. 
Skivenes and Tefre 2012). 
However, in the case of adoption, both the English and Californian child protection 
workers were united in their response, and both countries have clear policies that 
guides practitioners in this area. The lack of both statutory clarities to limit 
discretionary space and decision-tools to guide discretionary reasoning the result in 
Norway is clearly a challenge to central principles in the rule of law: the principle of 
legal certainty and the principle of equality before the law. 
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The variation resulting from strong discretion of Norwegian child protection workers 
challenges the principle of legal certainty because neither the child, the foster parents, 
or the birth parents can be assured of which conditions must apply if a child is to be 
adopted. Child welfare workers have little incentive to pursue adoption once the child 
is ‘safely’ placed in foster care, and there is no clear guidance to help them determine 
when adoption is appropriate. Whether a case is forwarded to adoption in Norway can 
thus be arbitrary (Helland and Skivenes 2019; Skivenes and Tefre 2012). Starting 
adoption procedures requires an active effort and justification for doing so. Leaving 
the child in foster care requires no such thing. Inertia effects are then likely to leave 
many children with the status quo. Indication of  this is found in a report of adoption 
in Norway (Helland and Skivenes 2019), which found that 94% of adoption cases 
forwarded to the County Boards during 2011-2016 ended in favour of adoption, and 
that very few characteristics separated adoptive children from other children residing 
in long-term care. At the same time there are considerable variation in the relative 
number of adoption cases between the different County Boards (Falch-Eriksen and 
Skivenes 2019:127). A minor study also indicated that in the agencies that forwarded 
most cases to adoption in Norway the local staff or leadership had made deliberate 
efforts to actively focus on adoption (Tefre and Helland 2019). This makes it likely 
that contingencies are a serious challenge in Norway to which children get adopted 
and not. However, if the child’s best interest is to be the guiding principle, then surely 
this must also be taken to mean that long-term foster care should also be an explicit 
decision, rather than a non-decision. Contingencies also threatens the principle of 
equality before the law because it requires equal treatment of equal cases. While, this 
is an intrinsic challenge in discretionary practice which cannot be entirely removed 
(Molander 2016), it is possible to ameliorate the challenges if the political level is 
more clear on the circumstances that require adoption to be considered. For example 
an expert report ordered by the Stoltenberg-government recommended the adoption 
always be considered within specified time lines for the youngest children (placed in 
care at age four and under) who face long-term care (NOU 2012: 5). While such a 
proposal does not address the criteria for adoption it would ensure that a group of 
children with some similar characteristics are actively considered, and would likely 
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improve both legal certainty and equality, and reduce contingencies in who gets 
assessed for adoption. This would also transfer more of the responsibility for 
legitimizing adoption from care to the political level, thus relieving some of the 
burdens on practitioners. 
6.2 The State’s Responsibility in Long-Term Care 
The role of the state in long-term care and adoption in Norway and the U.S. reflects 
wider differences in the boundaries between public state and private family 
responsibility for children in the two countries. Relating to the analytical framework 
on the centrality of ideas and discourse to understand policy, the findings in articles I 
(Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 2020), it is plausible that institutional context of the 
welfare state and cultural values influences the states responsibility for children. In 
the U.S. there is a strong policy preference that children in need of long-term care are 
reintegrated or refamilialized to the private sphere through adoption. In Norway there 
is no pressure to refamilialize children, and most children who cannot return to their 
families will grow up in foster care. The main challenge in Norway is that while the 
government signalled a clear desire for more adoptions from care, the policy failed to 
deliver any substantial guidance to practitioners about when adoption should be 
considered appropriate. 
Starting with the statistics, in Norway, when children are placed in foster care 
following a care order it is the norm rather than the exception that the placement is 
long-term. Numbers from the Central Unit of the County Boards show that between 
2011 and 2016 the County Boards handled on average 1006 care order cases 
annually, and on average 86% resulted in a care order. In comparison there were on 
average 300 annual cases of reunification, how many of these cases resulted in 
reunification is unknown. The relatively low rate of reunification in Norway is often 
attributed to the requirement to provide in-home services to prevent the need for 
placement. Thus, when children are placed in care they have often been in the system 
for an extensive period and the possible in-home services have already been 
exhausted, or the evidence suggests that further services will be unsuccessful (Backe-
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Hansen et al. 2014; Berrick and Skivenes 2013). In the United States roughly half of 
foster care placements result in reunification, and the majority of reunifications take 
place within a relatively short time after placement (Child Welfare Information 
Gateway 2019; Wulczyn 2004).  
Both countries experienced an increase in the number of children living in foster care 
during the time when adoption was debated (USA 1995-1997 and Norway 2003-
2013) (see table 1). Between 1982 and 1997 the U.S. foster care population more than 
doubled, which was an important driver to promote more adoptions from care, as the 
foster care system was experiencing severe challenges in handling the number of 
children in care (Tefre 2015). The reduction in number of children placed in care in 
the U.S. since 1997 is largely attributed to children exiting foster care through 
adoption and kinship care (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2019; Wulczyn, 
Chen, and Hislop 2006). Norway has also experienced a significant increase in the 
number of children in care since the 90s, however this development has not led 
Norway to emphasize measures to focus on adoption to reduce the number of 
children in care. Table 1 shows the number of children in care as point in time, and in 
the final column to the right the number of adoptions in 2016. Children placed in U.S. 
foster care are more than fifteen times more likely to be adopted from care, compared 
to Norwegian children in care.  
Given the fact that foster care placements in Norway are more likely to be long-term 
compared to the U.S., where about half of the children reunify, we might have 
expected that adoptions would be more common in Norway. This is not the case. 
Although, as shown in articles I and II (Tefre 2015, 2020), both Norway and the 
United States rely on very similar knowledge bases to inform legislators about the 
benefits of adoption to children in long-term care, the policy outcome is very 
different. The knowledge base has been important to explain the formation of policies 
to promote more adoptions in both countries. But due to normative ideas about state 
responsibility, and what the state can effectively do, these two states end up with very 
different policies on responsibility for children. Key here are different normative 
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ideas about the appropriate role of the state in relation to the family between the two 
countries.  
Table 1: number of children in out-of-home care, and per 1000 children, and 
children adopted from care in 2016, and per 1000 children (T in the first row 
represent point in time, as the years do not always overlap) 
 T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 Adopted 

































a Total number of children in care. Source: (House CWM 1996a:743, Table 12–14) b Source: (Berrick 
2011:19) c Source: (Berrick et al. in press b:Table 2) d Source: (Berrick et al. in press b:Table 1). 
In the U.S. foster care is by default a temporary solution, and the system is not 
designed to offer a permanent home for children. In one of the early hearings Shaw 
(R-FL) chairman of the House Subcommittee on Human Resources, summarized the 
goal of state responsibility for children in need of long-term care:  
as a nation, we are seeking a foster care system that meets three goals: First 
and most important, it must protect children from harm; second, it must 
remove as few children as possible from their homes; and third, when children 
are removed from their homes, the system must move quickly to either reunite 
them with their families or terminate parental rights and have the children 
placed for adoption (Rep. Shaw (R-FL) House CWM 1995:4). 
The foster care system is deliberately set up as a temporary safety net, and not 
designed to provide long-term care. Representative Kennelly (D-CT), one of the co-
authors of the House bill, expressed this view at the passing of ASFA: 
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our foster care system is an extremely valuable safety net, and I want to 
emphasize that … What this bill is about really, though, is to have a child in a 
permanent home. And where that safety net is there in a foster care home, the 
child knows when the home is not permanent (Rep. Kennelly (D-CT) CONG. 
REC 1997a:H10790). 
This clearly delimits the public role in long-term care to two central tasks, either 
rehabilitate the parents and reunify the child with his or her birth family, or move 
forward with adoption. One of the central justifications for adoption in ASFA was 
child refamilialization ethics, as shown in Article I (Tefre 2015), which emphasizes a 
limited state responsibility as parent, and the citations above by Reps. Shaw and 
Kennelly express this clearly. Foster care is a temporary haven, adoption provides a 
permanent family. In this view child rearing belongs in the private sphere, not the 
public. The state is considered both pragmatically incapable and ethically unsuited to 
the task of long-term parenting. Paradoxically then, the approach that favours a 
limited state role in long-term care of children also necessitates deep state 
intervention through termination of parental rights when reunification is not possible 
to refamilialize children to the public sphere. 
This should not be taken to imply that respect for family life and family-preservation 
is less sacred in the U.S. than Norway, as witnessed by the high rate of reunifications 
in the U.S. (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2019) and the relatively high 
thresholds for removal compared to Norway (Berrick et al. 2017). Rather, it reflects 
an ideal of limited government and children belonging in the private sphere. In light 
of a hands-off approach and limited belief in state capabilities to intervene positively 
in the private it makes sense that children should not grow up as wards of the state. 
Thus, adoption is clearly preferred if the alternative is growing up in public care.  
The idea of limited government in responsibility for children’s long-term care is also 
expressed through concerns over public spending. Especially Republicans noted 
several times during the ASFA proceedings that public tax spending should be placed 
where it could give maximum effect, and given the poor performance of family 
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preservation initiatives and the promise improved life-outcomes and permanency 
through adoption, this placed powerful fiscal incentives to prefer adoption as well: 
Not only will the provision increase the number of adoptions, but it will 
actually save money. Members of Congress will seldom have the opportunity 
to vote for a bill that both does the right thing for children and saves taxpayers 
dollars at the same time. (Rep. Shaw (R-FL) CONG. REC 1997b:H2016)  
Thus, in a political context that values limited government and minimizing public 
spending, adoption is easily marketed to legislators looking for best value for money. 
By contrast, in Norway it is inconceivable that politicians could argue fiscal savings 
as a positive side-effect of increased numbers of adoption. As noted in article II 
(Tefre 2020), the Stoltenberg-government was accused of acting unethically simply 
for stating that the costs of more adoption cases before the courts would be offset by 
reduction in costs for foster care. The citation by U.S. Representative Shaw may of 
course be interpreted as a cynical expression of fiscal conservatism. In this light 
adoption is a way of reducing public spending, especially since states are entitled to 
per diem federal compensation for foster care expenses for eligible children (under 
title IV-E of the Social Security Act). Another interpretation would be to view it as a 
pragmatic argument about spending your resources on what works. Regardless of 
Shaw’s intent, resources in child protection are finite, and it is therefore also 
necessary that politicians engage in debates over prioritization and how resources are 
most effectively spent. In Norway, any potential debate about public spending on 
long-term care and effective management of limited child protection resources was 
effectively squashed by reducing it to a question of putting a price on childhood. 
Norway shares the first two of the goals expressed by Shaw, to protect children from 
harm (central to the best interests of the child) and prevent the need for placing 
children in care (the principle of the least intrusive intervention) (Tefre 2020). But 
Norway differs markedly on the third goal, which focuses on getting children out of 
public care either through reunification or adoption. Contrary to the U.S., Norway 
retains a responsibility to facilitate continued contact between children in foster care 
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and their birth-parents, even when there is no intention of reunification. This 
responsibility of the state to facilitate continued contact even in long-term care is the 
primary reason why adoption is rarely practiced in Norway and it is deeply 
entrenched in Norwegian child protection through the biological principle. Article II 
(Tefre 2020) identifies the biological principle as the fundamental social value that 
children should grow up with their parents. The state’s role is subsidiary, and even if 
children cannot grow up with their birth parents, the state should facilitate continued 
contact. The biological principle was central to the debates on adoption in Norway, 
although the weight placed on biological ties was reduced over time as more parties 
embraced a more active role for adoption. However, the fundamental idea of how one 
should balance different groups of children’s needs for continued contact with their 
family of origin against their need or desire to belong fully to their foster family was 
never addressed. As noted above, this question was left to practitioners and the courts 
to deal with in each individual case. In its proposal to promote more adoptions, the 
Labour led Stoltenberg-government stated that: 
the child protection agency must practice good professional discretion when it 
considers if a case should be sent to the County Board. Whether adoption is in 
the child’s best interests relies on an overall assessment, where different 
considerations are weighed. The assessment must be specific, and based on 
information in the particular case. Therefore, it is not possible to provide a 
definitive and exhaustive list of all considerations that may be relevant in the 
assessment of the child’s best interests, nor is it possible to say anything 
general about how to balance the different considerations against each other. 
(Ot. prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009):34) 
It is reasonable that the government cannot provide an exhaustive or definitive list of 
considerations, as the complexity of these cases do not allow for a one-size solutions, 
and professional discretion is clearly necessary. The government did pledge to 
provide guidance in the form of a list of factors that are relevant in assessing whether 
adoption is in the child’s best interests. However, the claim that is not possible to say 
anything general on how to balance different considerations is puzzling, and amounts 
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to an abdication of political responsibility. Adoption is a highly political question that 
concerns how the state intervenes in the heart of the private sphere, the family. If 
elected officials cannot be expected to even make general statements about how 
different considerations should be weighed, an important source of democratic 
control is left open. It should also be noted that after ten years, the government has 
still not produced any guidelines on adoption to municipal agencies. Thus, it is still 
unclear what the policy on adoption actually is in Norway, and the result as discussed 
above, is that whether children are placed for adoption or not may be contingent on 
factors not germane to whether adoption is in the child’s best interests. 
Comparing foster care in Norway and the U.S., Berrick and Skivenes (2013) find that 
the Norwegian welfare state takes a very hands-on approach to foster care through 
law, policy and service provision which clearly marks foster care as a public 
responsibility. There are universal welfare services available to the families in 
addition to a comparatively rich access to services, support and resources to foster 
parents, and foster parents who care for children with special needs are financially 
compensated for taking time of work to care for their foster child. In comparison, the 
U.S. state takes a much more hands-off approach to foster care after the child has 
been formally placed. There are less resources and services available to foster carers, 
and the lack of universal welfare arrangements for children mean that foster parents 
also have to spend their own resources to navigate a complex system of entitlements 
and private service providers, and financial compensations are much less generous. 
Overall this conforms to the welfare regimes of the two countries where the state 
takes a back seat to markets in welfare provision in the U.S. whereas in Norway, the 
state is the main provider of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999).  
Thus, in Norway, foster care provides a more financially stable solution to foster 
parents, and comes with public support, whereas adoptive parents lose all access to 
such services and support. By law, adoptive parents are no different to parents who 
care for their own children. Thus, making the step from foster to adoptive parent 
could also be considered costlier to Norwegian foster carers than their U.S. 
counterparts who receive – compared to the Norwegians – little public support in 
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their role as foster parents. However, we have no studies that have examined foster 
parent motivation to adopt in Norway, and it may well be that they have simply never 
been asked to consider it. Also, this cannot explain findings in article III (Skivenes 
and Tefre 2012) where 40% of Norwegian child protection workers would not 
consider adoption, despite the foster parents’ desire to adopt. In spite of increased 
legal emphasis on children’s rights to participation in Norway, we still know almost 
nothing about how children in long-term foster care themselves consider adoption. 
These are important areas for future research, that may help clarify the appropriate 
place for adoption in Norwegian child protection. 
The question of the state’s role and responsibility in long-term care and adoption 
relies fundamentally on the question of what the state recognizes as ‘family’. In the 
U.S. this question was addressed during the ASFA-proceedings, and the answer is 
summed up well by Dr. Albert Solnit’s expert testimony during the hearings (House 
CWM 1996b:99): 
“A parent who can provide day-to day attention to a child’s needs for physical 
care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation will form an attachment 
with … and will become [the child’s] ‘psychological parents’ … [This role] 
can be fulfilled by any other caring adult – but never by an absent, inactive 
adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be.” 
In the U.S. the question of permanence has long been central to the debate on long-
term care and adoption (Bartholet 1999; Fein and Maluccio 1992; Tefre 2015). As 
noted in section 1.1, permanence has three components: legal permanence, residential 
permanence, and relational permanence (Brodzinsky and Smith 2019; Palacios et al. 
2019). In the U.S. an important argument for adoption has been to place the legal 
permanence with the caretakers that are expected to provide the child with residential 
and relational permanence. Thus, U.S. policy recognizes explicitly that the care-
takers most likely to constitute the child’s de facto family, should also constitute the 
child’s family de jure. This is a political choice that also clearly overlaps with the 
value of limited government, but explicitly prioritizing psychological ties above 
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blood ties is also a very child centred idea of what constitutes ‘family’. Importantly, 
legislators in the U.S. emphasized that legal permanence establishes families for life, 
not just a temporary home where children can live until the reach adulthood. This is a 
crucial difference between the focus on permanence and the ideas of stability and 
continuity which dominated Norwegian debates. While children and foster parents 
may, and often do come to regard each other as family in terms of the psychological 
ties they establish (Biehal et al. 2010; McSherry et al. 2016), the legal permanence 
provided through adoption takes a much longer perspective than just securing a stable 
childhood. It is about creating family ties for life, and into adulthood.  
A version of permanence has long been central to Norwegian child protection, 
especially in long-term care, with a narrow focus on providing children with stability 
and continuity of care. It is central to policies of early intervention and in-home 
services to prevent placement. But in the perspective of long-term care the idea of 
legal permanence has not received much attention (Skivenes and Thoburn 2016; 
Tefre 2020). A clear sign that Norwegian policy commits to respecting children’s 
need for emotional and residential permanence is evident in the burden of evidence 
required for reunification, which is higher than for a care order. According to Section 
4-21 of the CWA it must be “highly probable that the parents will be able to provide 
the child with proper care” in order to reunify, whereas the standard for care orders is 
the preponderance of the evidence. Even if the parents are able to pass this threshold, 
reunification cannot take place if “the child has become so attached to persons and 
the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an overall assessment, 
removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or her”. These restrictions 
were put in place to secure stability and continuity in the child’s upbringing (Ot. prp. 
nr. 69 (2008-2009)). But the paradox of Norwegian policy on adoption from care is 
only made more apparent. Thresholds for reunification are high, making it less likely 
that the child will return, and more likely that the child will come to view her foster 
family as her de facto family, but the state is seemingly reluctant to take the last step 
of integrating de facto and de jure family, even for children who are very likely to 
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spend their whole childhood in foster care, and have been placed with the explicit 
intent of long-term care (‘oppvekstplassering’). 
In Norway, the question of legal permanence is treated separately from the question 
of who provides the child with residential and relational permanence. A plausible 
explanation for this is that weight afforded to biological ties remains strong in 
Norway and where U.S. policy clearly favours a refamilialization of children to the 
private sphere over maintaining legal ties to biological family, Norwegian practice 
tends to uphold a distinction between the foster family that is expected to function as 
the child’s de facto family, and the child’s family de jure, which remains with the 
biological parents. For a child placed in care at a very early age, and who has spent 
the majority of his or her life in foster care it is well worth asking who the child 
considers family. 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The thesis started by asking how states form and justify policy as guardian of 
children’s right to protection from harm balanced against the rights and 
responsibilities of parents. To answer this, I have examined how Norway and the 
United States – two countries with very different welfare regimes and child welfare 
orientations – have formed and justified their policy on public responsibility for 
children in long-term care, both from the street-level and the legislative level. I will 
end this thesis by a brief reflection on the current criticism that is directed at 
Norwegian child protection in light of the findings discussed in this thesis.  
The Norwegian child protection system is currently undergoing unprecedented 
scrutiny by the ECtHR. One of the key findings in this thesis has been that 
Norwegian child protection workers carry a heavy burden of legitimizing child 
protection policy through their decisions with individual children, because the law 
and regulatory guidelines from the political level are vague and conflicting. The 
strong discretion given to the street-level practitioners require more effort in 
documenting their justification in any single decision to secure its legitimacy. 
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However, public audits by regulatory agencies have repeatedly shown that 
Norwegian child protection workers struggle to provide adequate justifications and 
documentation for their decisions (Skivenes and Tefre 2020). The same criticism of 
procedural errors is central to the judgements by the ECtHR which has found Norway 
in violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of 
Europe 1953), in three adoption cases in the last year (Strand Lobben and Others v. 
Norway, appl. no. 37283/13; Pedersen and Others v. Norway, appl. no. 39710/15; 
Abdi Ibrahim v. Norway, appl. no. 15379/16). Crucially the decisions by the ECtHR 
do not point at the material question of adoption, but to procedural errors and failure 
to provide satisfactory documentation at earlier stages of the case. The fact that it is 
procedural, rather than material aspects of these cases that are being criticised it is 
poignant to ask whether Norwegian child welfare workers are equipped to take on the 
enormous responsibility of strong discretionary decision-making, or whether the 
government and parliament needs to step in and relieve practitioners of some of this 
burden. This can be done by clarifying how central legal principles should be 
weighed, both in law and through professional guidelines.  
This is the case in Denmark. The Danish government has recently made legislative 
changes that require child protection agencies to consider adoption whenever a 
placement is expected to be long-term. It combined these changes with professional 
guidelines to aid decision-makers and clarify when adoption is the preferred solution, 
as well as the considerations practitioners need to address to assess and document the 
case (Socialstyrelsen 2015). Denmark has also downplayed the principle of least 
intrusive measure in legislation to strengthen the role of the best-interests principle. 
Thus, practitioners are no longer required to try or exhaust in-home services if an out-
of-home placement is in the child’s best interests (Hestbæk et al. in press). Through 
these changes Denmark elevates important ethical and moral questions about how to 
balance parental and children’s rights and needs to the legislative level, and the 
democratic arena. 
The Grand Chamber of the Norwegian Supreme Court recently made important 
clarifications about the status of Norwegian child protection principles in light of the 
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verdicts by the ECtHR, including implications for adoption (HR-2020-661-S). And it 
has been argued that these have provided much needed clarification to practitioners 
going forward (Sandberg 2020). The clarifications by the Supreme Court are clearly 
important. However, my analyses of discourses in parliamentary bodies in articles I 
(Tefre 2015) and II (Tefre 2020) emphasize the inherently normative nature of child 
protection legislation. Deciding what principles govern child protection and how to 
weigh them is not merely a technical question of what works. The central differences 
between Norway and the U.S. are not about pragmatic questions of whether adoption 
is more stable than foster care, or whether it can secure better outcomes. It is about 
how to balance deeply held ethical-political values and moral convictions in a 
political fellowship. These are questions that must be answered in the political realm, 
and it requires active engagement with difficult prioritizations by elected officials. It 
is easy to point at weaknesses in the discretionary reasoning of street-level 
bureaucrats, but the responsibility for structuring the discretionary space and 
providing guidance for discretionary reasoning must be anchored in the democratic 
processes and decisions of legislative bodies. If too much is left to the street-level we 
risk losing important democratic control over children’s rights and we are not able to 
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Appendix: Vignettes and survey 
The Survey for the CHILDPRO project contained six vignettes, here I include the two 
vignettes that were used in this thesis. I have included all the questions that followed 
each of the vignettes. However, in article III we addressed only answers to questions 
3, 4, and 7. For article IV I addressed only the answers to questions 1 and 2.  
Vignette for article III 
Benjamin, 3 years old 
Facts 
Benjamin is 3 years-old, white, and has lived with foster parents since CYPS placed 
him when he was 5 months old. The parents, also white, are drug users. Benjamin's 
parents have visitation rights but have never gone to see him. 
History 
Benjamin was born 7 weeks prematurely and spent four weeks in the hospital before 
his parents could take him home. When Benjamin was five months old, he was 
hospitalized with cranial bleeding. The medical examination indicated that he had 
been repeatedly physically abused. Both parents were high on heroin when they were 
at the hospital, and due to their substance abuse problem and the suspicion of 
physical abuse of Benjamin, the hospital contacted CYPS. CYPS decided to remove 
Benjamin from his parents, and when he was released from the hospital, he was 
placed with foster parents. Benjamin has special needs due to the abuse he received 
when he was a baby. 
The relationship between the foster parents and Benjamin is reportedly very good, 
and Benjamin's special needs are well taken care of. His development is on a very 
good track. His parents are still heavy drug users, primarily using heroin. They are 
often seen in well-known drug user milieu in the city. CYPS does not think it is likely 
that the parents will take part in the rehabilitation program. 
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Present situation 
When Benjamin turned three years old, his foster parents indicated that they want to 
adopt him. They love Benjamin as if he were their own son and think he would 
benefit from the stability and predictability that adoption would bring. Benjamin's 
biological mother will not agree to the adoption. The biological father is in favour of 
the adoption as long as it is guaranteed that he can continue to have visitation rights. 
Question 
Based on this information, which is a resumé of information from the case file, please 
tell us what you would do. 
1. How do you assess the level of risk for the 3-year-old? 
a. no risk 
b. low risk 
c. neither low nor high risk 
d. high risk 
e. very high risk 
 
2. What specific factors in the case led you to this assessment? [Open ended] 
 
3. Based on the case description above, what do you do? 
a. Do nothing 
b. Return the 3-year-old to his birth parents and provide in-home services 
(elaborate below) 
c. Leave the 3-year-old with his foster parents, but do not initiate adoption 
d. Prepare the case for adoption 
e. Another decision (elaborate below) 
If you answered b) ‘provide in-home services’, which services would you 
provide? [open ended] 
If you answered e) ‘another decision’, please explain here: [open ended] 
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4. Please explain which specific factors in the case were crucial to your decision? 
[open ended] 
 
5. Would you speak with the 3-year-old to get his viewpoint? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
 
6. If you answered yes, how much weight would you give to his viewpoints in this 
case? 
 
7. What would have to be different in this case for you to reach a different decision? 
[open ended] 
Vignette for article IV 
Andrew, 2 months old 
Facts 
Andrew is a white 2-month-old baby whose mother, white, age 22, has learning 
difficulties and has an IQ of 73. The paediatrician has contacted CYPS due to risk for 
possible neglect. Andrew's father is unknown. 
History 
In his visit with the paediatrician when Andrew was two weeks old, he showed signs 
of malnourishment. It became clear that his mother could not figure out how to mix 
his formula properly. The baby also had severe nappy rash, which he had since birth 
and which had not been treated properly. According to the paediatrician, it took the 
mother a long time to learn that she must hold up the baby's head when holding him. 
Andrew and his mother are staying with his grandmother. Andrew's grandmother 




When Andrew is 2 months old, he was hospitalized with a low-grade seizure disorder 
and an eye problem. While waiting at the hospital, the mother fell asleep with the 
baby in her lap, and the baby's head fell back. One of the nurses rushes to the mother 
to wake her up. The hospital contacted CYPS. 
Question 
Based on this information, which is a resumé of information from the case file, please 
tell us what you would do. 
1. How do you assess the level of risk for the 3-year-old? 
a. no risk 
b. low risk 
c. neither low nor high risk 
d. high risk 
e. very high risk 
 
2. What specific factors in the case led you to this assessment? [Open ended] 
 
3. Based on the case description above, what do you do? 
a. Do nothing 
b. Leave the 2-month-old baby with his mother and provide in-home services 
(elaborate below) 
c. Place the 2-month-old baby in out-of-home care (elaborate below) 
d. Prepare the case for adoption 
e. Another decision (elaborate below) 
 
If you answered b) ‘provide in-home services’, which services would you 
provide? [open ended] 
If you answered c) ‘Place the 2-month-old baby in out-of-home care’, 
which placement would you make? [open ended] 
If you answered e) ‘another decision’, please explain here: [open ended] 
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4. Please explain which specific factors in the case were crucial to your decision? 
[open ended] 
 
5. What would have to be different in this case for you to reach a different decision? 
[open ended] 
Survey Background Information 
1. Country [Norway, England, USA] 
2. City / County [open ended] 
3. Number of years working at current Child Protection Agency [continuous] 
4. Number of years working in Child Protection [continuous] 
5. Age [20-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70] 
6. Gender [Male, Female] 
7. Race 
8. Ethnicity 
9. Highest Educational Level [High-School, College / Høyskole, BA, MA, PhD] 
a. If you have a bachelor’s or a Master’s degree, in which field? [open 
ended] 
b. If you have any kind specialization or post-qualifying education, please 
supply information here: [open ended] 
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This article examines thenormative basis for prioritizing adoption in the “Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997”
(ASFA) as expressed by legislators and public witnesses in congressional hearings. By examining six congressio-
nal hearings in the period that led to the ASFA, the article provides new insights to understand how adoption is
justified in theU.S. not only as an acceptable formof public intervention but also as an actively promoted andpre-
ferred approach when reunification is not possible. The article uses a discourse theoretical framework based on
Habermas that distinguishes pragmatic, ethical–political, moral, and legal arguments. It reveals that U.S. federal
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inform policy. Parent responsibility ethics stresses individual responsibility for rehabilitation, with secondary
support from the welfare system. Child refamilialization ethics emphasizes decisive and authoritative action to
protect the child's needs for safety and permanence.
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1. Introduction
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (1997) (ASFA) rendered adop-
tion the preferred solution for the placement of children who cannot
or are unlikely to be reunified with parents within a limited period of
time. The ASFA was a response to a significciant increase in the number
of children in public care in the U.S., the continuation of “foster care
drift,” and highly publicized stories in which children are subjected to
continued abuse and neglect after reunification. Focusing on child safety
and permanency, the ASFA shifted priorities in the American child pro-
tection policy from family reunification to ideals of permanence and
adoption. After 16 years, the preferences expressed in the ASFA remain
the cornerstone of U.S. federal policy regarding children who are not
reunified. Although legislators in some European countries have
shown an increased interest in adoptions from child welfare (see
Official Norwegian Reports, 2012:5; Ramesh, 2013), adoption remains
controversial and is frequently regarded as a last resort (Gilbert, Parton,
& Skivenes, 2011; Rees, 2013). The U.S. differs significantly from other
countries on the issue of adoption; this issue is addressed in this paper.
Adoption is closely associatedwith the issue of how countries arrange
responsibility for children between the public and the private. It repre-
sents the most drastic form of state intervention in the private lives of
families1 by legally severing all ties between a parent and a child. The
ASFA was the result of a remarkable bipartisan consensus on the benefits
of adoption to children. It passed the House by 416–5 (Congressional
Record—U.S. House, 1997b), unanimously passed in the Senate
(Congressional Record—U.S. Senate, 1997), and was supported by Presi-
dent Clinton's administration (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (1997). The severity of the intervention coupledwith the enthu-
siasm it received by Congress makes the ASFA legislative process a highly
interesting case for examining the normative and pragmatic reasoning
employed by legislators to justify the limits of public responsibility for
children. I employ a democratic theory of deliberation (Habermas,
1996) to analyze the normative foundation that supports the ASFA and
its emphasis on adoption. Using a qualitative analysis of legislative hear-
ings and congressional records, I employ ideal type discourses of rational
justification to contrast how legislators justified their position on the in-
voluntary termination of parental rights (termination) and adoption.
Previous studies of the ASFA that have examined the legislative
process or intent have primarily focused on the outcomeof the ASFA, em-
phasized the policy shift it represents (Beem, 2007; Kim, 1999), criticized
its shortcomings (Gordon, 1999; Roberts, 2002; Stein, 2000, 2003),
identified the challenges of implementation or potential “loopholes”
(Bartholet, 1999; Bean, 2009; Gendell, 2001;Herring, 2000), or evaluated
its effect on increasing adoptions (Lowry, 2004;Wulczyn, Chen, &Hislop,
2006). Although the emphasis and input from democratic theory to
understand the pragmatic and normative influences on the limits of
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public intervention have not been subject to the same level of attention,
an understanding of why child welfare policies are adopted is critical. By
examining the justifications for adoption and termination in the ASFA via
congressional hearings and debates, this paper examines the type of
knowledge and evidence that was considered relevant and influential
to legislation. It examines the social and cultural norms and values that
were considered by legislators and the rights and needs of children and
families. Justifications for two sections that were intended to expedite
permanency for children constitute the focus of this study: first, the ex-
ceptions to reasonable efforts requirement, which allows states to direct-
ly proceed to termination in cases of severe abuse or neglect; second, the
introduction of a termination timeline that requires states to begin termi-
nation proceedings for a child who has spent 15 of the last 22 months in
care.
This paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 introduces the
theoretical framework for the analysis. Section 3 describes the employed
data andmethods. Section 4 presents the central findings. Section 5 uses
the findings to establish three pillars of reasoning that are combined to
support the ASFA. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
1.1. The context of child welfare reform
When Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act in 1980, it was considered a response to the concern with large
numbers of children in foster care and “foster care drift.” Its goal was
to reduce the number of children in care by requiring reasonable efforts
to prevent entry to foster care or to reunify children in care with their
families (Bean, 2009; Berrick, 2011). Although initially successful, the
foster care population began to increase again, from 262,000 in 1982
to 468,000 by the end of 1994. Urban areas experienced the majority
of this growth; the crack epidemic of the late 1980s was significant
(U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1996a). An equally trou-
bling issue was that the age of children in initial entries was decreasing,
with a median age of 7.8 in 1990. A contributing factor was the signifi-
cant increase in the number of infants entering care, which accounted
for 24% of the initial entries by 1992 (U.S. House. Committee on Ways
and Means, 1996a). Foster care drift re-emerged; in 1990, 57.2% of
children in care had experienced more than one placement, and almost
30% of children in care had experienced a minimum of three placements.
Although reunifications had significantly increased to 66.7% in 1990, 15%
of the total entries in 1990were re-entries due to failed reunifications, in-
cluding numerous infants (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means,
1996a). As the number of children killed by their parents increased
(McCurdy & Daro, 1994), the stories of these killings were featured in
major news headlines that emphasized the failure of childwelfare to pro-
tect children from dangerous parents (Bean, 2009). As a result, legislators
in the early 1990s became concerned that reunification efforts had
exceeded their limits and that the increase in the foster care population
was primarily attributed to reluctance and delays in adoptions, which re-
sulted in adoption backlogs (Wulczyn, 2004).
2. Theory: discourse ethics and principles of argumentation and
justification
This article employs a normative theoretical framework of rational
argumentation in collective decision making to examine the legislative
process. According to the discourse ethics of Habermas (1996), I argue
that an informed debate about the challenges and solutions regarding
adoption are required to obtain better answers when wrestling with
questions of policy choices. The value pluralism characteristic of mod-
ern democracies requires active and rational deliberation about conflict-
ing values and viewpoints to reach solutions that can be recognized as
legitimate by all. The key objective is to transform private preferences
into positions that canwithstand public scrutiny and testing via the pro-
cess of deliberation (Held, 2006: p.237). The rationality and legitimacy
of collective decisions are derived from the quality of the decision-
making process rather than their outcome. As an ideal type framework,
discourse ethics relies on two equally important parts: ‘process rules' set
requirements for participation to ensure that all affected parties can
have their voice heard, and ‘content rules' require debate participants
to provide rational justifications for their assertions that are open to
scrutiny and criticism to be considered valid (see Alexy, 1989: p.187–
197; Eriksen & Weigård, 2003: p.206–228). In this article, I will focus
on the content of justifications. I will not examine questions about par-
ticipation or the theoretical details of process rules.
I propose to examine the nature of the arguments presented during
the ASFA legislative process and how these arguments were considered
by members of Congress to understand the foundation of the resulting
policy.
Habermas (1996) argues that although questions about norms,
values, or cultural and religious beliefs cannot be considered true or
false (like facts about the natural world), we are capable of determining
the norms and values that should be considered “right” or “just” for us
as members of a society and democratic citizens. Although we will
never be satisfied that a single right answer to normative dilemmas
has been obtained, pluralistic democracies can achieve better solutions
by engaging in rational deliberations in law and policymaking.
Different types of policy questions require different types of delibera-
tive engagement and standards of justification to be considered rational.
As previously noted, certain values are not “true” or “false” but can be
considered “right” or “wrong,” “fair” or “unfair,” and “legal” or “illegal”
for us. Discourse theory distinguishes four types of discourseswith corre-
sponding requirements for the justification of arguments, to which the
participants in decision making must adhere in rational deliberation.
These types of problems consist of “pragmatic,” “ethical–political,”
“moral,” and “legal” discourses.
Pragmatic discourses (Habermas, 1996: pp.159–160) are concerned
with establishing the truth of empirical facts, proscribing appropriate
strategies for achieving established goals, and evaluating themost likely
consequences of possible choices of action. This is the discourse of clas-
sic strategic rationality, in which participants have to select the best ac-
tion for realizing a desired goal but are constrained by limited time and
resources. The goal is already established and is not a topic for debate.
The standard of justification is based on the evaluation of the solidity
of the presented evidence and evaluates if assertions are true or false,
sufficiently documented, reliable, and realistic.
Regarding the issue of which policy goals to pursue, we refer to
ethical–political discourses (Habermas, 1996: pp.160–161). Participants
are not only concerned with obtaining an appropriate solution to a
problem but also emphasize deeply held values and norms about
what constitutes a “good life” for members of society. The standard of
justification dictates that the arguments are authentic expressions of
their proponents' viewpoints, which can be contrastedwith other view-
points. Although a single solution that is perfectly satisfactory to all may
not exist, the process of openly engaging in debate about contested
valuesmay increase the chances of finding a solution that can be gener-
ally accepted as right and good for us.
Although the normative questions in ethical–political discourses are
grounded in a political fellowship's shared history and culture, moral
discourses (Habermas, 1996: pp.161–162) require us to take a step
back from the existing normative context to debate amore fundamental
standard of fairness: how can society be regulated in the equal interest
of all? Arguments are justified to the extent that a norm is only fair if it is
applicable to all in comparable situations and foreseeable typical cases.
Although they are very abstract, we delimit moral discourses to argu-
ments that consider different methods of conceptualizing fairness and
equality for similar situations.
Entirely normative questions in moral discourses are curtailed by the
rule of law. Legislative procedures establish rules that systematize
decisions, and any new law must be integrated with preexisting laws
and rights to which the political fellowship is bound. Legal discourses
(Habermas, 1996: pp.167–168) consider the correctness and consistency
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of law, which is important for the sake of legal clarity, to ensure that leg-
islative intent is maintained and to ensure that new laws are compatible
with the system of individual rights and law. Although legal discourses
were a central part of the ASFA, theywere concernedwith clarifying con-
gressional intent and with providing the best legal tools for courts to ex-
ecute this intent without interfering excessively with judicial and State
autonomy. Based on my reading of the hearings and debates, legal dis-
courses were not central to an explanation of why the increased use of
termination and adoption was justified. Therefore, I will not focus on
legal discourses in this paper.
As a highly abstract and normative theory, discourse ethics has been
criticized for setting a standard for deliberation that is impossible to
achieve in practice, thus calling into question its usefulness. However,
by applying an ideal type standard for the critical examination of dis-
course and decision making, I can scrutinize the reasoning for decision
making, which may help identify what is omitted from or considered
less important to the decision-making process. The intent of this paper
is not to establish the correctness or incorrectness of the ASFA but to
subject the legislative process to this type of scrutiny.
3. Methods
This study is limited to the congressional legislative process inwhich
a bill is shaped, debated, and passed. The data consist of records of
congressional hearings and the Congressional Record on the day that
each bill was passed. Including the final ASFA bill, seven different bill
proposals were debated at separate times on the congressional floor
or in committee meetings. All proposed bills have been reviewed and
carefully compared.
The study is based on a qualitative in-depth analysis of six congres-
sional hearings and four congressional debates that concerned changes
in federal adoption and foster care law and led to the enactment of the
ASFA. Table 1 provides an overview of the hearings and debates includ-
ed in this study.
The study includes six of the seven hearings that are listed in the
“ProQuest Congressional” website for ASFA's (PL105-89) legislative
record. The one excluded hearing, titled “Improving the Well-Being of
Abused and Neglected Children” (Senate, November 20, 1996), was
short. The only legislator present was Senator DeWine who appears in
multiple later hearings, additionally three of the five public witnesses
also provided testimony in other hearings. A short reading indicated
that the relevant informationwas already covered by the other hearings.
A search at the Library of Congress, the websites of the House
Committee onWays andMeans, and the Senate Committee on Finance,
reveals other hearings that involved child welfare reform during the
same time period as the included hearings. However, a decision was
made that those not included in the ProQuest Congressional Legislative
Record of ASFA would be excluded.
Identified and excluded hearings include the following: “Child
Welfare Programs” (House, January 23, 1995), “ChildWelfare Programs”
(Senate, April 26, 1995), “Causes of Poverty, with a Focus on Out-of-
Wedlock Births” (Senate, March 5, 1996), and “Protecting Children
from the Impacts of Substance Abuse on Families Receiving Welfare”
(House, October 28, 1997).
There are two main reasons for exclusion. First, these hearings do
not have care for children in what is expected to be long-term place-
ments as their primary subject, and although they might contain rele-
vant information they are not considered part of the core material in
preparation for the two paragraphs in ASFA that are being studied
here. Also, the hearing on substance abuse in the House took place six
months after the House had already passed its version of ASFA. Second,
the examination of previous studies of ASFA did not reveal any hearings
beyond those already mentioned.
The common feature of the included hearings is that they explicitly
focus on the question of long-term care and adoption as a response to
challenges in child welfare. Four of the six hearings were conducted
after the first bill was introduced in the House, and the previous two
hearings were closely linked to the development of the bill in their
focus on adoption.
Additional limitations in the hearing material were established by
focusing on the testimony of invited public witnesses and members of
Congress, including opening statements and deliberations after panel
testimonies. In situations in which prepared written statements were
available with the testimony, I have exclusively focused on these state-
ments and excluded the oral testimony because they are presumed to
overlap and the written testimony provides the most complete picture
of the arguments. The legislators were presumed to be prepared and
knowledgeable of the written testimonies (Leyden, 1995; Talbert, Jones,
& Baumgartner, 1995).
Written statements submitted byparties thatwere not invited to the
hearing have been excluded; however, they may be included in the
printed record of the hearing. As noted, the focus is not on establishing
the participatory quality of the proceedings but on establishing the cen-
tral arguments that could justify a stronger emphasis on termination
and adoption. The invited witnesses were presumed to be those with
the strongest influence on Congress and thus were the most important
for understanding how the ASFAwas justified. Congress did not write a
Conference Report for the ASFA, but the outcome of the conference pro-
ceedings was presented in brief on the House floor (Congressional
Record—U.S. House, 1997b: pp.H10783-H10787).
A total of 46 testimonies were received from 43 public witnesses
during the hearings and are included as data. Some witnesses testified
more than once, and some organizations were represented at multiple
Table 1
Overview of the ASFA legislative timeline and the debates included in this paper.
Year 1995 1996 1997
Date May 10 June 27 February 27 April 08 April 30 May 21 October 08 November 08 November 13
Chamber House of Representatives Senate House and Senate
Place Committee on Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human
Resources
House Floor Committee on Finance
Subcommittee on Social




Bill – – HR 867 IH HR 867 RH HR 867 EH S 511 IS (SAFE)
and HR 867 EH
S 1195 IS (PASS)
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hearings by different witnesses. A comprehensive list of public and con-
gressional witnesses and their affiliations is provided in the Appendix A.
All legislative records were prepared and coded using Atlas.ti quali-
tative software (Friese, 2012). The initial reading identified and coded
the participants' descriptions of the challenges of the system and their
recommendations for policy action. Subsequently, the segments of de-
scriptions and recommendations that were relevant to the provisions
being examined were discerned and divided into smaller pieces. The
focus of this paper is the limits of public intervention and the relevant
segments that address the process of determining when termination
and adoption are appropriate and justified. The important part of the
coding involved identifying the relevant segments of testimony and de-
liberations to be included in the in-depth analysis to enable easy access
to sorting and retrieving relevant segments of data during the analysis.
3.1. Limitations
The material is limited to the public record and is subject to the dis-
tinct limitation that many negotiations and compromises occurred in
private arenas. However, the theoretical framework emphasizes the
need for political decision-makers to publicly defend and justify their
decisions if they are to be considered legitimate. Open hearings and
floor debates are vital arenas for legislators to provide the necessary jus-
tifications. Because of this they serve as an appropriate source of data for
this type of research.
This study does not actively distinguish kinship foster care fromnon-
relative foster care. Kinship care was favored by legislators as a perma-
nency option for children compared with guardianship or non-relative
fostering, but the proceedings revealedminimal knowledge of its effects
and the stability for children at the time. It was included as an exception
to termination and adoption to avoid conflict with kinship caregivers
who may feel uncomfortable about creating additional turmoil within
the family. Congress ordered a report on kinship care but did not explic-
itly promote it. Although it received strong support from individuals,
this study did not examine its justifications or lack of justifications.
4. Findings—justifications for the ASFA
The ASFA emphasizes two central concerns for the well-being of
children: safety and permanency.2 I shall examine each of these con-
cerns in separate subsections because the provisions are intended to
address different segments for parents and children in the system.
Each subsection is organized according to the discourse ethics frame-
work of pragmatic, ethical, moral and legal discourses. Emphasizing
the discourses facilitates understanding of how different sources of
knowledge and values influenced the final outcome.
4.1. Discourses on child safety: exceptions to reasonable efforts
The discourses on child safety are best evaluated by examining the
reasoning behind the exceptions to reasonable efforts contained in the
ASFA Sec. 101(a), which indicates that some children have been sub-
jected to such severe neglect or abuse that parents should have no
chance at reunification and that a child's best interests are served by
immediate adoption.
4.1.1. Pragmatic discourses
The central pragmatic argument for bypassing reunification efforts
based on child safety was rooted in research that indicated that some
abusive parents were beyond rehabilitation. The chief proponent of
this viewpoint was Dr. Richard Gelles. According to his research,
rehabilitation of severely abusive parentswas based on a faulty assump-
tion that abuse is caused by different mixes of internal and external
stressors or a deficiency in resources to parents such that if services
were targeted to alleviate these stressors or the lack of resources, any-
one could be rehabilitated given sufficient time and dedication. Dr.
Gelles argued for a different understanding of the reasons for serious
abuse:
“There are, I believe, distinct types of abusers … there are parents
who, forwhatever social or psychological reasons, set out to severely
injure, maim, torture, or kill their children… the upper threshold for
these parents' behavior is so high that injury and death are much
more likely outcomes of their behavior than it would be for other
types of parents … we need to employ a theoretical model that
recognizes that in the most serious and harmful cases of abuse, the
parents… are probably constitutionally different… [and] are simply
non amendable to changing their dangerous and harmful behaviors”
(U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1996b: pp.65–66).
The greatest concernwith family preservation and reunification pro-
grams was not their lack of proven effect, although this was certainly
also an issue, but that they were also applied to families with no real
chance of success, and where reunification could pose a serious safety
or developmental hazard to the child. This pragmatic risk argumenta-
tion had a powerful influence on legislators (Congressional Record—
U.S. Senate, 1997: Sen.DeWine, p.S12670). Similar arguments were ar-
ticulated by several witnesses throughout the hearings (e.g. U.S.
House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1997a: Digre, p.116).
This pragmatic reasoning demonstrates how knowledge about the
problems of the child welfare system advanced from a social explana-
tion of abuse andneglect to anexplanation based on individual behavior
and pathology. This reasoning was central in shaping child welfare
reform.
The influence of this perspective is also reflected in the de-emphasis
of alternative explanations for the challenges of successfully reunifying
children with their parents. The link between poverty and maltreat-
ment was rarely debated in the hearings even after Representative
Rangel (D-NY) requested Congressional Research Services to produce
an oversight on the subject, andwhich confirmed the strong correlation
(U.S. House. Committee onWays and Means, 1996b: Robinson, pp. 23–
29). Although none opposed the claim that some parents were beyond
rehabilitation, proponents of reunification and preservation programs
had a more optimistic view of the possible benefits of these programs,
the main cause of reunification failure and the poor results of preserva-
tion programs was that children were reunified without adequate
follow-up services due to inadequate funding and budget cuts, high
staff turnover, poor implementation of programs, and inadequate su-
pervision. Importantly, these witnesses stressed that more families
than was currently the case could be helped by targeted reunification
services if these were properly funded and implemented (U.S. House.
Committee on Ways and Means, 1996b: Dr. Pecora, pp.76–79; 1997a:
Liederman, p.93).
However, these arguments did not convince legislators, especially
House Republicans, who emphasized the poor evidence from research
on the effects of family preservation efforts:
“We have examined the research on family preservation, as has the
General Accounting Office. I think it fair to say that the scientific
community agrees that there is no solid evidence that family preser-
vation leads to better outcomes for children. Given this, coupled
with the fact that current law already emphasizes family preserva-
tion, whywould we push the statutes any further in this direction?”
(U.S. Senate. Committee on Finance, 1997: Rep.Camp, p. 51).
Knowledge about the poor evidence of effect from family preserva-
tion programs was important to justify reunification bypass in serious
cases. There was no real dispute about Dr. Gelles' description of some
2 ASFA Sec.101(a) amendment of 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15)(D) details circumstances in
which reasonable efforts are not required, ASFA Sec.103(a)(3) amendment of 42 U.S.C.
675(5)(E) details the circumstances in which states are required to initiate termination,
and exceptions to this requirement.
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parents as being beyond rehabilitation, although there was some
disagreement about how large this group was. In order to protect chil-
dren from the most serious harm, it was necessary to accept that some
parents are beyond rehabilitation. This also meant that a social explana-
tion of abuse must be abandoned, at least in the serious cases, and
strengthened an individualized focus on parental characteristics and
risk-inducing behavior, while weakening attention to external conditions
that might affect the family.
4.1.2. Ethical–political discourses
The ethics that support an enhanced focus on child safety comprised
the perception that children's needs and rights were being sacrificed by
a system that focused too much attention on parental rights and the
importance of biological ties. Parental interests were favored because
the system “romanticiz[ed] biology” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways
and Means, 1996b: Bevan, p.132–133), which caused workers to focus
their attention on the needs of parents instead of on the needs of
children. Albert Solnit (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means,
1996b: p.99) claimed that workers were unable to place themselves in
the child's position and, as a result, would favor fairness on adult terms
to the situation that is least detrimental to the child. Legislators frequent-
ly stressed the importance of considering the child's viewpoint (e.g. U.S.
House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1997a: Rep.Shaw, p.44). These
considerations and those to follow are ethical because they address the
prioritization of two important social norms—a child's right to safety on
one hand and the value of the natural bond between parent and child
on the other.
The assertion that “reasonable efforts” had become “unreasonable” or
“extraordinary” efforts to preserve or reunify families at the expense of
child safety was critical to legislative changes. Anecdotes from high-
profile cases and major news stories that described the fate of children
subjected to horrific abuse and neglect while under or following release
from the supervision of child welfare services were important to
reinforcing the conviction that child safety was not taken seriously. The
content of these anecdotes is summarized by Lt. Governor Binsfield (MI):
“The children of whom I speak are the shattered bodies in tiny cof-
fins; the little ones who have been raped; the babies who have been
shaken so hard the blood vessels burst in their skulls; the children
who have been burned with cigarette butts or set on hot stoves or
put in scalding water to ‘make them behave'; the little faces and
bones broken by the people who brought them life or those they
allow into their homes. Generally, the public and state and federal
officials continue to regard these stories as rare and tragic events.
Let me assure you, from five years of experience of working with
abused children, they are not rare” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways
and Means, 1997a: p.33).
These stories were central to the viewpoint of a system that took
“extraordinary steps to protect parents who abuse and neglect their
children” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1998: Rep.
Shaw, p.6).
“We are sending too many children back to dangerous and abusive
homes. We send them back to live with parents who are parents in
name only—to homes that are homes in name only” (U.S. House.
Committee on Ways and Means, 1997a: Sen.DeWine, p.10, original
emphasis).
Senator DeWine's quote summarizes the core reasoning for making
child safety a priority, which suggests that parents who severely abuse
their children have no right to call themselves parents and should
have no right to reunite with their children.
“The big thing this bill does is to push the pendulum of government
concern back in the direction of the children… by allowing States to
define … aggravated circumstances that allow them to dispense
with services for the family and get on with the business of finding
an adoptive home for the child” (Congressional Record—U.S.
House, 1997a: Rep. Shaw, p. H2016).
The ethical argument for termination and adoption offered by legisla-
tors was the need to realign the system in favor of the persons for which
it was established—the children—and not with the parents, who were
considered the perpetrators of crimeswho forfeited their parental rights.
4.2. Discourses on child permanency: termination timelines
Two central concerns constitute the foundation of the permanency
discourses. First, some groups of children spent prolonged periods of
time in out-of-home care. Second, the time spent in out-of-home care
was highly unstable, with many children experiencing multiple place-
ments during their time in care. To examine the congressional justifica-
tion for adoption to promote permanency, this section presents findings
from debates on ASFA sec. 103(a), which states that in general termina-
tion proceedings should be initiated once a child has been in care for 15
of the last 22 months.3
4.2.1. Pragmatic discourses
Pragmatic discourses on setting time limits for reunification efforts
were heavily influenced by knowledge that emphasized the importance
of permanency for children. Children, particularly very young children,
need stability in their connections with caregivers to develop healthy
emotional, intellectual, and mental development.
“Newresearch tells us that thefirst years of life are critical to a child's
development. We now know that 90 percent of the brain's growth
takes place during the first 3 years … early life experiences help
determine the way a child thinks, learns and behaves for the rest
of his or her life” (Congressional Record—U.S. House, 1997a:
Rep.Pryce, p.H2013).
Testimony based on research and statistics established a distinction
between the damaging effects of long-term foster care and the promise
of adoption. Many emphasized the importance of understanding that
time is experienced differently by children, particularly the younger
children, and what may not seem a long time to adults could seem an
eternity to a child. The lack of stability in foster care was emphasized;
Peter Dirge testified on the experiences in California, in which 1/3 of
toddlers (ages 1–2 years) in care had experienced five or more foster
homes, and concluded,
“Long-term foster care is, tragically, neither stable nor permanent…
Adoption on the other hand, creates lifetime parents. It is not com-
monly understood how remarkably stable adoption is. In California,
only an average of 14 finalized adoptions are set aside annually out
of a potential pool of 15,000, a rate of less than .1% or one out of
1,000” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1997a: Digre,
p.113).
The evidence of the effectiveness of adoption was also emphasized
by research on child outcomes, measures of socioeconomic circum-
stances, home environment, access to medical care, health, mental
health, and academic performance, which concluded that
“the impact of adoption on children is overwhelmingly a positive
one…Adoptive families provide supportive, nurturing, environments,
for young people… The data also underline the importance of facil-
itating adoption early in the child's life, before neglect, abuse, or
family turmoil leave emotional scars that are slow to heal” (U.S.
House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1996b: Zill, p.110).
3 Except if (1) the child is in relative care, (2) termination is not considered to be in the
child’s best interests, (3) the State has not provided the familywith required reunification
services.
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This argument illustrated to legislators the positive effects of
adoption demonstrated by studies and empirical evidence for the
importance of swift action, which could be extended to demands for
timelines. Swift action was needed because time spent in uncertainty
could be harmful to the child's development, and because statistics
indicated that the chances of adoption decreased with a child's age.
Dr. Solnit provided testimony on the importance of psychological
ties to caregivers:
“A parent who can provide day-to-day attention to a child's needs for
physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation will
form an attachment with… and will become his (or her) ‘psycholog-
ical parent'… [This role] canbe fulfilled by any other caring adult—but
never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal re-
lationship to the child may be” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and
Means, 1996b: p.99).
This testimony also provided a psychological knowledge base that
was favorable to adoption. Placing greater importance of the psycholog-
ical relationships of children with their caregivers compared with
biological ties strengthens the position of adoption over prolonged
reunification efforts based on the argument that the “real” parents are
the parents who satisfy a child's daily needs. Pragmatic discourses
established a knowledge base that emphasized the documented harms
associated with unstable living arrangements while emphasizing the
benefits of stable caregivers to children's life outcomes.
4.2.2. Ethical–political discourses
Broad agreementwas received for the notion that children were not
to blame for their parents' actions and should not be punished for their
parents' actions (or lack of actions)
“It is time to acknowledge in our laws… that parenting is not an ab-
solute right, but carrieswith it corresponding duties and responsibil-
ities to children and to society, and when parents abuse, neglect or
abandon their children, these parental rights may be lost. Protecting
children in the foster care system entails promoting policies that are
consistent with basic child development principles, including the
child's need to grow up in a stable, loving family whether biological
or adoptive … Children should not suffer from their parents' lack of
personal responsibility or inability to care for themselves or the chil-
dren in their care” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means,
1996b: Bevan, p.136).
The citation provides a suitable illustration of the two central ethical
arguments that favored limits for the required length of time that a child
could remain in care prior to termination.4 Bevan argued that retaining
children in care longer than 12months would significantly hurt a child,
which was not fair given that children frequently had no responsibility
for their placement. The citation also suggests that parents were indi-
vidualized and portrayed with a greater personal responsibility for
their own rehabilitation.
This logic established an important ethical distinction in the ASFA
proceedings:
“Each report to a child protective service agency involves a victim
and a perpetrator, in most cases a child and his or her parent” (U.S.
Senate. Committee on Finance, 1997: Sen.Roth, p.1).
The ethical claim distinctly expresses the adversarial understanding
of parental, child and state interests in child welfare. The perspective of
children as innocent victims of their parents' actions and parents as
perpetrators legitimizes the idea that parents must bear the main
burden of responsibility for rehabilitation. Although the state should
make services available to parents, the overriding responsibility of the
state should focus on care for the interests of the innocent child.
This child-centric focus legitimizes early termination when the
chances of improvement are slim or when transgressions are serious:
“If … you really are concerned with the best interest of the child
and … what predicts best developmental outcomes, you terminate
parental rights as early as possible, and I say that with a small foot-
note, you are going to make mistakes … Do you want to make mis-
takes that ultimately end up in children having poor developmental
outcomes, or even being killed, or do youwant to take children away,
maybe inappropriately form parents, maybe a little bit early because
the system is tilted toward the best interest of the child? It would be
the latter system I think that we need” (U.S. House. Committee on
Ways and Means, 1996b: Dr. Gelles, p.93).
The individualization of parents is evident, and the concern for
rescuing the child for a better future is evident when the pragmatic
and ethical arguments are combined. Minimal attention was given to
exploring whether children could have interests in maintaining ties to
their parents despite their shortcomings.
Research has associated adoption with positive life outcomes for
children. The ethical side of this positive association corresponds with
social norms that emphasize the vital role of family in child rearing:
“Adoption is good for children. The reason is simple. Nearly every
adopted child is put in the midst of the best child-rearing machine
ever invented—the family…With adoption we change a child's en-
tire life … the intervention stays with the child for her entire
childhood—and perhaps her entire life. That's why adoption is prob-
ably the most powerful social intervention known” (U.S. Senate.
Committee on Finance, 1997: Rep.Camp: p.49).
Theprotection offered by vestingparental rightswithin a new family
instead of spreading responsibility for the child between foster care-
givers and the child welfare system was emphasized as one of
adoption's significant benefits by anchoring responsibility for a child's
well-being to a single set of caregivers, with the ideal of replicating
the “natural” family (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means,
1997b: Wulczyn, p.112).
4.2.3. Moral discourses
Although moral discourses were important to some debates during
the ASFA proceedings (e.g., all children should be covered by federal
foster care maintenance payments, not only children whose biological
parents could qualify for TANF), they were less common during debates
about child permanency or safety.
Representative Mink (D-HI) opposed the House bill and argued that
it would penalize poverty:
“I cannot vote for a bill that takes welfare reform one step closer to
the final penalty of poverty: The loss of one's children by edict of
the Government. First you take their money away. Then, you force
them into desperate conditions of poverty. Then, you deem them
unfit to raise their children and you remove them from the home
and place them in foster homes. Then, after 18 months you put the
children up for adoption. Whose family values do we stand for?”
(Congressional Record—U.S. House, 1997a: Rep.Mink, p.H2023).
The argument refers to the Personal Responsibility andWorkOppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which she believed de-
prives poor parents of the necessary resources to adequately care for
their children and renders childrenmore likely to enter care andparents
less likely to improve their circumstances. Themoral argument is that this
4 The final 15/22 Termination requirement included in the ASFA has no justification in
the hearings. Disagreements between the supporters of an 18/24 timeline and a 12/18
timeline were identified. The House bill included the former, whereas the Senate bill in-
cluded the latter. It seems likely that the final result of 15/22 is a negotiated compromise;
however, I will not consider the arguments related to the specific length of time.
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situation creates an unfair double standard between well-off and poor
parents. Although no response to Representative Mink's argument was
identified, similar sentiments that link poverty to the disproportionality
of challenges in child welfare were previously raised by Representative
Rangel (D-NY) (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1996b:
pp.23, 30, 83–86) when he argued that the main challenges of child wel-
fare reform could be approached by providing education and job oppor-
tunities for young single mothers. However, Representative Rangel
eventually supported the House bill (Congressional Record—U.S. House,
1997a: p.H2016).
A less fundamental moral concern with the ASFA was raised by
Golden of the DHHS (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means,
1998: pp.24–27), who argued that a timeline would not discriminate
between children who were suitable candidates for adoption and chil-
drenwhowere not suitable candidates for adoption,which could create
“legal orphans.” A timeline would not be sensitive to the best interests
of individual children and introduced the risk of treating different
cases as if they were similar. The moral argument is that if different
cases are treated as if they were the same, this would require a good
reason. Golden advocated that termination should only be pursued for
children with a case plan goal of adoption. This sentiment was shared
by parts of the judiciary:
“There is a reluctance on the part of judges across this country to ter-
minate parental rights because they think they are casting the child
into the pit where nothing will happen … When a judge is saying
there is 50,000 children out there lined up whose rights are termi-
nated already are going nowhere. Whoa, you know” (U.S. Senate.
Committee on Finance, 1997: Hon.Grossmann, p.47–48).
Representative McCrery (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and
Means, 1998: pp.25–27) defended the bill by arguing that these
concerns were unfounded because the bill already addressed them by
providing exceptions to termination. He suggested that timelines
were a necessary mechanism to pressure courts to make decisions at
an earlier stage, regardless of whether that decision would result in
termination.
TheHouse bill would only apply the termination timeline to children
under age 10. However, this restrictionwas removed in conferencewith
the Senate, which did not advocate such a restriction. The Children's
Rights Council considered theHouse restriction unfair to older children:
“Children above the age of ten are often more difficult to place in adop-
tion but still have the same need for stability and permanency in their
placements” (U.S. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 1998: Henry,
p.58). Despite removing the “under age 10” clause, the ASFA was dis-
tinctly focused on younger children; this is evident when examining
the types of examples and concerns that were raised by witnesses and
legislators alike, which generally were attuned to the challenges and
needs that faced the younger children. However, there were no explicit
debates about whether children of different age groups might have dis-
tinct needs, orwhether termination timelinesmight affect older children
differently from the younger.
5. Discussion—the normative foundations of the ASFA
The remaining issue is the information that can be gained from these
findings from theASFA legislative process about the “normative founda-
tion,” which was decisive in how Congress divided the public and pri-
vate responsibility for children in long-term care. What are the core
knowledge, beliefs, values, and social norms underpinning political
choices? Laws aimed at protecting or enhancing child welfare are
derived from approaches to considering, prioritizing, and responding
to contested normative questions about the appropriate processes,
lengths, and depths to which the public can intervene in families in
the name of child welfare. The most striking finding from the hearings
is the extremely high level of consensus between legislators from both
political parties, including a majority of witnesses, that permanency
for children should be the primary consideration in decisions regarding
long-term care and the agreement that adoption is the best approach to
securing this goal.
I argue that the normative foundation that supported the ASFA's
promotion of adoption was based on three pillars: risk pragmatism,
child refamilialization ethics, and parent responsibility ethics. Their
combination makes adoption a highly desirable and justified place-
ment option despite the serious implications for children and their
families.
5.1. Child risk pragmatism
Child risk pragmatism dominated the legislative proceedings. This
pillar consists of risks to children's safety and health from returning
home or the risk of poor developmental outcomes, mental health dam-
age, or poor life opportunities due to prolonged periods in unstable fos-
ter care or the repeated failure to reunify. Legislators were disillusioned
with the promise and effects of family preservation programs, which
were unsuccessful in curtailing the increase in the foster care population
and the poor rates of successful reunifications. Although some advocat-
ed that such programs could still work given the necessary funding,
resources, and rigorous implementation, these arguments did not con-
vince Congress. The combination of the potential risks to children if
preservation or reunification failed with the poor evidence of effects
as demonstrated by research, led Congress to argue that children should
not have to suffer uncertainty when no reliable evidence of improved
outcomes existed. When critics of preservation and reunification used
research findings to indicate that some parents may be pathologically
unsuited for raising children, they further emphasized the risks to chil-
dren. Themodel of socioeconomic and external explanations for deviant
and harmful parental behaviorwas discredited in theASFA proceedings,
replaced by an individualized approach to thinking about personal risk
factors and pathologies associatedwith specific types of parental behav-
ior and the risks to children exposed to these behaviors.
Adoption, on the other hand, could demonstrate better outcomes for
children, both in terms of safety and permanency. Subsequent studies
have generally confirmed the positive effects on life outcomes for
children who are adopted (see Christoffersen, Hammen, Andersen, &
Jeldtoft, 2007; Triseliotis, 2002; Vinnerljung&Hjern, 2011). In a political
climate focused on salvaging a child welfare system on the verge of col-
lapse from the number of families it served, adoptions had the potential
to effectively reduce caseloads, promise permanency for children, and
serve as cost-neutral or money-saving options. In situations in which
parents are unable or unwilling to change their risk-inducing behaviors
and the public foster care system is incapable of delivering a stable and
secure upbringing to children, adoption offers one of the few available
options to place children if they are to be protected from the risks asso-
ciated with the remaining two alternatives. This explanation is a strong
reason why adoption became highly favored despite the severity and
finality of the intervention. This situation establishes the role of the pub-
lic as a risk manager, with less emphasis on family welfare services and
greater emphasis on identifying and evaluating potential outcomes
from different alternatives.
5.2. Parent responsibility ethics
As noted by Beem (2007), the ASFA and the welfare reform of 1996
signified a change in the federal approach to entitlements and responsi-
bility. An ethics of parent responsibility is evident throughout the ASFA
proceedings. Parental rights include certain responsibilities to both the
child and society to care for the child usingmethods that conform to im-
portant shared norms of childrearing. A conditional trust (Harding,
1997: p.51) is a type of trust that can and should be removed if broken.
Sen. DeWine's statement about parents and homes “in name only”
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should be considered based on this viewpoint. The notion of family is
more concerned with the care and nurturing provided to a child than
with blood ties. Although these aspects are important, they are subordi-
nated to the importance of securing for the child a family that is capable
of satisfying the child's physical and emotional needs.
Minimal attention was given to the differing circumstances of
parents that prompted the removal of their children. The focus was on
examples of theworst possible circumstances, including child maltreat-
ment and chronic substance abuse; the representativeness of these an-
ecdotes to parents was never addressed in the proceedings. Parents of
children in care that were dominantly portrayed as the perpetrators of
horrible crimes against their children, but the accuracy of this image is
questionable and makes it difficult to distinguish between parents
who, for various reasons, are unable to care for their children and
thosewhoare outright dangerous. Themanyexamples anddescriptions
mixed abusive parents and parents who failed to get their life in suffi-
cient order to care for a child and often failed to create a clear image
of potential key differences between families that were to be targeted
by two distinct paragraphs; the reunification bypass on the one hand,
and those who would receive services limited by the termination time-
lines on the other. The latter group is likely to include a very wide vari-
ety of families and circumstances, and probably much wider than what
was illuminated in the hearings.
The heavy focus on “horrible” parents andparentswhoare incapable
of change fuels an adversarial understanding of child welfare. Although
the interests of children and parents are separate in many cases, the
adversarial assumption establishes a divide between children who are
worthy of state aid and parentswho are less worthy of state aid. Because
children can never be blamed for the actions of their parents, theymust
be protected by the state. However, parents do not have this same claim
to state assistance, which obscures the notion that sometimes children
may indeed share interests with their parents and may also benefit
from contact even if they cannot live together.
The shift in thinking from external or socioeconomic explanations
for maltreatment to individual pathologies and risky behaviors was
important to the argument that parents must bear the majority of the
responsibility for making the necessary changes to reunite with their
children. Although the public has an obligation to help the parents of
children who have been removed, public responsibility is weakened
by emphasizing parental “willingness” or “ability” to change harmful
behavior. The addition ofmore services is disqualified because if parents
do not take advantage of existing services, additional funding is wasted.
Successful reunification requires that parents assume personal respon-
sibility for change. The role of government is secondary because a per-
son cannot be forced to change if he or she lacks the ability or desire
to change.
The policy decision to place temporal limitations on services, with
the threat of termination, is based on ethical considerations of parental
responsibility as much as pragmatic evaluations of the likelihood of
reunification or ability to change after a given period of time. An expla-
nation based on socioeconomic or external conditions for parental
inability to care for a child would likely placemore pressure on the pub-
lic to address these issues and aid parents prior to termination, an expla-
nation that emphasizes the individual's failure to act as a responsible
adult does not carry the same level of entitlement to public services or
to retain parental rights.
5.3. Child refamilialization ethics
The ASFA ethics of child refamilialization is based on a conviction
that at some point the interests of the child and the parents are no lon-
ger shared but become distinct, either because of the seriousness of
abuse and neglect or because of the lack of parental progress in chang-
ing their behavior. At this point, the standard assumption is that the
child's welfare is no longer with the family of origin, and the state's
only concern should be to provide the child with a new permanent
home, preferably through adoption.
This approach is clearly child centered, based on a concern for the
child's welfare and development, seeking to remove the child from
harmful situations and simultaneously seeking to quickly establish the
child in a new and stable placement. To justify quick and decisive action,
members of Congress repeatedly emphasized the importance of “seeing
the world through the eyes of a child.” However, this concern for the
child's viewpoint was not taken beyond establishing a set of basic
child needs. Children's rights were never examined in terms of autono-
my or the rights of individuals with valid concerns and interests in their
own future; instead, children's rights were understood in terms of
predefined “needs” for protection from dangerous adults and for a per-
manent and loving home and family. The needs of children are defined
by adults, and the state acts as a watchdog because children are unable
to care for themselves and needed adult protection, care, and guidance
(Freeman, 1983). This understanding of children's rights as primarily
responding to threats against their basic needs is a paternalistic ap-
proach to children's rights. A positive paternalism where the state acts
as guardian of child interests and welfare is also necessary to legitimize
the authoritative intervention that comes with adoption. The state is
right to exercise this deep and serious intervention because the child's
basic needs are threatened. The state can then get to the equally impor-
tant task of placing the child with a suitable family that is capable of
meeting the child's needs on a permanent basis. The need for an adop-
tive placement, rather than permanent foster care, is justified not only
in the poor state of the child welfare system but also because parents
make the best decisions on behalf of their children. The good family is
less about biological ties than with a single set of caregivers that meet
the child's needs and act on what they perceive to be the child's best
interests, free from public interference. The underlying assumption in
legislation is that the state is capable of not only protecting the child
from abuse and neglect but also improving the child's life by actively
refamilializing the child. The paternalism lies in the belief that active
State action can indeed improve the life of these children, not simply
protect them from harm (Harding, 1997: p. 53).
In contrast to the individualization of parents, childrenwere consid-
ered a much more coherent group, which reduced attention to the fact
that children as a group are highly diverse and that different age groups
have different needs and viewpoints about their circumstances. Moral
arguments that suggest that these differences should also be reflected
in legislationwere rejected, and the responsibilitywas transferred to ei-
ther the state or judiciary level. These moral arguments of fair treat-
ment, in which similar cases are treated equally and dissimilar cases
are treated differently, were secondary to the ethical social value that
children need to belong to families. Concerns that some groups of chil-
dren were much less likely to be adopted were cast aside, the soultion
was simply for States to make stronger efforts at getting children
adopted. Beyond exempting children placed in relative care from the
termination requirements, very little attention was given to consider
whether children, particularly older children, could benefit from
retaining ties to their families of origin despite not being able to live
with them. Similarly, the issue of what to do for childrenwhowould re-
main in foster care was more or less ignored by legislators (see also:
Gordon, 1999). The message from the ASFA proceedings was clear; no
child should be left to grow up in non-relative foster care. No efforts
were made to strengthen the foster care system itself, so that children
who are not adopted or placed in guardianship could have better
chances of attaining the same stability as their adoptive counterparts.
The ethics of child refamilialization is finally also influenced by a de-
sire to secure the good of the future society as more children develop
into well-adjusted and productive citizens. Authoritative intervention
is ethically justified because it can ensure better outcomes for the
child and for the greater good of society. The child refamilialization
ethics that justify termination and adoption are strongly paternalistic
in the approach to child protection and reflect a strong belief in the
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capacity of the state to improve the future of children and society via
authoritative intervention.
6. Conclusion
This study sought to further understanding of the types of knowl-
edge, norms, and values legislators have emphasized to justify a policy
that considers the termination of parental rights and adoption to be
the preferred outcome in child welfare when children are not expected
to reunifywith their families. By applying a theory of discourse ethics to
study the congressional hearings and debates that led to the ASFA, I
have identified the central arguments and justifications and their impli-
cations for the shaping of federal policy on the termination of parental
rights and adoption in accordance with pragmatic, ethical and moral
discourses.
By examining pragmatic discourses, this study finds that knowledge
focused on potential risks to children is important. Adoption is seen as
the most effective path to prevent children from unnecessary exposure
to risks associatedwith particularly abusive parents and risks associated
with instability in care. The focus on risk has also meant that explana-
tions and solutions based on social structures have been weakened;
they are seen as ineffective at protecting children from harm. In in-
stances of uncertainty, a focus on individual risk justifies resolute, au-
thoritative action earlier than does an approach based on social
explanations.
The study alsofinds that parents are given greater individual respon-
sibility for their circumstances and formaking the necessary changes for
reunification. The ethical conviction that parents have primarily them-
selves and their actions to blame for having their children removed
lessens the burden of responsibility on the state to provide extensive
services. This viewpoint is strengthened by the shift in the knowledge
base from explaining abuse by social and socioeconomic factors to indi-
vidual risk factors.
Finally, the study finds that an ethical child refamilialization dis-
course was central and tied to both of the above discourses. Although
parents had themselves to blame, children should never be blamed for
their parents' actions. Thus, the first responsibility of the state is to pro-
tect the child andher future before ensuring that the parent is able to re-
unify. This perspective neglects the often-overlapping interests. The
focus on children's needs is predefined as safety and permanence, and
authoritative intervention is justified to provide these needs by re-
familiarizing children with “proper” families through adoption. Howev-
er, little attention has been paid to the diversity of children's
circumstances and viewpoints.
In the years subsequent to the ASFA, the number of adoptions
increased significantly. The ASFA seems to have played a role in this
development (Wulczyn et al., 2006). Many children's lives have been
improved by these adoptions; the evidence of positive impacts on
children's life outcomes after adoption seems strong. However, there
is concern with the single-mindedness with which congressional legis-
lators pursued adoption as a panacea in the process of developing the
law. According to Berrick (2009), adoption remains the least likely
route of exit for a child entering foster care in the U.S., despite the signif-
icant emphasis on adoptions in federal law. Moral arguments suggest
that although adoption is good for many children, it would also be inap-
propriate or unrealistic for some children. The ASFA left this group to be
addressed by the states and judiciary. The problem with this approach,
however, is that Congress took no responsibility for those children who
were unlikely to be adopted but who would nevertheless remain in
care. The significant emphasis on the benefits of adoption to children
and the horrible actions of parents shifted attention from the extremely
important systemic challenges of the U.S. child welfare system. In the
ASFA, fiscal budgetary concerns and an adversarial approach to the
poor choices and terrible actions of parents diverted Congress from
focusing on the urgent need for resources and funding to aid the system
itself and the families in need of extra help to reunify or to find
appropriate, permanent placements for children who were unlikely to
be adopted. These are the children who were overlooked in the ASFA
proceedings, and future policy developments must focus on the needs
of these children.
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Abstract: 
This paper examines how Norway turned to a more active policy on adoption in the 
child welfare system. It examines the full public records from all four times that the 
government and Storting debated adoption from care, over the period 2002–2013. I 
analyse the empirical and normative arguments that shaped policy, through a discourse 
theoretical framework (Habermas, 1996) to distinguish different types of arguments. 
The Article contributes an empirical case for analysing the normative aspects of social 
and welfare policy. The findings show that an active adoption policy is justified by 
strengthening of child-centred perspectives. First, research and expert discourse gained 
influence in the framing of adoption policy over time. Second, the ethical response to 
this knowledge base has been to shift attention from shared family needs to the child’s 
individual and developmental needs. There are signs that legislators view adoption in 





The responsibilities of the child protection system are characterized by normative 
dilemmas, where both the goals and the means to achieve them are contested and 
uncertain. Decision-making takes place within an unavoidable tension between the 
requirement of helping families stay together and the requirement of protecting 
children from harmful life outcomes. How states balance the right to respect for family 
life against the individual child’s needs differs over time and between contexts (Gilbert 
et al., 2011; Harding, 1997), but is a fundamentally normative and political question 
about how the state defines it responsibility towards children and draw the line 
between the public and the private. 
In this paper, I study policy formation on adoption from care – without parental 
consent – as a child welfare measure.1 This is controversial because it breaks with the 
fundamental value and human right (ECHR Article 8) that children and parents belong 
together. Since 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have 
communicated 26 cases to Norway concerning possible breach of article 8 in child 
welfare. Ten of these cases concern adoption from care. Two of the adoption cases 
have thus far been resolved. While the ECtHR found no violation of article 8 in the 
case of Mohamed Hasan v. Norway (appl. no. 27496/15), Norway was found in 
violation of article 8 in the high-profile Grand Chamber judgment in Lobben and 
Others v. Norway (appl. no. 37283/17). This high number of cases stands in contrast to 
the relatively low number of adoptions from care that actually take place in Norway 
(see Helland and Skivenes, 2019). Countries such as England and USA have promoted 
adoption as a way to secure a permanent family for children who cannot return to their 
biological family (Tefre, 2015; Skivenes and Thoburn, 2016). In Norway, Section 4-20 
of the Child Welfare Act of 1992 (CWA) regulates child welfare adoption. Although 
the legal threshold is rather similar to England and USA, numbers of adoption are 
much lower. 
                                                          




However, during the late 2000s there was a political shift in support for a more active 
use of adoption from care. During the eleven-year period 2003-2013, political party 
position on whether to increase adoptions from care flipped from five of seven parties 
opposed to five of seven in favour. I set out to study this shift, how a policy to promote 
more adoptions in child welfare has gained much broader political support in later 
years by examining the political justifications for promoting a politics on increased use 
of adoptions from care. 
I analyse the central arguments that political parties used in the debates to justify their 
position on adoption through public records. The focus of the study is to understand 
empirical ideas and normative values as drivers for change, by uncovering the ideas 
and beliefs about children and families that shape child welfare policy and the 
justification for state intervention. As a normatively charged field, decisions about 
child welfare policy are poorly understood if reduced only to bargaining between fixed 
interests. Following Fischer and Gottweis (2012: 2) I take the policy arguments as the 
starting point to ‘understand the relationship between the empirical and the normative 
as they are configured in the process of policy argumentation’ and how they combine 
to shape policy. The analysis covers every occasion when the government and the 
Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) addressed child welfare adoption for the period 
2002-2013, and all publicly available records from these debates are included. By 
studying arguments and their influence, the analysis will contribute to the policy 
research that underscores understanding of policy development as a normative project 
that cannot be reduced to a value-free, technical project. 
I start with a short introduction to the Norwegian Child Welfare System and its central 
principles. Then I explain the theoretical framework that structures the analysis and 
discussion, followed by methods. I will then present and discuss the findings from the 
study in three subsections, sorted by type of discourse drawn from Habermas (1996): 





2. Adoption in the Norwegian Child Welfare System 
In an international context the Norwegian child protection system, along with the other 
Nordic countries, is often tied to a family-service orientation (Gilbert et al., 2011). The 
approach builds on low thresholds and early intervention with in-home services to 
support struggling families and help them stay together, and prevent the need for more 
intrusive action, such as foster care.  
Norwegian child protection builds on three fundamental principles. The most 
important is the principle of “the child’s best interests”, included in the CWA, Section 
4-1. The law gives “decisive importance” to the child’s best interests over the interests 
and rights of parents when these diverge. The law gives very little guidance to what 
the best interests of a child are, but point to three things: ‘stable and good contact with 
adults’, ‘continuity in care provided’, and since 2003, the child’s right to participate 
and be heard in matters that relate to their case. In 2018 the child’s right to 
participation and be heard was moved to a new section 1-6 in the introductory chapter 
to elevate its importance to all aspects of the Child Welfare Act. This did not 
materially change children’s rights to participation. Second, “the biological principle” 
expresses a fundamental social value that children grow up with their parents, and 
there are strong bonds between children and parents that there is good cause to 
preserve. This implies that  a) The state’s responsibility is subsidiary and b) even if 
children cannot stay with their parents their shared biological ties means that the state 
should facilitate continued contact (NOU 2012:5). Although the biological principle is 
not explicitly mentioned in the law, it’s legal importance is based on statements in the 
legislative preparations (Skivenes, 2002). The principle does not distinguish parental 
and child interests, and it has been argued that when child and parental interests collide 
the principle mainly protects parental interests (NOU 2012:5: 49)  
Third, “the principle of the mildest intervention” means that any intervention must be 
proportionate to the goal. This means that the state limit its intervention to what is 
necessary. The principle is not explicitly stated in the law, but implicitly expressed for 
example in Section 4-12 of the CWA where it is stated that even if there are ‘serious 
deficiencies in everyday care’, a care order cannot be made if ‘satisfactory conditions’ 
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can be created for the child through in-home services. The principle is a protection of 
parental and child rights against excessive state intervention. 
In 2012, an expert committee (NOU 2012:5: 15-16) proposed a new principle of 
“developmentally supportive attachment”, which it argued should rank above the 
biological principle. The principle emphasizes secure attachments for children to 
promote healthy development, and builds on child- and developmental psychology. 
The principle would imply a reduced emphasis on biological attachments in favour of 
attachments that support psychological development for decision-making. The 
principle is not included in law, although it received support in the Storting (Innst. 395 
L (2012-2013)). 
The language of the CWA does not place a very high threshold on adoption, and there 
are three main conditions for termination of parental rights and adoption. Section 4-20 
of the CWA states that:  
 
a) it must be regarded as probable that the parents will be permanently unable 
to provide the child with proper care or the child has become so attached to 
persons and the environment where he or she is living that, on the basis of an 
overall assessment, removing the child may lead to serious problems for him or 
her and  
b) adoption would be in the child's best interests and  
c) the adoption applicants have been the child's foster parents and have shown 
themselves fit to bring up the child as their own 
Importantly, the only people who can adopt a foster child are the child’s present foster 
parents. This is very different to practice in England and the U.S. (Skivenes and 
Thoburn, 2016). It also means that children being adopted will remain in the family 
that they are currently residing in, thus being much less intrusive to the child than 
would be a stranger-adoption. 
Adoption places the biological principle and the principle of the mildest intervention in 
direct conflict with the child’s interests in stable care. The Supreme Court (Rt-1997-
534) has also stated that weighing these interests against one another is the greatest 
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challenge in making judgments about adoption. Furthermore, adoption confronts the 
fundamental legal principle that foster care is temporary and that there should be an 
intent of reunification, as stated both in legislative preparations (Ot.prp. nr. 44 (1991-
1992)) and in ECtHR judgments (see Johansen v. Norway, appl. no. 17383/90).  
Adoption as a child welfare measure has never been a major debate in Norwegian 
child welfare policy. It received little attention in the legislative proceedings to The 
Child Welfare Act (1992) (CWA) (Skivenes, 2002). Adoption entered Norwegian 
political discourse after the ECtHR judged that Norway violated Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), on the right to respect for family 
life. The case Johansen v. Norway (appl. no. 17383/90) involved the involuntary 
termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption of an infant. Although Norway 
is the Nordic country that most frequently uses adoption, they are still rare. The 
practice was more frequent in the 90s, before the ECtHR-judgment, than in the 2000s 
(Committee on the Rights of the Child, 1993: para.227). Adoptions dropped from 53 
cases in 1995 to 11 by 2007 (Skivenes, 2011), but since 2010 the numbers have 
climbed and currently number around 50 foster care adoptions per year, this amounts 




To explore the development in political support for adoption, I turn the spotlight to the 
content and relationship between different types of arguments and discourse that 
legislators engaged in during the public legitimization of the policies. Studying the 
developments of Norwegian politics on adoption over a twelve-year span provides 
glimpses at what kind of considerations, knowledge, norms and values have been 
shaping political will on a normatively contested area of public child welfare. 
The argumentative turn in policy research includes a wide range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches, but Fischer and Gottweis (2012: 7) argue that all share the 
recognition that ‘public policy, constructed through language, is the product of 
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argumentation’. Accordingly, they see policy making fundamentally as ‘an ongoing 
discursive struggle over definition and conceptual framing of problems, the public 
understanding of the issues, the shared meanings that motivate policy responses, and 
criteria for evaluation’. Importantly, the argumentative approach recognizes the 
inherent normative nature of all public policy, from its early conceptualization to the 
public justification of results; and includes tools for analysing the normative 
foundations of policy. Schmidt (2012: 100) distinguishes between “coordinative” and 
“communicative” discourses in policy research. Coordinative discourses take place 
between actors involved in the policy process, where different groups seek to influence 
the direction and shape of policy. Communicative discourses take place in the political 
sphere, between political actors and the public engaged in presenting, deliberating, 
debating, contesting, and legitimising policy ideas. While coordinating discourses take 
place between policy elites, communicative discourses take place in the public sphere 
where policy makers are required to legitimise proposals to the public, and where 
communication may flow top-down and bottom-up. This study examines 
communicative discourses of how legislators have defended and contested the use of 
adoption as a child welfare measure to the public. By arguments, I refer to how 
participants in the policy processes express claims, reasons, and objections to justify 
their position on the issue at hand. By discourse I refer to the type of concepts and 
ideas that circumscribe, influence, and shapes the argumentation (Fischer and 
Gottweis, 2012: 10). 
Habermas’ ideas of communicative action (1984) are important influences in the 
argumentative approach to policy research, and I apply his framework of discourse 
ethics (1996) to analyse the arguments and the discourses they draw on for 
justification. Discourse ethics is a normative theoretical framework for rational 
argumentation that distinguishes different types of normative and factual arguments in 
relation to corresponding standards of justification. While Habermas’ theory includes a 
strong procedural component (see Bächtiger et al., 2010), I employ the perspective as a 




Habermas (1996) argues that different types of policy questions require different types 
of deliberative engagement and standards of justification to be considered rational. 
Although norms and values are not “true” or “false” in the way facts about the world 
are, they can be considered “right” or “wrong”, “fair” or “unfair”, and “legal” or 
“illegal” for us. Justifications are especially important in pluralist democracies because 
‘once the acceptance of binding political decisions can no longer be based on 
justifications derived from a substantive world view, or can be expected to be, shared 
by all citizens, the burden of legitimation finally falls only on what we may expect from 
the democratic process’ (Habermas, 2005: 386).  
Discourse theory distinguishes four types of discourses with corresponding 
requirements for the justification of arguments, to which the participants in decision-
making must adhere in rational deliberation. These types of problems consist of 
“pragmatic”, “ethical-political”, “moral”, and “legal” discourses.  
Pragmatic discourses (Habermas, 1996: 159-160) are concerned with establishing the 
truth of empirical facts, proscribing appropriate strategies for achieving established 
goals, and evaluating the most likely consequences of possible choices of action. 
Justifications are evaluated on the solidity of the presented evidence and if assertions 
are true or false, sufficiently documented, reliable and realistic. In the analysis, claims 
to knowledge and beliefs about causal relationships are sorted under pragmatic 
discourses. 
Ethical-political discourses (Habermas, 1996: 160-161) refer to the questions of which 
policy goals to pursue. Participants are not only concerned with obtaining an 
appropriate solution to a problem but also emphasize deeply held values about what 
constitutes a “good life” for us as members of a political fellowship. Justifications 
require authentic expressions of their proponents’ viewpoints, and sincere reflection on 
what values are being privileged and the reasons why. Ethical-political discourses 
emphasize values as goals that can be realized through directed effort. They consider 
who ‘we’ are and who ‘we’ ought to be. Given the value pluralist society and 
normative complexity of child protection, it is not possible to realise all ‘good’ values 
simultaneously. What values policy makers choose to place at the front is therefore of 
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central importance, and their ability to argue why may affect the legitimacy of the 
child welfare system. Questions about the value of biological ties and interpreting the 
child’s best interests are classic examples that require ethical reflection on what 
constitutes a good life for us collectively. 
Moral discourses (Habermas, 1996: 161-162) also address normative questions, but 
they do not have the goal-oriented nature of the previous discourses. Moral discourses 
examine how we can regulate common life in the equal interests of all. Moral norms 
take the form of duties or imperatives that should be obeyed by all in comparable 
situations, because it claims to be equally good for all. While ethical values prescribe 
what we ought to strive towards, moral norms claim to be absolutes that must be 
respected, even in our pursuit of the good life (Habermas, 1996: 255). In the following, 
I shall consider as moral discourses instances where legislators make claims about 
fundamental normative rights of children or parents that they argue must be respected 
in any proposal. 
Legal discourses, for Habermas (1996: 167-168), in legislation and policy making 
concern technical questions of determining fit with the existing corpus of established 
law, a requirement of coherence. Following Dworkin (1978) I take this to include the 
interpretation and framing of legal principles. Legal principles concern the more 
fundamental values from which the empirical valid laws may be assessed (Nilssen, 
2007: 25-26). Principles occupy a central place in Norwegian (and international) law 
(Graver, 2006), and are foundational for the Norwegian CWA. In legal discourses 
participants consider how to best interpret existing law and harmonize new law with 
the existing body of law. This includes children’s rights as inscribed in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1989) (UNCRC) and the ECHR (1950), such as rights to 
protection, family life, and participation. The general character of these legal 
principles mean that there is substantial room for interpretation and framing, and as 
such legal discourse includes very much a normative activity of interpreting and 





The data for the analysis consists of written government and parliamentary documents, 
including white papers, legislative proposals, parliamentary committee reports, and 
minutes from plenary debates in parliament. The study covers all four parliamentary 
debates on adoption during the twelve-year period 2002-2013, and parliament has not 
addressed adoption since. To identify relevant debates I searched the publically 
available records for the ministry of children and equality, and the Storting. All 
records are available online. I collected supplementary documentation from hearings 
and reports, not available online, from the government. Prop. 7 L (2009-2010) which 
introduced Section 4-20 a, open adoption, to the child welfare act was the only one of 
the four proceedings that changed the law. All four procedures are understood as 
important instances of policy making and signal political will to how practitioners 
ought to practice the law. 
The study analyses the full set of arguments that parties presented for their position on 
adoption over the course of the debates. The analysis includes proceedings on open 
adoption because these were important to how and when adoptions in child welfare 
can be granted. However, I do not consider arguments about who to include in post-
adoption contact, what type of contact to include or how to enforce such contact. The 
analysis considers all the proceedings as instances of will-formation where political 
actors, both government and political parties, express their justification for political 
positions and decisions, in this context both the question of open adoption and 
promoting more adoptions tell us something about where the state draws the line for 
legitimate intervention. Further, both governments recognized that including open 
adoption in law would likely lead to more adoptions (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002); 
Prop. 7 L (2009-2010)). 
The analysis points to several outside sources that influenced the justifications of 
involved actors, such as expert reports, research, advice from hearings, Supreme Court 
and ECtHR judgments. I have examined these documents, but in the context of this 
study, I use them as background to explain how the political actors justified their 
position, and to show what evidence has influenced the process. 
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The method is grounded in argumentation theory and the conceptual framework of 
discourse ethics (Habermas, 1996), and the actors are the governments and political 
parties that participated in the debates. The central variables of analysis are the 
arguments of these actors to uncover the types of knowledge, norms and values that 
inform policy, both explicit and implicit. This contributes to in-depth understanding of 
the normative foundations of child welfare policies and the role of the state. 
The analysis was done in several steps. First, I identified the basic position that each of 
the actors had toward the debates topic at the different points in time. A second 
reading, established the most central reasons political parties gave for their position 
and sorted these according to factual (pragmatic/legal) or normative (ethical/moral) 
reasons. Importantly this step also traced how parties changed or maintained their 
reasoning over time. A third reading focused closer on identifying whether the parties 
offered proof of validity for their claims and reasons, and if so which were these.  
I structure the presentation and discussion of findings according to discourses in order 
to make clear what standards of justification apply. I present a brief overview of the 
chronology of the adoption debates in the next section. However, in presenting and 
discussing the arguments I contrast within each discourse how legislators argued and 
justified their positions at different times. 
All source-materials are in Norwegian and the author made all translations. I interpret 
speakers in the plenary debates as representatives of their party, as party discipline is 
the norm in Norway, and there are no indications in the record that any parties gave 
members free votes in any of the debates. Square brackets in quotes contain 
modifications to the quote to improve clarity, and are not part of the original quote. 
 
5. Developments in Norwegian Adoption Policy  
During the period 2002-2013 debates over adoption took place at four different times 
(see table 1), and covers two different governments. First, the Bondevik-government 
(2001-2005), a centre-right minority coalition, consisting of the Christian Democratic 
Party (Krf), the Conservative party (H), and the Liberal Party (V). Second, the 
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Stoltenberg-government (2005-2013), a centre-left majority coalition consisting of the 
Labour Party (AP), Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Centre Party (SP). Parliament 
consisted of seven parties throughout this period. The only party not in government at 
any point was the Progress Party (Frp). 
In a 2002 White Paper on child welfare (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002)) the Bondevik-
government raised the issue of introducing open adoption in the Child Welfare Act, 
following recommendations from the Supreme Court (Rt-1997-534) and an expert 
committee on child welfare (NOU 2000:12) that it be considered. According to the 
Supreme Court, open adoptions would prevent the need to weigh benefits of continued 
contact with biological parents against the benefits of adoption when determining the 
child’s best interests. The government concluded against open adoption, primarily out 
of a concern that it would lead to an increase in the use of adoptions (St.meld. nr. 40 
(2001-2002): 187). SP, Krf, H, and V sided with the government. Only AP and SV 
argued in favour of open adoption. 
In the years 2008-2010, the Stoltenberg-government made two initiatives to promote 
adoption for children in long-term foster care. First, Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009), 
presented an initiative to increase the use of adoption by issuing guidelines to 
municipal child welfare agencies. Guidelines should the help caseworkers determine 
whether adoption is in a child’s best interests and reduce uncertainty in decision-
making. The government’s assumption was that guidelines would increase the number 
of cases forwarded to adoption by the agencies. H, V and Frp opposed the government. 
However, Krf and SP who previously opposed an increase in adoption now sided with 
SV and AP arguing in favour of more adoptions. The following year the government 
proposed to introduce post-adoption contact (open adoption) in the Child Welfare Act 
(Prop. 7 L (2009-2010)). The government saw the question of open adoption as 
directly tied to its initiative to promote more adoptions (Prop. 7 L (2009-2010): 15; 
Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009): 29). Despite the shared expectation that introducing open 
adoption would lead to more adoptions, the law passed unanimously in the Storting, 
and was also supported by the parties critical of any increase in adoptions. 
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In 2013, the Stoltenberg-government revisited its intent to provide guidelines to 
promote adoptions in Prop. 106 L (2012-2013) . Its comments on adoption came on 
the back of an expert report NOU 2012:5 (2012), which had made several 
recommendations regarding adoption. The report and its recommendations built 
primarily on psychological theories on attachment and child development. The 
government again concluded that it would provide guidelines to the municipal child 
welfare agencies to help decision-making and enable more adoptions. H now joined 
SV, AP, SP and Krf in support of increasing adoptions. In eleven years, the question of 
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5.1 Legal Discourses 
The room for using adoption as a policy instrument is restricted by both national laws 
and international conventions. Under Norwegian law, the biological principle and the 
principle of mildest intervention are the most important legal restrictions on adoption. 
Legislators are also bound to respect the CRC and the ECHR as well as rulings by the 
ECtHR. Any effort to expand the use of adoptions must therefore take place within the 
confines of established legal rights of children and parents. It is however interesting to 
note how differently the two sides in the debates framed the legal restrictions on 
adoption, especially based in ECHR, and the CRC. 
The Bondevik-government argued strongly for giving decisive weight to the biological 
principle when there was any doubt about the child’s best interest in adoption cases 
(St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002)). At the request of parliament in 1996, the government 
ordered a report on whether the county boards practiced adoption according to 
legislative intent. For the White Paper (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002)) legal scholar 
Bendiksen submitted a report to the government which examined termination of 
parental rights and adoption decisions by the county boards for the years 1994 and 
1998 (later published: Bendiksen, 2008). The report laid the foundation for the 
Bondevik-government’s argumentation about the legal centrality of the biological 
principle and limiting the use of adoption. 
First, the report tied the biological principle to quality of legal decision-making. 
Though the majority of decisions in both 1994 and 1998 were in favour of adoption, 
there was a drop in the number of cases from 1994 (41 children) to 1998 (17 children). 
The drop was accompanied by an increased emphasis on the biological principle. The 
Bondevik-government argued that: 
In the researcher’s opinion all the decisions from 1998 are thorough and given 
satisfactory treatment, as opposed to the decisions from 1994. The report shows 
that the 1998-cases call attention to and emphasize the biological principle and 
the value of visitation between the biological parents and children to a much 




The government considered this development toward a heightened legal focus on the 
biological principle in decision-making was appropriate and saw the report itself as 
further contributing to strengthen this focus. The government did not specify what it 
meant by “The value of visitation”, nor did it consider what conditions could imply 
that visitation is valuable as opposed to when it is not valuable or whether children and 
parents might have attach different value to visitation.    
Second, the Bondevik-government saw a strict interpretation of the biological 
principle as being in line with decisions in the Supreme Court and the ECtHR. 
Commenting on the reduction of adoption cases between 1994 and 1998 the 
Government stated: 
It is not unlikely that the decision against Norway by the ECtHR in 1996 and 
decisions by the Supreme Court have affected the development. The Decision by 
the ECtHR has attracted great interest in the expert communities, and there is 
reason to believe that the decision has led to more awareness around these 
questions. There is also cause to believe that the discussed research report will 
lead to further awareness and more discussion around the topic. (St.meld. nr. 
40 (2001-2002): 187) 
Especially Johansen v. Norway (appl. no. 17383/90) was seen as confirmation of the 
centrality of the biological principle in the question of adoption. Importantly, the 
Bondevik-government saw limiting the access to adoption in child welfare as 
furthering the intent of the ECtHR.  
Third, Bondevik-government responded to the call from both the Supreme Court (Rt-
1997-534) and an Expert report (NOU 2000:12) to consider introducing open 
adoptions. Based on the analysis of legal implications of allowing open adoptions 
(Bendiksen, 2000), the government argued against introducing open adoptions in law. 
Open adoptions, the report argued, would increase the total number of number of 
adoptions because it would allow adoptions even when continued contact with 
biological parents could benefit the child (Bendiksen, 2000: 221-222). The Bondevik-
government agreed, and cited the report to conclude:  
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The discussed report argues that adoptions should not be granted in those cases 
where one considers it good for the child to maintain contact with his or her 
biological parents. The [government] shares this view and is concerned with 
identifying the best way to prevent adoption when visitation with biological 
parents is desirable. [The government] considers guidelines to this effect. 
(St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002): 187) 
Thus, the Bondevik-government was not only concerned with a possible increase in 
adoptions, it considered measures further restricting the use of adoptions. A majority 
in the Storting Committee supported the conclusion and added, ‘An adoption is final 
and cannot be dissolved. These members emphasize that the effects of an adoption 
imply that one should exercise caution with adoption against the will of parents’ 
(Innst. S. nr. 121 (2002-2003): 42, H, KrF, SP). 
Finally, open adoption were considered to undermine the ‘adoption institution’ 
because it does not include a full transfer of legal rights and duties to the adoptive 
parents, as biological parents would retain a right to visitation (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-
2002)). Accordingly, a right to post adoption visitation would be inconsistent with the 
legal idea of adoption, and would in effect introduce what KrF representative Eriksen 
dubbed a ‘light-version’ of adoption (S.tid. (2002-2003): 1829).  
The Stoltenberg-government challenged the legal understanding of the Bondevik-
government, and especially its reliance on the biological principle as decisive. Central 
to this was a reinterpretation of the ECtHR decision in Johansen v. Norway (appl. no. 
17383/90). While the Bondevik-government saw the decision as placing clear limits on 
the use of adoption, the Stoltenberg-government argued that the decision did not really 
refer to the question of adoption, but rather ‘termination of parental rights with a view 
to adopt’ (Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009): 28). The difference is subtle but important. The 
Stoltenberg-government argued that the ECtHR really addressed the practice of 
terminating parental rights (especially for infants) in conjunction with the care order 
decision. This enables a possible future adoption by the foster parents but severs all 
contact between child and birth family. According to the ECtHR this practice violated 
both the child’s and parents’ right to respect for family life and to attempt reunification 
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(Johansen v. Norway, appl. no. 17383/90: paragraph 78). Accordingly, it was the 
decision to deny mother contact with her baby following the foster care placement that 
violated article 8, and not the subsequent adoption, because it prevented mother from 
ever being able to attempt reunification without proper justification. The government’s 
argument downplays the judgment’s relevance for termination of parental rights and 
adoption cases where the child has already resided in foster care over an extended 
period, and where reunification is impossible or highly unlikely. 
An important Supreme Court judgment on adoption took place in 2007 (Rt-2007-561), 
which may have provided a window of opportunity for the Stoltenberg-government’s 
effort to promote adoption. In justifying the legal room for promoting more adoptions 
the government leaned heavily on the recent judgment, which it saw as ‘opening for 
using adoptions in child welfare to a somewhat greater degree than previously’ 
(Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2008: 39). According to the minister of children 
and equality: ‘We wish to adjust [adoption] practice to align it with the latest Supreme 
Court verdict’ (O.tid. (2008-2009): 889). The government emphasized three points 
from the judgment. First, the expert witness believed that generally adoption was 
preferential to foster care when the placement will be long term and occurs before the 
child has developed attachments to any biological parent. This gives a legal support for 
the government’s emphasis on research positive to adoption. Second, while the ECtHR 
has decided that adoption without parental consent requires ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, the Supreme Court ruling stated that long-term foster care placements 
generally occur precisely when the child is in a situation that one would otherwise 
consider exceptional. Third, the Supreme Court stated there is nothing in the language 
of the law itself or in Supreme Court precedent that precludes adoption because 
visitation with biological parents is desirable. The question of visitation is one among 
many in a total consideration of the child’s best interests (Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009): 
28). This goes against the assumption of the Bondevik-government that adoption 
should be avoided whenever the child might benefit from continued contact with 
biological parents and weakens the biological principle by placing individual child 
needs in a broader sense at the centre of the case. 
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With the exception of FrP, there was no opposition from any parties to the framing of 
the legal room for adoption by any party. FrP however, have consistently opposed the 
practice of adoptions from care in any form. In the words of FrP representative Solveig 
Horne: ‘what the Progress Party want to emphasise is that we oppose forced 
adoptions as a child welfare measure. It is a highly invasive coercive measure and, as 
I see it, could violate several conventions’ (S.tid. (2009-2010): 2836) 
FrP presented these arguments, that adoptions from care violate international 
conventions, at every debate on adoption: 
These members are highly critical that one chooses not to abide by the principle 
of mildest intervention. Adoption is an irreversible action and should be used 
with caution. These members opine that this could contribute to care orders 
without attempts at reunification with biological parents. These members view 
this as a violation of the UNCRC Articles, 7, 8, 9, and 16. (Innst. O. nr. 121 
(2008-2009): 18) 
These members emphasize that forced adoptions pursuant to the CWA section 
4-20 as a child welfare measure is a highly invasive, coercive measure, and 
could violate the ECHR. These members point to the UNCRC Article 7, which 
gives the child as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or 
her parents, and Article 9, which protects the child from separation from his or 
her biological parents. (Innst. 395 L (2012-2013): 45) 
However, FrP is alone in this interpretation of international conventions. Although 
other parties may disagree on when adoptions are necessary and legitimate, they all 
nonetheless accept the basis that in some cases adoption is both legal and in the child’s 
best interests. 
 
5.2 Pragmatic Discourses 
Pragmatic arguments about knowledge played only a very small part in the adoption 
debates under the Bondevik-government. The government recognized research that 
claimed adoption could have positive effects on child life outcomes (St.meld. nr. 40 
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(2001-2002): 185-186), and two expert reports (NOU 2000:12: 152; Bendiksen, 2008: 
384 ff.) referred to and considered this literature. However, as an argument in favour 
of adoption the Bondevik-government’s did not give it much weight: 
The [government] considers that based on current knowledge about [open 
adoption], there is not sufficient grounds to make changes that establishes a 
right to post-adoption visitation for biological parents (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-
2002): 186). 
As noted, the Bondevik government was mainly concerned with the predicted increase 
in the number of adoptions that could follow an introduction of open adoption in law. 
Thus, even if the government did recognize possible benefits of adoption it did not see 
these as outweighing other concerns.  
In contrast, the Stoltenberg-government framed the debate as a question of whether 
adoption would benefit child development. The research that claimed evidence of 
positive effects from adoption on life outcomes became central to the government’s 
aim of promoting adoption. The pragmatic arguments for adoption, fronted by the 
Stoltenberg-government, centre on the claim that adoptions are more likely to produce 
good childhoods and healthy adults than long-term foster care. 
The Stoltenberg-government pointed to ‘serious concerns’ from ‘various expert 
groups’ that adoption is used too seldom, and that while the number of adoptions had 
dropped, the number of children in public care had grown substantially in later years 
(Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2008: 34). The claim was backed by pointing to 
overwhelming support for adoption promotion during the hearing, 104 of 107 
consultative bodies approved (Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009): 30-33). As such, there was 
already considerable support among interest and expert groups for using adoption in 
more cases, and for issuing guidelines to that effect. 
The government continued by arguing that research that comparing adopted children 
with children in foster care and children of the general population consistently showed 
better outcomes for adopted children compared to children growing up in care. The 
government concluded that:  
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There is research that shows adoption can provide a more secure and 
predictable childhood compared to foster care, because the parents still have 
access to apply for reunification. The child’s uncertainty about the placement 
duration can have significant impact on their development… foreign studies 
conclude that early adoption generally gives the best outcome in relation to the 
child’s attachment and its cognitive, emotional, and behavioural development, 
compared to children placed in foster care or residential care. (Ot.prp. nr. 69 
(2008-2009): 29) 
The Stoltenberg-government did not present new knowledge as evidence for the 
argument, but referred to the report by legal scholar Bendiksen (2008: 384 ff.), used by 
the Bondevik-government six years earlier, which cited British, American and Nordic 
studies (see Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2008: 39). There is no indication in 
the record of the Stoltenberg-government acquiring new knowledge to justify 
adoptions before the 2009 decision to promote adoptions. What was new was the 
emphasis the government gave to this research. 
This research argument is consistent with the viewpoints of SV and AP since 2003 
(Innst. S. nr. 121 (2002-2003): 41), but both SP and Krf shifted their position to 
support more adoptions in 2009 (Innst. O. nr. 121 (2008-2009): 17-18). As they did so, 
both parties explicitly embraced the same argumentation about benefits to child 
development fronted by the Government.  
Opponents of adoption promotion rarely addressed the government’s claim that 
research showed adoption to provide significant benefits to children compared to long-
term foster care. However, representative Thommessen of the Conservative party did 
on one occasion question its relevance: 
The justification provided by the government for its proposal, is that adoption 
may provide a safer and more predictable framework for childhood than long-
term foster care placements. Of course it may, but it is hardly an absolute truth 
(O.tid. (2008-2009): 887, H, original emphasis). 
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Leaving aside the question of what would qualify as an ‘absolute truth’ in this context 
the Conservatives were especially critical that the government did not present evidence 
based on Norwegian data. The government relied mainly on research from the U.S. 
and England for its knowledge of adoption benefits. The government acknowledged 
some of these challenges but did not consider in any detail what the contextual 
differences in child protection systems should mean for adoption in Norway (Ot.prp. 
nr. 69 (2008-2009): 29). Later, in 2012, an expert report ordered by the Government 
supported the use of international research, arguing that ‘it is unlikely that results from 
such a wide range of countries should have no relevance for Norwegian conditions’ 
(NOU 2012:5: 130). 
More common than addressing the research provided by the government, parties 
opposed to increasing adoption argued on their own terms that adoption might harm 
children. According to FrP: ‘Children who are adopted from public care may 
experience this as highly traumatic later in life’ (Innst. O. nr. 121 (2008-2009): 18, 
FrP). FrP provided no evidence for this claim but repeated it several times during the 
debates. Opponents of adoption promotion rarely offered evidence beyond the 
anecdotal level, as exemplified by Liberal Party representative Grande: 
 I have spoken to several foster children who for virtually no part of their lives 
have lived with anyone but their foster family, but who still have a hard time 
turning away from their biological parents, even though they have never been 
there for them. (O.tid. (2008-2009): 890, V) 
The inability to present evidence beyond anecdotes meant that parties critical of 
adoption were unable to establish a discourse of knowledge that could contradict the 
empirical evidence of adoption benefits that was so important to the promoters of more 
adoption. One exception to the lack of evidence for potential harm of adoption 
promotion came from KrF and H, who cautioned against taking adoption too far by 
following the UK. These parties argued that in the UK ‘preliminary numbers show that 
about 20 percent of adoptions of children between 5 and 11 years old, result in the 
child re-entering public care’ (Innst. 209 L (2009-2010): 9 KrF, H). No reference was 
provided, but the claim is likely based on the study by Rushton and Dance (2006), 
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which reports a 23% adoption disruption rate. However, the study is small (99 
children) making it vulnerable to selection bias. Further, cherry picking studies does 
not recognize that there have been several studies of adoption disruption, and that this 
estimate is among the highest (see Coakley and Berrick, 2008). A recent study which 
included all children adopted from foster care in England between 2000 and 2011 
(36,749 children) placed the disruption rate at 3.2%  (Wijedasa and Selwyn, 2017). 
While it is important to recognize that adopted children do in some cases re-enter 
public care, this problem is significantly less frequent than claimed by KrF and H. 
The Stoltenberg-government also ordered reports to strengthen the knowledge-
argument for promoting adoption (Barnevernpanelets rapport, 2011; NOU 2012:5; 
Skivenes, 2009). However, only the 2009 report by Skivenes on open adoption was 
submitted before the Storting made its decision.  
The expert report on the biological principle (NOU 2012:5) provided a psychological 
foundation of knowledge. Based on child developmental psychology it argued the 
importance of secure attachments to child development and was critical of the role that 
the biological principle had in Norwegian child protection. The expert committee 
recommended always considering adoption when a child faces long-term placement at 
an early age (NOU 2012:5, 2012: 133). The report strengthened the Stoltenberg-
government’s pragmatic research argument for adoption, and the report’s general 
description of adoption benefits was widely supported in the Storting. In 2013, five of 
the seven parties in parliament jointly stated that: 
Research demonstrates favourable long-term effects for adopted children 
compared to children in long-term foster care and children permanently placed 
in foster care… these studies demonstrate that as adults adoptive children 
manage as well as children with an ordinary childhood. This is presumably 
linked to a sense of security in attachment to their family felt by adoptive 
children. The committee considers stability of care essential for children. (Innst. 
395 L (2012-2013): 44, AP, SV, SP, KrF, H) 
This marks the first occasion where the Conservative party also expresses support for 
promoting more adoptions. While this data cannot tell us why the conservative party 
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changed its stance, it is interesting to note that support is first recorded in response to 
the expert report. It could indicate that the Stoltenberg-government was successful in 
its consistent emphasis on research about individual outcomes, as a way of arguing for 
more adoptions. 
The Stoltenberg-government’s child-centric focus is evident in the type of research 
that it relied on, which is concerned with advancing the child’s developmental 
potential and expected life-outcomes. Knowledge based argumentation, rooted in 
research evidence, was clearly more important to parties promoting adoption than to 
the opponents. While adoption promoters sought to establish a clear link between 
adoption and improved life outcomes, the opponents were never able to establish a 
discourse that could effectively challenge this view. While adoption can thus be seen 
as a means to an end for those in favour of performing more adoptions, the reasons for 
opposing more adoptions do not primarily come from a strong disagreement over what 
is considered valid knowledge. However, this knowledge discourse did play a large 
role also in shaping the ethical and moral discourses on adoption. 
The expert report’s most specific recommendation – to specify time-limits for how 
long the youngest children could remain in foster care before agencies are required to 
consider adoption (NOU 2012:5: 133) – was only acknowledged by the government as 
something for future consideration (Prop. 106 L (2012-2013)). This could imply a 
reluctance against being too specific and going too far in promoting adoptions, an 
indication that the topic is still politically controversial. 
 
5.3 Ethical-Political Discourses 
Throughout the debates, two major ethical discourses inform the parties’ 
argumentation of a good childhood and family life. First, a ‘Family-oriented’ discourse 
that emphasizes shared interests and values of biological and family ties and 
maintenance of contact. Second, a ‘child-oriented’ discourse that emphasizes the value 
of stable care and attachment to psychological caregivers. Importantly, both supporters 
and opponents of adoption promotion drew arguments from each of the discourses. 
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However, proponents of adoption promotion tended to emphasize the child-oriented 
arguments whereas opponents argued in a family-oriented way. 
To opponents of increasing use of adoption the prime justification lies in the value of 
preserving biological ties between child and birth family. V, H, and FrP argued 
strongly for the shared interests of children and parents in preserving biological ties. V 
set clear limits on state responsibility, based on ethical considerations of biological 
ties. The words of representative Grande (V) in the Storting debates are illustrative of 
several components in the family-oriented discourse: 
That some are born to parents who do wrong things can never be prevented by 
political decisions… These children learn to live with it, and that is what we 
should help them do, teach them to live with it… the biological ties are there no 
matter what. Children often feel responsible for their parents, even parents who 
make mistakes. Even parents who cannot be good parents, children feel 
responsible for and connected with. (O.tid. (2008-2009): 889, V) 
First, this illustrates the axiomatic nature of biological ties to the family-oriented 
discourse. Biological ties are fundamental and establish permanent bonds between 
child and parent, and as a society, we ought to preserve these ties. Second, the 
axiomatic status of biological ties implies clear limits on what the state can and should 
seek to do for children. Because the child is forever tied to the biological family, 
severing these ties could risk harming the child. Further, social value of biological ties 
implies that the state has a duty to protect them. The result is also that children’s and 
biological parents’ interests are merged to ‘family interests’ because both have an 
inherent interest in preserving the biological ties. Adoption breaks this shared interest. 
This quote from FrP illustrates the implication of shard bonds to limiting state 
intervention: 
[FrP] is very critical of how the [government] chooses to define the role of the 
public, in terms of what the state may allow itself to do with children in public 
care. It is important to emphasize that the biological parents always will remain 
the biological parents (Innst. O. nr. 121 (2008-2009): 18, FrP) 
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It is not the role of the state to decide a child’s family. Again, the role of biology is 
axiomatic to the argument. Thus while it may be necessary for the state to place a child 
in public care, it cannot and should not create new families. FrP’s primary position is 
to abolish adoption, but gave subsidiary support for open adoption because at least it 
would enable some children to maintain a degree of contact with biological family 
(S.tid. (2009-2010): 2836, representative Horne (FrP)). 
The Conservatives provided a more moderate argument for the importance of the 
biological ties in the debates about open adoption: 
The question of a right to knowledge about ones biological parents, biological 
origin, is a recurring subject when it comes to questions of family and questions 
tied to children. The Conservatives consider this an important starting point. 
(S.tid. (2009-2010): 2837, representative Thommessen (H)) 
There is little nuance in these statements of the importance of biological ties. It is 
unclear if – and how – biological ties are understood as different from psychological 
attachment when it comes to their importance to the child. The underspecified concept 
of biological ties thus seems to be applicable to groups of children that can be different 
in crucial ways. To exemplify: a child placed in foster care at birth, and a child placed 
at five years old, are likely to have very different relationships and attachments to their 
families. Both have the same biological ties. Do these children share the same 
interests? There is no evidence in the record of anyone addressing such questions. The 
lack of attempts at clarifying such questions also means that proponents and opponents 
may have very different cases in mind when they talk about adoption and talk past 
each other (deliberately or not).  
The ‘child-oriented’ discourse attacks the biological presumption and builds on the 
idea that a good childhood requires stable attachments to secure caregivers in order to 
promote the child’s physical, mental and emotional development. What matters for 
this is the child’s psychological attachment to caregivers, not their biological ties. 
According to Labour representative Olsen: 
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Far too many Norwegian children sorely need a safer life. It is our task to lay 
the foundation that provides the best possible childhood for as many children as 
possible… That the child is ensured a stable and predictable childhood must be 
decisive for the actions provided. (S.tid. (2009-2010): 2835, AP) 
Adoption is justified from an ethical perspective because it is better at securing the 
child a stable placement than foster care. In this view, stable care is the most central 
requisite for a good childhood and trumps the necessity for maintaining biological ties. 
The child-oriented discourse also emphasises the value of belonging to a family that 
does not rely on biological ties. Centre Party representative Ramsøy argued that many 
children in long-term foster care:  
face an unstable childhood, maybe in different foster homes, and always 
uncertainty about contact with biological parents. The question always 
becomes: How long can one stay in the foster home? Many children will also 
feel that they do not properly belong to a family. (S.tid. (2009-2010): 2837-
2838, SP) 
The representative addresses the value of children’s need to ‘properly belong to a 
family’, but does not equate belonging with biological ties. Instead she argues that the 
stability of care provided by adoption can provide this sense of belonging that foster-
care cannot. Instead belonging and family is connected with the caregivers that 
provide for the child’s physical, emotional and developmental needs. The ethical 
justification is strongly intertwined with the knowledge discourse and argues that if we 
know that adoption is likely to improve a child’s chances in life, compared to long-
term foster care, it is in the best interests of children that the government promote 
more adoptions, even at the expense of biological ties and parental rights. If a child is 
more likely to form secure attachments to caregivers through adoption than in foster 
care, then it should also promote a better childhood. As such, adoption in this 
perspective is a means of realizing important childhood values, including a sense of 
security and belonging. 
This concern with stability was also a central driver for open adoption, as shown in 
this joint statement by five parties (including the conservatives): 
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The majority emphasizes that the purpose of [open adoption] must always 
remain to secure the child a stable and predictable childhood with the adoptive 
parents... that the child may have contact with its origin with absolute certainty 
that he or she will remain in the care of the adoptive parents” (Innst. 209 L 
(2009-2010): 8, AP, H, KrF, SP, SV) 
I should emphasize that all parties consider child development and stability of care as 
essential, where they fundamentally differ is in their view of shared interests. Where 
the family-orientation presumes a shared interest in maintaining biological ties, the 
child-orientation consider their benefit to the child. Whether biological ties are worth 
preserving is, at least in part, dependent on how they affect the child’s potential to 
develop ‘normally’. They also differ fundamentally on whether the possible stability 
benefits of adoption outweigh the costs of severing ties. 
Finally, all parties considered fiscal considerations inappropriate in relation to 
adoption. The government’s statement that adoptions would be cost neutral, possibly 
cost saving (Ot.prp. nr. 69 (2008-2009): 78), was met with condemnation by H, V and 
FrP who found this statement ‘astounding and unfortunate’ (Innst. O. nr. 121 (2008-
2009): 18). In the words of FrP representative Woldseth: ‘I cannot support such 
statements. Every child in Norway should feel safe and as far as possible be well, and 
then money is irrelevant.’ (O.tid. (2008-2009): 885). The government had to reassure 
that mentioning costs was purely a legal administrative requirement of any proposal, 
and had absolutely no bearing on the decision to promote adoptions (O.tid. (2008-
2009): 889). Most likely, this was a rhetorical argument. It is hard to imagine that 
legislators are unaware of the government’s obligation to account for economic and 
administrative effects of any proposition. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy there is 
consensus between both sides of the argument that fiscal concerns are inappropriate to 
even consider in the context of adoption. Especially considering that child welfare is 
pressed for resources. This could obviously have been framed as a pragmatic question 
about how to most effectively prioritize limited public funding. It is instead dismissed 
on the ethical grounds that we should not consider money when talking about the good 
of children. However, it is also important to acknowledge that while such fiscal 
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concerns may work poorly in discourses of public justification, they could be 
important in coordinating discourses behind closed doors. 
The key value difference in the ethical discourses lies in how the parties emphasize the 
child’s individual interests to healthy development, and the child’s interests in 
preserving biological ties to the birth family. The child-oriented discourse is linked 
with the pragmatic discourse about developmental outcomes, and they inform and 
reinforce each other to argue that children ought to be brought up in ways that best 
promote their development to healthy adults. The value of adoption in this aspect is 
teleological as it is seen to promote good of healthy childhoods and future adults. The 
family-oriented discourse is based on the inherent value of biological ties. The value of 
biological ties is justified in separations of state and private responsibility for children, 
and deeply held social values that children and parents belong together as a 
fundamental part of the social order (perhaps even the natural order). Even when 
children and parents cannot live together, their biological ties imply a degree of shared 
interests. As such, the family-oriented discourse is deeply sceptical about the 
legitimacy of deep state intervention through adoption, even though its proponent may 
support long-term foster care.  
Open adoptions are a compromise between child-oriented and family-oriented values, 
where each side is able to offer support but for different reasons. For proponents of 
adoption it signified a means to secure adoption for children who otherwise would be 
less likely to be adopted, whereas for parties that do not approve of adoption it seems 
that an increase in adoptions could be accepted if the child would be allowed to 
maintain contact with the birth family. A compromise of values, between securing the 
child a permanent family and maintaining biological ties. Since the Stoltenberg-
Government had already decided to pursue increased use of adoption, the fear that 
open adoptions would lead to more adoptions could also have been of less concern to 





5.4 Moral Discourses 
Moral norms are deontological and take the form of moral rights that we ought to 
provide to everyone under equal circumstances. Where the ethical-political discourses 
questioned how we as a society should best care for children and secure a good 
childhood and successful transitions to adulthood, the moral discourses question which 
normative rights we owe to children and parents. While moral arguments were not as 
prevalent in the debates as pragmatic and ethical arguments, they show the same 
divide between child-oriented and family-oriented framing that we find in other 
discourses.  
The Progress Party was the strongest advocate for parental rights throughout the 
debates. In their view, adoption is an injustice to parents, and has no legitimate place 
in child welfare: 
To FrP it is still important to maintain an intent of reunification with the 
biological family. Anyone can change; anyone can get his or her life in order. 
However, performing a forced adoption is so final that there is no possibility of 
reunification. (S.tid. (2009-2010): 2836, representative Horne (FrP)) 
The argument appeals to moral principles about fairness, to make amends and start 
anew, or at least to avoid unnecessary punishment. While this leans on the child’s right 
to be cared for by his or her parents, the moral weight is given to parents’ right to 
respect for family life and takes for granted that the child’s interests will coincide with 
parental interests. 
While the ethical-political arguments against adoption tend to merge child and parental 
interests into family interests, the moral rights arguments illustrate how concern for 
parental rights overshadow the child’s perspective. The Bondevik-government stated 
that: 
The most important objection [to open adoption] is that [it] may lead to 
increased number of adoptions under the child welfare act. The [government] 
does not want this development. Adoption against the will of the biological 
parents is an exceptionally radical intervention to both child and parents. It will 
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remain so, even if biological parents in some cases were granted some form of 
visitation rights” (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002): 186) 
The government here emphasises the ‘will of the biological parents’ and frames post-
adoption visitation as a right bestowed to parents. There is no consideration of the 
child’s views on the matter. On the contrary the government was concerned that it 
would not be able to enforce visitation rights ‘if it was sabotaged by the child him- or 
herself or by the adoptive parents’ (St.meld. nr. 40 (2001-2002): 185). The idea that a 
child could ‘sabotage’ visitation by not wanting to participate further illustrates that 
the Bondevik-government considered post-adoption contact primarily a right of 
biological parents rather than the child. It also denies the child agency and a voice in a 
matter that clearly affects him or herself, a crucial part of children’s rights (Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 1989: Article 12). The government’s rationale was to 
protect the child from conflicts over visitation between adoptive and biological 
parents. However, this framing reduces the child to an object of adult interests instead 
of a subject with his or her own preferences. This paternalistic stance of having to 
protect the child from active participation was expressed several times as an argument 
against adoption. Here in the words of Liberal party representative Grande:  
One could probably find many good examples of cases where it is appropriate 
to allow foster parents to adopt, but I would like to relieve the child of the 
responsibility of having to choose between biological parents and foster 
parents. Having to pick between one’s parents is a heavy burden that I do not 
want forced upon children. (O.tid. (2008-2009): 889-890) 
The idea that it is sometimes in the child’s best interests to be protected from 
participation is not uncommon in Norway (see Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2016). It 
is, however, an ethical argument about what is good for children that should be 
considered against a moral and legal question of children’s rights to participation in 
matters that concern them (CRC article 12). The question of how to balance the child’s 
best interests or well-being with the child’s right to express their view is complicated, 
but it would certainly amount to an illegitimate expression of paternalism, and a 
breach of a right accorded to children to deny the opportunity to express their view 
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simply by referencing best interests (Archard and Skivenes, 2009). Fenton-Glynn 
(2014) has argued forcefully that children’s voice in adoption proceedings are of 
particular importance for three reasons: first, one cannot determine the best interests of 
a child without considering their own views. Second, it has procedural value and 
shows respect to the child. Success of adoption relies on the child’s willingness and 
desire to integrate with the adoptive family. Third, participation has symbolic value of 
recognizing the child as a rights-holder. While a final decision may not comply with 
the child’s expressed views any decision about the child’s best interests must also 
consider independently the child’s views (Archard and Skivenes, 2009). 
However, the debates about open adoption in 2010 showed a more child-centred 
orientation to right to post-adoption contact. The Stoltenberg-government framed post-
adoption contact as a right for the child. While some argued that post-adoption contact 
could and did take place without court orders, the government argued that ‘legal 
access to adoption with contact is more in accordance with current view of the child 
as an independent legal subject with independent rights’ (Prop. 7 L (2009-2010): 27). 
A broad majority in the parliamentary committee, the Socialist Left, Labour, Centre, 
Christian Democrats and the Conservatives agreed that open adoption should be 
understood primarily as a right for the child: 
The Majority emphasizes that the proposal’s goal must be to secure the child a 
stable and predictable childhood with the adoptive parents. The majority also 
emphasizes that if it is in the child’s best interests, this can ensure the child a 
certain degree of contact with his or her origin. The majority further 
emphasizes the importance that the child can have contact with his or her 
biological parents in absolute certainty of remaining with his or her adoptive 
family. (Innst. 209 L (2009-2010): 8)  
All parties in the committee, with the exception of the progress party, now supported 
the view of post-adoption contact as a right of the child, not the parents. The same 
majority also emphasized that the child’s opinion or resistance to contact would 
constitute sufficient reason for the county board to reconsider the decision about post-
adoption contact (Innst. 209 L (2009-2010): 11). This emphasizes a degree of self-
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determination for the child in the question of contact that was not evident in earlier 
debates. 
The child-oriented arguments emphasized children as autonomous bearers of rights, 
which also applies to post-adoption contact, a right of the child to have knowledge 
about his or her biological family. This is a marked shift from how the Bondevik-
government framed open adoption, in which post-adoption contact was “granted” to 
parents. According to representative Barstad of SV: 
the purpose of these changes is to place contact in a proper framework and 
secure children’s rights… The child is an independent legal subject with 
independent rights. For this reason, the child’s opinion must carry extra 
weight…  Adoption and child welfare is about children’s right to a safe 
childhood, not about biological parents’ rights to their own children. (S.tid. 
(2009-2010): 2837, SV) 
Where the ethical arguments about children’s needs is something they deserve to be 
given because it is good for them, the framing of post-adoption contact as a right to the 
child implies that it is the child him or herself that should finally determine whether 
contact actually takes place. This framing of child rights places the child as 
independent legal subjects with rights of their own, on par with adults.  
It is important to emphasize that the child as an autonomous bearer of rights was not a 
major part of the debates, and it is hard to say how influential this way of thinking was 
to inform policy, and how much was more an ethical consideration of children’s best 
interests. Arguments about children’s desires and opinions were much more 
pronounced in debates about visitation than in the debates over whether to increase the 
use of adoption. In the latter, the question of children’s participations was mainly 
reduced to a legal technicality that children always have the right to heard in 
accordance with their age and maturity, but neither proponents or opponents of 
adoption argued what role the child’s own wishes should have in relation to other 




6. Concluding Discussion 
I have examined Norway gradually shifted to a more active adoption policy by 
analysing the arguments and justifications provided by the government and political 
parties in the Storting. The findings from the adoption debates give interesting insight 
in how Norwegian views on child protection struggles between an emerging child-
focused orientation and its emphasis on family-service and biological ties. The 
contestation between the orientations are evident in the type of knowledge 
emphasized, the ethical-political values and the way law and legal principles are 
interpreted and framed. Broadly speaking the adoption debates show a significant shift 
towards a child-centred approach under the Stoltenberg-government. Importantly, the 
shift cannot only be attributed to a majority government, as opposition parties also 
shifted their position during this time.  
The analysis uncovers two important developments in argumentation that legitimizes a 
shift towards a more active adoption policy: First, research-based knowledge and 
expert discourse on child development has become the central knowledge base 
framing adoption. This knowledge base places the child and its developmental 
potential as the central subject of interests. Secure attachment to caregivers and 
stability for the child are central components to promote development. This child 
centred knowledge base has been important to shift Norway towards a more active 
adoption policy. 
Second, there is evidence of a normative shift in priorities from addressing the child’s 
interests as part of a family unit towards the child’s autonomous interests and aligns 
with the child-centred knowledge-base. The ethical-political justification is based on 
the view that children ought to be able to have secure attachments and be safe where 
they live to develop into healthy adults. If adoptions are superior to foster care at 
promoting healthy development then the state is justified in pursuing more adoptions 
in the best interests of children, when reunification is no longer an option. According 
to this view the state is not just responsible for protecting the child from harm, by 
placing it in a safe foster home, but ought to actively pursue the best possible 
conditions for its development, even if this means setting aside the biological principle 
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through adoption. This line of arguing is very different to an approach where adoptions 
are a last resort, and where the state’s responsibility is to maintain biological ties as far 
as possible, even when children reside in foster care. This could be seen as a challenge 
to the family-service orientation, but not necessarily. While the assumption that the 
state has a responsibility to keep families intact by providing services at an early stage 
can and should remain, there need be no opposition to thinking primarily about the 
child’s developmental needs when the alternative is growing up in foster care. At the 
same time, there is missing a serious debate about what constitutes a ‘family’ for a 
child who may never have resided with his or her biological parents and whose only 
point of reference may be the foster parents. Even proponents of adoption focus 
mainly on the stability benefits to children, but rarely ask the question of what the 
child sees as his or her family or what the children themselves understand as 
belonging. 
There are signs of less paternalistic, moral discourses on adoption that sees the child as 
an autonomous legal subject and bearers of rights. According to this perspective 
children have individual rights on par with adults, and we are obliged to consider the 
individual child’s needs and wants rather than view the child as part of the family. 
From this rights-discourse adoption is a tool to secure children their rights to a safe 
childhood and emphasizes that the state’s responsibility is to care for the child in the 
best possible way when families fail in their parental responsibilities. Importantly, this 
discourse includes an emphasis on the child’s own views. While the ethical-political 
discourse about the ‘deserving’ child was more pronounced in the debates, both serve 
the same purpose of isolating the interests of children in long-term care from those of 
the biological parents. As noted the rights discourse primarily took place during 
debates about post-adoption contact.  
The analysis of arguments and justifications shows that Norway’s path to an active 
adoption policy built on ideas that framed the child’s interests and needs as distinct 
from the family. The biological principle is central to Norwegian Child Welfare policy 
and practice, but as this analysis shows it is challenged by an emerging child-centred 
perspective. It is clear that expert discourse about child developmental needs and an 
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ethics that places the child’s interests above parental rights has been central to this 
development in Norwegian policy on adoption. However, this knowledge discourse is 
dependent on a normative view of the child as an independent subject, not simply an 
integrated part of family interests, in order to be effective in shaping policy. The study 
supports claims by Skivenes (2011) that there are signs of an emerging child-centred 
orientation in Norway, and offers evidence to how such an orientation is affecting 
policy. It is possible that this strong emphasis on the child’s interests as opposed to 
family interests is part of the explanation for why Norway currently has had ten 
adoption cases decided or communicated by the ECtHR since 2015.  
The examination of public justifications is an important source to understand why 
parties have shifted their position on adoption, but I make no claim that it provides the 
full explanation. I am restricted to what is available in the public documents and 
cannot rule out bargaining behind closed doors in government coalitions or the 
Storting committee. Justifications could be window-dressing, as alluded to by the 
opposition in its reaction to fiscal concerns as an actual reason for increasing adoption. 
Nor can it make causal claims about special interests that may have affected policy 
development behind closed doors. It is also important to emphasize that this study 
makes no causal claims about the effect of these changes in discourse on the actual 
increase in adoptions since 2010.  
However, understanding the normative underpinnings of policy-making (Fischer and 
Gottweis, 2012; Habermas, 1996), and in social welfare policy in particular (Kildal, 
2018) is an important task because it reveals what is often taken for granted, but has 
important implications for how welfare services and interventions are shaped. This 
paper is an empirical contribution to this literature on policy studies, by showing how 
important shifts in discourses that frame the state’s normative responsibility for 
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This paper, through the vignette of a three-year old boy's case, examines how child welfare workers in three
countries, Norway, England and the United States (California), decide whether to recommend forced adoption.
Legislation and policy recommendations for the termination of parental rights and adoption vary among these
three countries, but they all regard permanency for the child as the overarching goal for children in care.We find
that a majority of the workers suggest forced adoption, and their main justifications were related to parental
behaviour and their failure to fulfil visitation arrangements, followed by arguments about how adoption would
provide both permanency and solid attachment for the child. It was Norwegian workers (41%) that decided
against forced adoption, and their main objections were the lack of parental consent and the fact that forced
adoption is uncommon in Norway. The findings of this study show that the reasoning of child welfare workers
clearly reflects the policies and guidelines of their respective countries, which demonstrates the impact of each
country's policy instruments. The workers' reasoning also reflects their knowledge of the basic premises for
promoting adoption and permanency for children in care. As such, the state power that child welfare workers
exercise rests on a rationale that is evidence oriented and extends beyond a mere reflection of policy guidelines
and instructions.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper examines how 299 child welfare workers in three
countries, England, the U.S. (CA), and Norway, justify their decisions
about forced adoption when presented with the same vignette about
foster parents wishing to adopt their foster child. All three countries
regard permanency for the child as an overarching goal when a child is
looked after. However, the Nordic child welfare systems and the Anglo-
American child welfare systems have different approaches to the use of
forced adoption (Garrett & Sinkkonen, 2003; Gilbert, Parton, & Skivenes,
2011). In England and the U.S., policy programmes and legislation
clearly state that if reunification with the biological parents is not
possible, then permanency through adoption is the preferred solution
(Bartholet, 2009; Berrick, 2011). In Norway, adoption is rare (Grinde,
2005; Skivenes, 2010, 2011). These differences are reflected in the
adoption rates in each of the respective countries: seven per 10000
children in USA, four per 10000 in England and one per 100000
children in Norway (Gilbert et al., 2011). This paper examines how
child welfare workers mandated to pursue permanency for children
but operating within different systems make decisions about forced
adoption.
The data consists of the decisions and the reasons why 299 workers
in the US (97), England (99) and Norway (103) either support adoption
or continued foster care with respect to a vignette of a three-year-old
boy, Benjamin. The abridged version of the vignette is that Benjamin has
livedwith his foster parents since hewas fivemonths old. His biological
parents were substance abusers and have visitation rights but have
never visited the boy. Benjamin's foster parents wish to adopt him, but
Benjamin's mother opposes the adoption, whereas his father supports
it. Presentedwith the same case scenario, almost all workers in England
(98%) and the US (96%) suggest an adoption, whereas six out of ten
workers in Norway recommend adoption. Thisfindingwas expected for
the English and American workers, but was unexpectedly high for the
Norwegian workers.
This paper seeks to explore how workers justify their decisions. We
examine their reasoning and evaluate if there are differences between
workers and between countries. For example, doworkers have different
Children and Youth Services Review 34 (2012) 2220–2228
☆ Many, many thanks to all child welfare workers that have participated in the
project, and we very much appreciate all help and assistance that we have received
from researchers, project assistants, child welfare agencies, municipalities and city
councils, in facilitating the cross-country data collection.
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 959 24 979, +47 555 87151.
E-mail addresses: mski@hib.no, skivenes@me.com (M. Skivenes),
Oyvind.Samnoy.Tefre@hib.no (Ø.S. Tefre).
URL: http://www.hib.no/avd_ahs/fou/childwelfare.asp (M. Skivenes).
0190-7409/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2012.07.013
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Children and Youth Services Review
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /ch i ldyouth
opinions regarding permanency or the child's welfare/best interest, and
can we identify varying perceptions about the roles of public and
private responsibility for children and the state's role in such situations?
Our study is unique in that we have a large number of respondents
from three countries that make decisions based on a vignette and give
open-ended explanations for those decisions.We have found no studies
on decision-making in the child welfare system with respect to forced
adoption with a similar design. Thus, this study gives us important
insight and knowledge about how child welfare workers within differ-
ent child welfare systems think about and act on important issues such
as forced adoption.
The paper is organised in the following way: we begin with a pre-
sentation ofwhatweknow about the decision-making rationale of child
welfare workers, followed by an outline of the welfare systems of each
of the three countries and the basic premises for forced adoption.
Thereafter, we describe our method and data, followed by our findings.
In the discussion, we address the differences between the countries
studied and how workers' justifications for their decisions may shed
light on these differences.
2. Theoretical platform and research on the reasoning of child
welfare workers
Decision-making in the child welfare system is complex andmarked
by a high degree of uncertainty (cf. Elster, 1989;Mnookin, 1973;Munro,
2008). In child welfare practice, decisions involve multifaceted norma-
tive issues, many types of research knowledge, conflicting legal rights
and policy instructions, the unique needs and interests of children and
their parents, and the prioritisation of scarce resources, to name a few of
the issues that must be considered. Each issue is weighed against the
others, evaluated and finalised during the decision-making process. The
regulative ideal is, therefore, that the process, not the outcome, defines
the quality of a decision. Deliberative theory, as formulated byHabermas
(1996) and others, suggests hownormative questions and dilemmas can
find legitimate solutions through rational discourse when the proce-
dural and content rules of such discourse are fulfilled. The procedural
rules refer to the fact that all parties concerned by a decision should be
allowed to participate so that all relevant arguments are presented and
discussed in an open and free debate (see Alexy, 1989; Eriksen &
Weigård, 2003). It follows that the focal points of examination are the
arguments and accounts in the decision-making process. The impor-
tance of examining how childwelfareworkersmake decisions to further
our knowledge of how to improve the quality of decisions is stated in the
research (see, for example, Benbenishty, Osmo, & Gold, 2003; Gambrill,
2008;Munro, 2008; Osmo&Rosen, 2002). In this paper, we focus on one
important aspect of understanding decision-making, that is, the reasons
and justifications workers give for their choices.
Analyses of the rationale for policies (Duffy & Collins, 2010) and
examinations of the decisions made by professionals and the courts in
child welfare cases are few in Norway (Backe-Hansen, 2001; Grinde,
2003) and internationally. We have found two studies that are of par-
ticular interest for our paper. In a paper from 1994, a study of 73 child
welfare workers in Israel (Rosen, 1994) analyses workers' use of
knowledge in decision-making. A distinction between different cate-
gories of knowledge is established. The main conclusion is that this
sample of workers underused research-based knowledge and relied on
normative assertions (p. 574). In the wake of this study, and the most
relevant study for the purposes of this paper, is the comparison of Israeli
and Canadian child welfare workers (Benbenishty et al., 2003). A sam-
ple of 119workers gives the rationale behind their risk assessments and
decisions in a vignette case. The analysis focuses on the argumentation
structure and content of workers' rationales, and shows that workers
report that they base their decisions on theory, general knowledge and
experience but workers fail to mention values, policy and empirical
knowledge. Workers rarely expressed their degree of confidence in
their judgements or the reasons why they were valid (p. 144f.). The
major difference between the countries was that Israeli workers men-
tioned ‘general knowledge’more often than “theory” and “experience”,
compared to their Canadian peers. Our aim is to add to this research. In
the following section, we outline the country specific policies and leg-
islation regarding adoption in the child welfare system.
3. Policy and system context
Adoption is considered the most effective way of obtaining the
security of a stable and permanent family for children who cannot
live with their biological parents (see Hollinger, 2002, for a thorough
overview of different types of adoption practices). A wealth of re-
search demonstrates the importance of permanency for children
(Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, 1973, cf. Grinde, 2005). Among the North-
ern European countries, the United States and Canada, the child wel-
fare systems in England and the U.S. most actively use adoption
(Gilbert et al., 2011; Thoburn, 2007). Research on the outcome for
adopted children in the child welfare system versus children that are
in foster care or residential units or reunited with their biological
parents, show solidly and convincingly, that adoption gives children
the best outcome (Christoffersen, Hammen, Andersen, & Jeldtoft,
2007; Triseliotis, 2002; Vinnerljung & Hjern, 2011). In the Danish
meta study published in 2007, examination of available research on
adoptions covering a period from 1977 till 2006 from 11 countries,
the findings form a strikingly uniform picture. Regardless of whether
the focus is on the child's physical or cognitive development, the
child's self-esteem or behavioural and emotional problems, adoptive
children are managing better compared to their peers who were
either reunified with their biological parents, or grew up in residen-
tial care or in foster care (Christoffersen et al., 2007, p. 155). Adop-
tions are also associated with greater stability and continuity in care
compared with long-term fostering, particularly if the child is
adopted at an early age. Triseliotis (2002) examines the research
literature and compares the reported effects of long-term fostering
with adoption on six factors (Stability of long-term foster care and
adoption, Adjustment, Sense of security and belonging, Personal and
social functioning, Subjects' retrospective perceptions, Substitute
parents' perspective). He concludes that there are signs that break-
down rates may be diminishing and evening out between foster care
and adoptees in some age groups, but maintains in his conclusion
that: “compared with long-term fostering, adoption still provides higher
levels of emotional security, a stronger sense of belonging, and a more
enduring psychosocial base in life for those who cannot live with their
birth families. The main limitation of long-term fostering is its unpredict-
ability and the uncertain and ambiguous position in which the children
find themselves.” (Triseliotis, 2002, p. 31). And, of particular interest
for our cross-country study is the Swedish study published in 2011 by
Vinnerljung and Hjern, which uses national register data to compare a
wide range of long term outcomes for 3951 children who entered the
welfare system before age 7 and were either adopted or grew up in
long term foster care. After adjusting for birth parental related selec-
tion factors and age of entry to out-of-home care they found that
adoptees had more favourable outcomes on all factors tested (pri-
mary school performance, cognitive tests at military conscription
(boys only), educational achievement, and reliance on public welfare
at age 25) compared to long-term foster children: “The results from
our study indicate that adoption does have stronger compensatory
traits over time compared to long term foster care” (p. 1908). It is
worth noting that these adoptions are voluntary as Sweden does not
allow forced adoptions and that there are no data to explain why
some of these children were given up for adoption while others grew
up in foster care (Vinnerljung & Hjern, 2011, p. 1908).
This paper compares child welfare practices in societies with differ-
ent childwelfare systems and policies about adoption (cf. Gilbert, 1997;
Gilbert et al., 2011). Gilbert (1997) categorised England and the U.S. as
‘child protection’ systems, which focus on protecting children from risk
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and harm. The Nordic countries, including Norway, are ‘family service’
systems, which focus on needs and therapeutic approaches to helping
parents provide for their children. In a later comparative book about
child welfare systems (Gilbert et al., 2011), Parton and Berridge (2011)
argue that England has been transforming its child welfare system
towards a needs-based system, but there are indications that this is
being reversed (Parton, 2011).
In both types of child welfare systems, permanency is an overarching
goal for children that cannot livewith their birth parents. In England and
theU.S., adoption is ameasure to provide a permanent home for children
that cannot be reunited with their birth parents. The United States has
explicit guidelines that define how long the child welfare agency should
work for reunification and at what time permanent placement should be
pursued. If reunification is not possible, then adoption is the next best
alternative (Berrick, 2009, p. 53). The child should remain outside of the
home for nomore than 15 of the preceding 22 months (Bartholet, 1999).
Thereafter, adoption is the paramount goal. In this period, the biological
parents are entitled to receive help that will enable them to reunite with
the child. The main criterion that must be fulfilled is that the child
welfare agency must have provided reasonable efforts to help the pa-
rents. American legal scholars are critical of the legislation because it
contains too many exceptions and gaps that make it possible to circum-
vent the time limits with the goal of adoption (cf. Bartholet, 1999, 2009).
England also has a policy that involves deadlines, but they are less
conclusive. In a case of care order, the case is reviewed onemonth after
the child ismoved from the biological parents, and a second assessment
is done three months later. After four months, there must be a plan in
place to ensure the child's stability and a plan for the parents to regain
custody of their child. For example, parents may become part of a
binding detoxification programme or participate in anger management
therapy. The plans incorporate clear objectives and deadlines. The child
welfare agency is required to work intensively with the family before a
final decision on placement can be made, but if they do not succeed,
then they will put the child up for adoption or foster care. According to
the English Public Law Outline 2008 (PLO), adoption processes will
begin after 40 weeks, at which point there is a full legal review of the
case. At this stage, it will usually be clear how the parents are coping and
if services (e.g., rehabilitation or other remedial action) have been
effective. In England, it is also possible for foster parents who have had
custody of the child for 12 months to require the adoption of the child
(Isaacs & Shepherd, 2008, pp. 201).
The Norwegian legislation on adoptions in the child welfare system
does not set particular strict restrictions and high thresholds, for the use
of adoptions (The Norwegian ChildWelfare Act of 1992, 1992 Section §
4–20; Innst. O. No. 80, 1991–92, p. 27, cf. Skivenes, 2009). The law
establishes four conditions: (1) there must be a likelihood that the
parents will permanently be unable to care for the child properly, or
that it would be detrimental to the child to be moved because of
attachments formed with foster parents and the environment in which
the child resides; (2) adoption must be in the child's best interests; (3)
the foster parents must have proven themselves capable of bringing up
the child; and (4) the conditions for granting adoption in accordance
with theAdoption Act of 1986must be in place. The legislatorwas of the
opinion that adoption had to be consented to ‘in cases where it is better
for the child to be adopted than to grow up as a foster child’ (Ot. Prp. No.
44, 1991–92, p. 54). It is not evident from the preliminary legislative
deliberations that any particular issues beyond those given in the legal
text (§ 4–20, points 1–4) ought to be considered, and a unanimous
Parliament supported the provision without debate or criticism (Innst.
O. No. 80, 1991–92, p. 27). However, although the relevant criteria do
not seem to be comparatively strict, adoption with or without parental
consent is very rare in Norway (Grinde, 2005), as it is in all of the Nordic
countries. In 2007, the Norwegian child welfare service only presented
seven cases to the County Social Welfare board (a tribunal) concerning
adoption, and, in 2006, they presented 11 cases. Altogether, two-thirds
of these cases resulted in adoption (N=12).
4. Methods and data
This study, which was funded by the Norwegian Research Council,
is part of a larger comparative mixed-methods research project on
child welfare systems in the United States, England and Norway. We
conducted a survey of 304 child welfare workers in public agencies to
explore their perceptions of risk, decision-making and knowledge. In
Norway, we had 103 respondents, 100 respondents in England and
101 respondents in the U.S. In the survey, we had six vignettes, and
we have chosen to report on an adoption vignette in this paper. The
online survey was answered from January to May 2008 in Norway,
from March to August 2008 in England, and between March and
September 2010 in California. The survey took approximately one
hour to answer. We recruited study participants by first inviting city
councils and/or the head of a child welfare agency to participate. The
child welfare agency sent an invitation letter to all workers and
supervisors in the defined unit(s) on our behalf. This letter contained
detailed information about the research project and stated that par-
ticipation in this study was voluntary. The letter also discussed the
implications for those consenting to participate and stated that par-
ticipation would occur during non-work hours. Those who wished to
participate contacted the principal investigator by email or phone.
Workers received an honorarium based on a research reimbursement
model that proposes reimbursing participants for their time (Grady,
Dickert, Jawetz, Gensler, & Emanuel, 2005). We also followed justice
considerations; we wanted all participants in the project to receive
the same relative amount, regardless of their country of residence.
Workers received NOK 1000 in Norway, GBP 75 in England and USD
150 in California. The honorarium may not only have motivated a
broader set of workers to participate, but it may also have skewed the
sample towards those who were attracted by the honorarium. How-
ever, the samples were representative for their units at the time of
data collection.
Many of the participants were experienced caseworkers. Our Califor-
nia sample had the longest mean experience of 12 years, a variance of
40 years and a median of 11 years. In England, the mean was 8 years,
with a variance of 35 years andamedian of 6 years. InNorway, themean
was 9 years, with a variance of 38 years and median of 8 years. The
participants from California were also more highly educated than case-
workers in Norway and England. Eighty-nine percent of the Californian
caseworkers in our sample had earned a master's degree, and the re-
maining 11% held a bachelor's degree. In both England and Norway,
fewer than half of the caseworkers sampled held amaster's degree (40%
in England and 37% in Norway), and the remaining workers held bach-
elor's degrees or an equivalent college degree. In all three countries, the
vast majority of caseworkers sampled were female; England stands out
with 21% of the caseworkers being male. In California and Norway, the
proportion of male to female workers was only seven and five percent,
respectively.
This study has been peer-reviewed as part of the application process
for funding from the Norwegian Research Council. It was also reviewed
by the office of the Norwegian Privacy Ombudsman for Research, which
assesses privacy-related and ethical dimensions of a research project,
and by the Research Ethics Committee of the English city where we
conducted interviews. In California, our study did not fall within the
scope of the rules that the Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects of the Californian Health and Human Services Agency is obli-
gated to review under the Federalwide Assurance (CPHS, 2010 p. 6).
The vignette of Benjamin's adoption is presented as a snapshot in
time in which Benjamin, aged three, is wanted for adoption by his
foster parents, with whom he has lived since he was five months old.
The vignette gives a short description of the case specifics and the
background for Benjamin's placement in foster care, his relationship
with his biological parents, his development during foster care, and
details about his current situation, his biological parents and his foster
parents. Benjamin's biological mother refuses adoption, while his
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biological father is positive as long as he can retain visitation rights.
The workers are asked a series of questions, such as what course of
action they would recommend, why they would choose this specific
course of action, and what would have had to be different in the case
for another course of action to be recommended.
A total of 301 child welfare workers responded to the vignette about
Benjamin. Of the participants, 239 stated that theywould start preparing
for an adoption whereas 30 said they would leave Benjamin with his
foster parents but not start preparations for adoption at this time. Eight
participants said they would do nothing. For further analysis, the re-
spondentswho said theywould do nothingwere grouped together with
those who said they would leave Benjamin in foster care, as these
alternatives both result in the same outcome. Twenty-three participants
chose “another decision”. These participants were then asked an open-
ended question to provide an explanation of what this decision would
be. Based on an analysis of the answers to this question, 21 of the
respondents were assigned to either the group who would prepare for
adoption or the group that would leave Benjamin in foster care. The
remaining 2 respondents who could not be assigned to either group
were then excluded from further analysis. Both respondents who could
not be placed were from the American sample. The total number of
participants included in the study after the initial round of categorisa-
tions and exclusions was N=299 (Norway N=103, England N=99,
and the U.S. N=97).
The case of Benjamin's adoption follows a common type of vignette
technique in which fixed-choice responses are combined with open-
ended questions (Finch, 1987). A benefit of this approach is that while
the fixed-choice responses make it easier to compare the responses in
different countries, the open-ended questions leave room for the re-
spondent to define the meaning of the situation and point to the ele-
ments that lead to a specific decision (Finch, 1987, p.106).
After providing their recommendations, the respondents were
provided with an open-ended question to explain the specifics of the
case that led to the decision. Of the 299 respondents, 274 provided an
answer. Table 1 shows the distribution of those who answered the
open-ended explanatory question. The final question in the vignette
asked the workers an additional open-ended question about what
would have had to be different about the case for them to have made
another decision, and 278 workers provided an answer to this ques-
tion. Table 2 shows the distribution of the responses.
A limitation of our data relates to the differences in samples across
countries, which are due to the specific hiring patterns of the public
authorities we sampled and the economic recession, which seemed to
affect our Californian study sites most. The groups of workers invited to
participate in this study differed in England, Norway and California. This
is partly due not only to the organisation of the agencies in the respec-
tive countries, but also the fact that in California we only recruited
workers from the Emergency Response unit. These differences in cross-
country samples may affect how workers answered our questions.
However, the Californian workers were not completely different from
the English and Norwegian workers because most of them had ample
experience working in other roles in other child welfare units, espe-
cially as on-going caseworkers. We are aware that the relatively small
sample sizes in each country mean that our samples cannot be taken as
representative of the general population of child welfare workers in
these countries.
The case vignettes are based on real cases and have been tested and
reviewed by childwelfareworkers in all three countries. To determine if
the vignette cases in the survey were realistic, if they were sufficiently
complex, and if the respondents' answers reflected their opinions rather
than those of their managers, we asked about 25% of the sample to
respond to these issues. The results show that almost all confirmed that
they had answered as they themselves would have done, and approx-
imately nine out of ten respondents thought the vignettes were realistic
(the rest answered ‘I don't know’ (5), ‘in between’ (3) and ‘no’ (2)).
Regarding complexity, one-fifth of the respondents found them less
complex than real cases, about three-fifths said they had the same
complexity level as real cases and less than one-fifth found them more
complex than real cases.
Although the vignette contains only limited information, it was de-
signed to be recognisable toworkers in different countries as an approx-
imation of a real-life situation (Barter & Renold, 1999, 2000; Finch, 1987;
Soydan, 1996). The survey was translated from back and forth from
Norwegian to English to Norwegian again tomake surewe had the same
version of the questions and vignettes. The aim of the vignettes was to
capture the workers' professional assessments of cases. We asked the
same questions in each country, and we made an effort to give partici-
pants an option to choose open categories, as an alternative to fixed
categories, and to allow them to explain their choice. This was to make
sure that if they experience the survey form to be rigid, they had an
alternative. Although we aimed for a survey that was similar in each
country, we are aware that this type of comparison involves challenges
regarding conceptual differences, legislative framework and cultural
factors that have implications for child welfare. Therefore, the vignette
itself does not include any references to national legislations or other
specifics that could make it specific to any one country. The vignette
contains limited information about the case and allows the childwelfare
workers to interpret the case according to their own setting. The open-
ended questions are therefore of central importance, and it is through
these questions that we seek to understand just how the case is inter-
preted and positioned within the respondents' respective contexts
(Barter & Renold, 2000; Finch, 1987; Grinde, 2004). The questions allow
the participants in each country room to provide details that relate to the
different policies, laws, social norms and institutional practices that may
be influential to their decisions. Finally, although one of the strengths of
the vignette technique is the reduction of ‘social desirability factors’ and
the avoidance of observer effects (Soydan, 1996; Wilks, 2004), we are
aware that what is expressed in the respondents' answers may not
necessarily reflect how they would act in a real situation. Respondents
may have several reasons for answering in ways that may seem more
socially acceptable or more acceptable to the researchers (Barter &
Renold, 2000; Finch, 1987;Wilks, 2004). An important caveat is that this
study analyses a case of foster parentswishing to adopt their foster child,
and as such its resultsmay be of less value for adoption issues in general.
Data files were entered into SPSS. The open answers were entered
into Atlas.ti qualitative software. Open coding was used to analyse data
for predominant themes. For data analysis, we approached the interview
material with an analytical and conceptual strategy (Coffey & Atkinson,
1996) by (1) identifying what accounts child welfare workers gave for
their decisions; (2) identifying common themes and patterns in each
country, and (3) comparing the themes across countries. Where the
Table 1
Distribution, by country, of those who explained their decision.
Recommendation Norway England USA Total
Stay in foster care 36 2 4 42
38.3% 2.2% 4.5% 15.3%
Start adoption 58 90 84 232
61.7% 97.8% 95.5% 84.7%
Total 94 92 88 274
100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2
Distribution, by country, of those who explained what factors may have changed their
decision.
Recommendation Norway England USA Total
Stay in foster care 40 2 4 46
40.8% 2.2% 4.5% 16.5%
Start adoption 58 90 84 232
59.2% 97.8% 95.5% 83.5%
Total 98 92 88 278
100% 100% 100% 100%
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quotations of childwelfareworkers are presented, they reflect responses
that are typical of other workers. We present only themes that are
representative of at least 20% of the sample.
5. Findings
Childwelfareworkers in the three countries examinedwere asked to
give justifications for their recommendation for or against adoption. A
majority of workers, 251 out of 299, suggested adoption in this case.
However, as expected, there were country differences, and 41% of the
Norwegian workers did not suggest adoption. We explore the justifica-
tions workers gave for their decision and examine if workers differ in
their considerations cross-country. A total of 274 workers gave an
explanation for their decision, and 278 explained what factors would
have to be present in the case for them to change their decision.
Interestingly, workers in these three child welfare systems present
rather similar reasons for suggesting an adoption for Benjamin.
5.1. Reasons for adoption
There are eightmain justifications that childwelfareworkers give for
suggesting adoption, and we have labelled them as follows: “parental
behaviour”, “permanency for Benjamin”, “Benjamin's attachment to his
foster parents”, “parents lack of visitation”, “Benjamin's needs”; “early
placement and young age”, “Time, the duration Benjamin has been in
foster care”, and “Benjamin is wanted by his foster parents”. In Table 3,
an overview of the major justifications given regarding Benjamin's
adoption is provided.
5.1.1. Parental behaviour
Clearly, parental behaviour, as described in the vignette, is the most
common justification (68%) for suggesting Benjamin's adoption, and a
short explanation from an American worker is illustrative: “parents
inflicting great physical abuse, still using drugs and no visitation” (P3:
128:128). There are three aspects to the ‘parental behaviour’ account.
First, the biological parents continued substance abuse is a major con-
cern that workers mention, and by this they mean that biological pa-
rents have not rehabilitated, have not been able to change their lives,
have not used the opportunity and time to access services and have a
lifestyle that is detrimental to Benjamin's well being. A second factor is
the low probability that the parents will be able to stop misusing sub-
stances. A third factor is the abuse that the biological parents inflicted
on Benjamin as a baby. For someworkers, this factor tells them how the
parents might treat the child, and others point to the fact that Benjamin
is a vulnerable boy with special needs due to the abuse his parents
inflicted on him.
We identify that the majority of American workers (77%) use
parental behaviour as a justification versus 64% in Norway and 61% in
England.
5.1.2. Permanency
Permanency is the second most common justification. About 56%
of the workers gave this reason and included direct statements about
permanency and the certainty with which Benjamin can predict his
future within this family.
“Adoption would achieve permanency, which is in the child's best
interests.” (English worker P2: (82:82))
Sixty-two percent of English workers mentioned permanence,
versus about 51% of the Norwegian and American workers.
5.1.3. Attachment
‘Attachment’ is mentioned by 40% of workers as a justification for
adoption, and they emphasise Benjamin's attachment to his foster
parents and the emotional bonds that they have established. Some
workers also contrast this attachment with the lack of attachment
between Benjamin and his biological parents. The following quote
from a Norwegian worker illustrates this justification:
“The child's attachment to the foster home and his need for predictability,
stability and continuity.” (P1: (10:10))
The Norwegian workers emphasise this reason to a higher degree
(57%) than either the English (31%) or American workers (37%).
5.1.4. Visitation
Visitation is mentioned almost as often as attachment, and 39% of
workers mention this justification. Visitation includes statements
about the biological parents' lack of contact with Benjamin after he
was placed in a foster home, and workers find this indicative of their
lack of interest in and poor attachment to Benjamin.
“Because the parents have not participated in any services to reunify
with the child, nor have they exercised their rights to visitation, it
appears that the most beneficial scenario for the child would be a
permanent, loving home with the foster parents, who have already
expressed a willingness to adopt.” (P3: (136:136))
5.1.5. Needs
Many workers (34%) also mentioned reasons that we have cate-
gorised as ‘needs’, which includes the child's present and future needs
and his foster parents' ability to meet them. Also present is the senti-
ment that Benjamin has special needs because of the harm inflicted on
him as a baby.
“Benjamin is doing well in his placement, and it appears to meet all of
his needs.” (English worker P2: (170:170))
“The child is special needs.” (P3: (16:16))
The cross-country difference for “needs” is that 27% of the American
workers mention this versus 38% of the Norwegians and 37% of the
English.
5.1.6. Time
About 24% of the workers mention ‘time’ as a reason for suggesting
adoption, and refer to either the eventual rehabilitation of the parents
or years that Benjamin has lived with his foster parents. English and
American workers note that Benjamin should have been in the process
of being adopted long ago, whereas only 12% of the Norwegianworkers
Table 3
Major justifications for deciding to initiate an adoption, cross-country differences marked
with yellow (N=232).
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mention “time” as a consideration. The following quote from an English
worker captures the main sentiments expressed:
“Carers who have cared for a child for this length of time can approach
the courts for an adoption order.” (P2: (180:180))
5.1.7. Early placement
Considerations regarding Benjamin's placement in foster care at
an early age and his status as a young child are gathered in the
category “early placement/young child”. Twenty-eight percent of
workers provide this as an argument for adoption, and the American
workers stress this point more often, 35% compared to 26% and 24% in
Norway and England, respectively.
5.1.8. Wanted
Finally, one-fifth of the workers who suggested adoption mention
the importance of Benjamin being ‘wanted’. In particular, American
workers mention that it is important that Benjamin's foster parents
wish to adopt him. Thirty-two percent use this argument, a fact that
may reflect a higher awareness of the difficulties finding adoptive
parents in the U.S.
Overall, the picture that we see emerge is that about half of the
sample identifies ‘parental behaviour’ and ‘permanency’ as their main
reasons for suggesting adoption for Benjamin. Additionally, Norwegian
workers regard ‘Benjamin's attachment to his foster parents’ as a third
reason. When we examine co-occurrences of the reasons that workers
use to justify their decision, we find that ‘parental behaviour’ in com-
bination with either permanency (37%) or visitation (36%) exceeds
more than a third of all workers. The share of workers who mention
both permanency and attachment is 27%, and the co-occurrence is 34%
among Norwegian workers. One-fifth of the workers gave three differ-
ent reasons for their decision. Twenty one percent provided ‘parental
behaviour’, ‘visitation’ and ‘permanency’ as the justifications for adop-
tion, while 20% provided ‘parental behaviour’, ‘permanency’ and
‘attachment’. These triple co-occurrences are strikingly similar in all of
the countries studied, and there is a variance of between 19 and 22% in
both combinations. To gain a more complete picture of the workers'
justifications, we also asked themwhat elements of the case could have
been different to convince them to make an alternate decision.
5.1.9. What could have been different?
When asked about what factors in the case could have been different
to convince the workers to choose another decision, the focus shifts to
the parents. There are two main justifications that workers in all three
countries emphasise, andwe have labelled them ‘change’ and ‘visitation’.
In addition, one-fifth of the workers mention ‘time’ as a factor.
First, the code ‘change’ reflects the parents' willingness and capacity
to change their behaviour, and their ability to demonstrate their capacity
and desire to be parents to the three-year old. Sixty percent of workers
provide ‘change’ as a condition for considering another decision. Second,
and closely related to the change dimension, is the code ‘visitation’.
Approximately 38% of the workers mention that the parent's fulfilment
of the visitation agreement would have been an indication of their
interest in Benjamin. The co-occurrence of ‘change’ and ‘visitation’ is
32%, which means that over half of the workers who indicated that
change is necessary also require that visitations needed to take place.
American workers more often stress this combination (38%) than
Norwegian and English workers at 28% and 30%, respectively.
A third justification stressed by 22% of the workers is “time”,
which is indicated by two factors. First, the parents should have made
changes at an earlier stage by either entering a drug rehabilitation
programme or maintaining a significant period of sobriety. Second,
many workers point to the length of time that Benjamin has already
spent in foster care and indicate that given this lengthy period, there
is little that can be done even if the parents did show signs of change.
An interesting difference between the countries is evident, as 27% of
the American workers versus 14% of the Norwegian workers stress
time as an important factor for making an alternate decision. The
following quote from an American worker illustrates what could have
been different and confirms the importance of time:
“If the parents had been clean and very involved with the child, then
maybe they would have a standing to get their child back. However,
because so much time has passed, it is by law that the child be given
permanency. Thus, he should have already been adopted.” (P3:
(167:167))
A quarter of the workers who stress change also indicated that this
change would have had to happen at an earlier point in time. Several
workers from the U.S. (17%) and England (20%) state that there is
nothing in this case that would have made them change their
decision regarding Benjamin's adoption, while only 3% of Norwegian
workers indicate this. This point is closely related to those workers
who stress that the time that has passed makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to consider another decision, and is also related to those
that stress that the parents must have shown signs of change at an
earlier stage.
What is clear from the above is that given the time frame the
vignette describes, the parents' substance abuse and lack of ability
and/or will to rehabilitate, together with the lack of visitation and
bonding with Benjamin, constitute the main justifications that the
sample of workers give for suggesting adoption.
5.2. Why would (Norwegian) workers not recommend an adoption for
Benjamin?
Of all the workers surveyed for the study, it is primarily the Norwe-
gian workers that do not recommend Benjamin's adoption (N=42,
41%). Thus, the following discussionwill concentrate on the Norwegian
workers and their justifications for keeping Benjamin in foster care.
Thirty-six workers explained their decision. There are two primary
reasons provided for continuing Benjamin's foster care placement. First,
64% of workers state that the mother's lack of ‘consent’ is decisive.
Second, 44% state that there are policy issues that make initiating an
adoption difficult, which include the lack of political support, legal
feasibility, and precedent for forced adoptions in Norway. The following
quote demonstrated these sentiments:
“In Norway, it's not common that children in foster homes are adopted
by their foster parents, as, for example, in England. I would not have
started proceedings for adoption without consent from the biological
mother.” (P1: (42:42))
Another dimension that we touched upon above is the time factor,
as workers worry that parents are not given sufficient time to get back
on their feet. Several workers (31%) stated that they would spend time
talking to the mother, either to gain her consent for an adoption or to
give her another chance at ‘becoming a mother’ to Benjamin. The fol-
lowing quote illustrates aspects of the need for consent in combination
with both policy concerns and a strategy for gaining the mother's
consent:
“It's important that themother is heard. One cannot start proceedings for
an adoption without the mother after only 2.5 years.” (P1: (130:130))
5.2.1. What factors may have convinced the workers to support adoption?
Of the 40 workers that provided factors that may have convinced
them to support rather than oppose adoption, approximately half of
them stated that the mother's consent would have altered their
decision. The rest of the workers provided varying accounts of what
factors would have to be different. Many did not refer to the option of
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adoption but instead gave accounts, similar to those given by workers
that supported adoption, for what would have to be different for
them to reunify Benjamin with his parents.
6. Discussion
The findings from this vignette study show us that there are many
cross-country similarities and some differences in how child welfare
workers justify their decisions. In this section, we will discuss some
factors thatmay shed light on the similarities and differences in decision-
making processes. Although the majority of workers would suggest
adoption in this case about foster parents wishing to adopt their foster
child, 41% of workers from Norway would decide against adoption. We
believe that the policy differences between the countries examined are
themost important factors for understanding this difference. In Norway,
there are no timelines or guidelines that “instruct” or direct workers to
take steps towards adoption proceedings. Thus, the more surprising
finding is that 60% of the Norwegian workers recommended adoption.
To better understand this phenomenon, we need to examine the ac-
counts that workers give for and against adoption.
The analysis shows that most workers in the three countries eval-
uated point to several conditions in the case that defined their decision.
The most important factor is the ‘parents' behaviour’, and we see that
workers also state that if the parents' behaviour was to change, then
their decisionmight also change. The second and thirdmostmentioned
justifications for adoption are child focused and are about ‘permanency’
and ‘attachment’ relations for the three-year-old. The fourth justifica-
tion for adoption is parents' failure to visit the boy, and if the parents
had visited the child, then decision regarding adoption may have been
different. The following two reasons workers give for adoption recom-
mendations are clearly child focused: Benjamin's ‘needs’ and his ‘early
placement and age’. The two last accounts relate to the time factor, and
the fact that the foster parents ‘want’ to adopt the boy. There are studies
about the decision-making processes of childwelfareworkers, but there
are few cross-country studies and none about forced adoption.We see a
balance between child-focused and adult focused factoring in the
reasoning that we believe reflect the developing child-centrism in
modern child welfare systems (Gilbert et al., 2011). The traditional
parent-focused approach that theseworkers displayed also appears in a
study by DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, and Soto (2006). A sample of 51
American child welfare workers identified the significant factors in
placing a child outside of the home. The study asked workers to assess
35 risk/well-being factors and identified two primary factors: parents'
boundary settings towards an abuser and parental motives (cf.
Christiansen & Anderssen, 2010).
Although there are clear similarities in how the countries view this
case, there are also some differences that require examination. The
American workers distinguished themselves by puttingmore emphasis
on three factors: ‘parental behaviour’, the fact that the child is ‘wanted’
and his ‘early placement and young age’. Less emphasis was placed on
the child's ‘needs’. The English workers distinguished themselves with
the issue of ‘permanency’, and the Norwegian workers put more em-
phasis on ‘attachment’, but less on ‘time’. We believe that most of these
differences are related to systemdifferences, although there are similar-
ities between England and Norway that require additional explanation.
The ‘child protection’ system, represented by the USA and England
(Gilbert et al., 2011), is a system designed to protect children from
risk and harm rather than to promote childhood development. As
such, it makes sense that American workers are more concerned with
parental behaviour than with the child's needs. Further, the strict
timelines that the American system uses for children placed outside
of the home make the comparatively bigger role of ‘early placement
and age’ more understandable. Finally, the emphasis on the three-
year-old being wanted by his foster parents may be due to challenges
in recruiting good and stable foster parents in the American foster
and adoption system (Berrick & Skivenes, 2012).
The English workers' emphasis on permanency and their agree-
ment with the Norwegian workers regarding ‘needs’ indicates the
turn the English child welfare system has taken from a pure child
protection system (cf. Parton, 2009; Parton & Berridge, 2011) to a
family service or child-focused orientation (Gilbert et al., 2011). The
English Public Law Outline 2008 (PLO) is also explicitly concerned
with permanency considerations, and, as such, the English workers
are in line with existing guidelines.
The particular focus on ‘attachment’ among Norwegian workers
may be a reflection of the child-centric orientation that characterises
the Norwegian child welfare system (Kriz & Skivenes, in press;
Skivenes, 2011). The child's attachments are given a lot of weight in
questions of removal and reunification, and attachment is an
important factor when the child's attachment is to his or her foster
parents. The comparatively lower emphasis Norwegian workers put
on time may best be understood by the lack of guidelines and policy
attention this theme has had in the Norwegian child welfare system.
We believe that the orientation of the Norwegian child welfare
system, traditionally focused on family services, sheds light on the
finding that 41% of workers do not suggest adoption for Benjamin. The
system is set up to provide services to families and is intended to help
parents become sustainable again. This is also reflected in the workers'
statements suggesting that Norwegian policy does not promote adop-
tion. At the same time, we believe that an emerging child-centric
orientation, in combination with professional knowledge about the
benefits for adopted children, explains the high number of workers that
suggest adoption.
For those that do not recommend adoption, more than half say that
their decisions are due to a lack of consent from the biological mother. If
the mother had changed her position and given consent, most workers
would have considered adoption. In a Norwegian study published in
1998, Christiansen, Havnen and Havik examined 90 child welfare referral
case files from four agencies and interviews with 27 case workers and
found that when parental cooperation and consent were lacking, even in
serious cases, workers showed a strong reluctance to forward the cases to
the courts. Bunkholdt and Grinde (2004) found that child welfare
workers would use strategic means, and sometimes threats, to gain
consent and cooperation fromparentswhen trying to determinewhether
to place a child in out-of-home care. Bunkholdt (2006) relates thisfinding
to the insecurities workers face when considering whether their decision
will stand up in court and their desire to avoid the feeling of defeat after
failing to receive the court's approval. Such tactical considerations could
also be seen as pragmatic because the court has been very restrictive
regarding forced adoption (Skivenes, 2010). Another Norwegian study
examined the forced commitment of substance abusers to treatment
centres (Lundeberg, Mjåland, Søvig, Nilssen, & Ravneberg, 2010) and
generally showed little use of force but nevertheless a marked increase
between 2001 and 2009. Our findings agree with the major findings
described above. The lack of consent is similar to the general lack of clarity
about what constitutes sufficient grounds for a given child protection
measure, in our case, the use of forced adoption. The fact thatworkers are
split 60/40 on whether to initiate adoption may be a strong indicator of
this lack of clarity. Furthermore, we also find that there is uncertainty
regarding the interpretation of the law, and a sense that application of the
law is strict, therefore making it difficult to gain court approval for
adoption. This strict interpretation may also create strong incentives for
workers to attempt to gain parental consent before making a final
decision, as indicated by the fact that 31% of Norwegianworkers who did
not recommend an adoption stated that they would have further
conversations with the parents before making a final decision.
7. Conclusion
Forced adoption is one of the most serious interventions the state
can enact with respect to a parent and a child. A decisive component for
the legitimacy of state power is measured in the quality of justifications
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given for an intervention. Our analysis of child welfare workers ac-
counts for recommendations for and against adoption and shows us
that the type of child welfare system and its policy guidelines play a
major role in the recommendations of frontline child welfare workers.
This finding indicates that workers follow the democratically legiti-
mized instructions for interventions, and more so in England and the
U.S. However, we also notice that workers have elaborate rationales for
their decisions and demonstrate their in-depth knowledge of the rea-
sons for adoption policies and permanency considerations for children
that are looked after. The findings indicate that American and English
workers have a clearer perception of the role of public and private
responsibility for children and the state's role in a long-term placement
situation, than their Norwegian peers. However, the political climate in
Norway in the last three years suggests a turn towards increased use of
adoptions in the child welfare system. In 2009, this was formulated as a
political aim (Ot.prp. No. 69, 2008–2009, p. 33–35). While not wanting
to change the law guiding adoptions in the child welfare act the gov-
ernment pledged to provide more precise guidelines to aid child wel-
fare workers in making best-interests considerations on adoptions, in
order to make it easier to forward cases for individual workers (Ot.prp.
No. 69, 2008–2009, p. 34). In addition the government introduced a
higher legal threshold for parents to demand reunification (Ot.prp. No.
69, 2008–2009, p. 25). Also, in 2010Norway introduced open adoptions
in childwelfare cases (Prop. 7 L, 2009–2010),which is intended tomake
best interests decisions easier for the courts when the dilemma is
between the need for permanency and the child's need for some contact
with birth parents. However, in light of the government's previously
stated goal of increasing the use of adoptions it should also be seen as a
way of making adoptions a more attractive and less severe solution
in difficult cases. In addition the two latest reports ordered by the
Norwegian Ministry of children, equality and social inclusion, the 2011
“Report of the Child Protection Panel” (p. 47) and the more extensive
2012 Official Norwegian Report — ‘NOU, 2012:5’ “Better protection of
children's development” (p. 133), both recommend that in cases where
children are placed at a young age and the placement is expected to be
long-term adoption must be considered within specified time-frames
and it must be clarified whether or not the foster parents are willing to
adopt at time of placement. What will become of these recommenda-
tions remains to be seen.
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